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This dissertation is my analysis on how and why a particular portrait 
of a national past was reconstructed and disseminated in close connection 
with the political elite’s interests of the times especially focusing on the 
portrait of the Japanese Occupation of Singapore. I started such a project due 
to my concern with the perpetuating war memory controversy between the 
Japanese and the peoples from other Asian countries. In Japan, the Second 
World War is generally remembered as suffering inflicted on Japanese 
civilians that include American indiscriminate air-raids on Tokyo and Osaka, 
atomic-bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and children’s evacuation to 
Japan’s countryside. Atrocities committed by the Japanese Army such as the 
Nanjing Massacre, Unit 731, and the Sook Ching Massacre are not major 
components of war memory transmitted to younger Japanese. On the other 
hand, the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre occupy major 
parts of the transmitted war memories for younger generations in China and 
Singapore, respectively. The problem here is that each people remembers 
and passes down their own suffering but is relatively ignorant of another 
people’s pain. What I tried to reveal in this dissertation was that how such a 
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‘self-centred’ or patriotic understanding of the war was reconstructed and 
disseminated for what purpose in the context of the nation-state system. 
My concern with war memory issues was triggered by my personal 
experiences. In 1994, I travelled to Beijing to attend a one-year Chinese 
language course during which I had many opportunities to discuss ‘history 
issues’ with my Chinese and Korean friends. Luckily, our debates were 
always not so heated because at that time I was a university student of 
international relations, therefore, had basic knowledge of various atrocities 
committed by the Japanese. Once they found that I knew those atrocities and 
did not justify the Japanese invasion, they no longer continued the discussion. 
However, a big surprise to me was that almost all Chinese university 
students I met at that time had only knowledge and image of the Japanese 
during the Second World War but were totally ignorant of the present Japan. 
For example, nobody knew that a post-war Japan had maintained a peace 
constitution with relatively small armed forces only for its self-defence. I felt 
that the transmitted war memory to the younger Chinese was selective and 
one-sided. 
Another incident that made me look into war memory issues 
happened in Japan. In 2001, as a staff member of an NGO in charge of 
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conducting international friendship programmes, I was writing a report 
based on feedback forms from participants of a Japan-Korea friendship 
programme. In many forms, I found Japanese participants’ comments like: 
“In discussion sessions, I could not discuss history matters with Korean 
counterparts due to a lack of historical knowledge. I felt awkward with 
them.” Having read many comments of this kind, I thought that ignorance of 
another country’s history and memory could constitute an obstacle even to 
the success of a youth friendship programme. Then, I deepened my 
conviction that if we would leave such war memory or historiographical 
gaps between peoples in Asia, it would invite unnecessary conflicts among 
them in the era of globalisiation.  
In 2002, I returned to my academic life by moving to Singapore. A 
reason for choosing Singapore was that despite the fact that Singapore 
suffered a harsh Japanese invasion and occupation, unlike China and Korea, 
younger Singaporeans hardly had anti-Japanese sentiment; I was interested 
in how and why this was possible. Although I do not yet have a clear answer 
to this question, what I can say now is that the transmitted war memory to 
younger Singaporeans is very different from the one passed down to younger 
Chinese and Koreans. 
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In the case of Singapore, according to Diana Wong, war memory was 
once ‘suppressed’ soon after its independence in 1965 and later ‘produced’ 
on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Second World War. Having 
encountered this article, I became aware of the fact that war memory was in 
part reproduced in close connection with the political elite’s interests of the 
times. Thereafter, I decided to do a closer analysis on how and why the 
Singapore government reconstructed and disseminated the official war 
memory through history education and war commemoration. 
As implied above, my intention to write this dissertation is to 
contribute to finding a solution to war memory controversy by revealing the 
process of how and why a government reconstructed a national past and 
disseminated a particular portrait of the war among people. It is not my 
intension to hang the responsibility of war memory controversy only on the 
Singapore government or any other governments of Asia. What I want to 
argue here is that, as will be discussed in this dissertation in more detail, the 
perpetuation of war memory gaps between different nations is caused not 
only by contextual factors but by structural factors (anarchical nature of the 
nation-state system and the mechanism that each nation-state unites people). 
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I wrote this dissertation chiefly because such structural factors tend to be 
overlooked in current discussion on war memory controversy in East Asia. 
Lastly, I would like to express my gratitude to all those in the 
Department of Japanese Studies and, particularly, my research committee 
members who supervised my project without which this dissertation could 
not be materialised. I would like to thank Dr. Simon Avenell, my main 
supervisor, for reading a few versions of the manuscripts and giving me 
pithy advice despite the fact that the topic of my research was not his 
specialty. I would like to thank Dr. Teow See Heng for his constant support 
and help to improve the manuscripts. He gave me detailed and constructive 
comments and introduced me many books and articles relevant to this 
dissertation regardless of the fact that he was not a main supervisor. Also, I 
am grateful to Dr. Timothy Amos and Dr. Timothy Tsu for giving me good 
advices since I started this project. I cannot fail to express my gratitude to Dr. 
Kevin Blackburn (National Institute of Education, Singapore) who shared 
with me information of primary sources regarding this project and 
introduced me key persons who were involved in Singapore’s war 
commemoration programmes. Many thanks are due to Mr. George Yeo, Mr. 
Kwa Chong Guan, Mr. Pitt Kuan Wah, Ms. Tan Teng Teng, Dr. John Miksic, 
 vi 
Dr. Yong Mun Cheong and Dr. Doreen Tan who shared with me their 
precious experience during the period when they were involved in the 
commemoration projects or history syllabus revisions. Finally, millions of 
thanks are due to my family members for their unchanging support to me. 
This dissertation could not be materialised without any of the above people’s 
support and help. Again, I would like to express my gratitude to all those 
who gave me a help to make this dissertation possible. 
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Summary 
In the current political structure of the nation-state system, a nation-state 
cannot survive without inculcating national identity and patriotism in the minds 
of people, and among its major means of inculcation are history education and 
war commemoration. Within such a structure, present interests and aspirations 
of the state, or the political elite, define the official interpretation and 
representation of a national past and decide whether they actively disseminates it 
to the people.  
In Singapore, the government, since its independence until the 1970s, was 
indifferent to teach young people its national past because the political elite 
considered that history teaching was detrimental to Singapore’s unity. However, 
due to socio-political changes in the 1970s and 1980s, they started to emphasise 
the importance of history teaching, which laid the groundwork for state-led war 
commemoration programmes in the 1990s that aimed at young Singaporeans’ 
remembering of the Second World War. 
Between 1991 and 1995, the government, in cooperation with related 
organisations, organised commemoration activities to mark the 50th anniversary 
of the war, such as war exhibitions, war plaques, history camps, and 
 x 
commemorative ceremonies. In these activities, the political elite intended to 
spread the message of ‘don’t forget to fight for Singapore; be prepared for war 
even in peacetime’ and highlighted a historical analysis that the British were 
easily defeated because of their unpreparedness for the Japanese invasion that 
started in 1941. In addition, they portrayed the Japanese Occupation as the 
starting point of a local nationalism, painted the period as that of ‘bravery, 
patriotism, and sacrifice’, and accentuated the role of local war heroes, albeit 
such political intentions were not always exactly reflected in the war exhibitions. 
The driving force of such state-led programmes was created from the 
interplay between contextual and structural factors. Firstly, the political elite 
were concerned about the danger that the end of the Cold War would make more 
Singaporeans complacent in national defence. Under such circumstances, 
instead of communist threat, the lesson from the British defeat was exploited as 
an alternative theory to justify Singapore’s burdensome defence policies. In this 
context, the war commemoration programmes highlighted the importance of 
Singapore’s independence, defence, and patriotism. 
Secondly, such state-led programmes were needed because of the anarchical 
nature of the international system in which war was still not totally denied as a 
method of conflict resolution. Due to such a structure of the international system 
 xi 
each nation-state needed defence forces and patriotism. It was in such an 
international structure that the Singapore government used the opportunity of the 
50th anniversary to convince the people of the necessity of strong defence and 
patriotism even after the end of the Cold War. 
Lastly, there is a structure or mechanism that a nation-state unites people by 
inculcating national identity and patriotism in the minds of them; if people do 
not think themselves as the members of a nation, such a nation would fall apart.  
Due to the above two structural factors, a nation-state always needs to inculcate 
national identity and patriotism in the minds of people. Within this structure, 
contextual factors, such as the present interests and aspirations of the political 
elite, affect the ways in which the inculcation is conducted and how a national 
past is portrayed.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1. Patriotic education and war commemoration in the 1990s 
This dissertation looks into the question of how and why different portraits 
of the Second World War have been actively, or inactively, disseminated to 
Singaporean youth in different times through history education and war 
commemoration. Also, this thesis examines how and why the Singapore 
government construct particular portraits and message pertaining to the war 
through state-led programmes to mark the 50th anniversary of the Second World 
War between 1991 and 1995. The message that the government intended to 
spread was, in one sentence, ‘don’t forget to fight for Singapore; be prepared for 
war even in peacetime’. The political elite, through the war commemoration 
programmes, wanted to remind the youth of the importance of Singapore’s 
independence, defence, and patriotism. In other words, they conducted a kind of 
patriotic education under the name of war commemoration. 
Such a move was not only seen in Singapore but in China. In the 1990s, the 
Jiang Zemin administration launched a campaign of patriotic education (aiguo 
zhuyi jiaoyu) to remind people of China’s modern history, portrayed as a 
victorious story of the Chinese Communist Party. Issued by the Party on 23 
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August 1994, its purposes were, according to the ‘patriotic education 
enforcement scheme’ (aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shishi gangyao), “to promote the spirit 
of China, to strengthen the solidarity of the Chinese people, and to inculcate 
national pride in the minds of people of China” by “particularly letting people 
understand the exalted spirit and glorious achievement of the Chinese 
Communist Party, which led all people in China to bravely fight for the building 
of a new China.” 1  Such a campaign was launched because, according to 
Tomoyuki Kojima, there was a need to unite people by using the slogan of 
patriotism, instead of using outdated communism, to deal with social instability 
after the Tiananmen Square Incident and the collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991. Also, there was a need to 
justify the rule of the Communist Party by disseminating the portrait of its 
brilliant past, of which probably the most important one was the role it played in 
the Chinese victory over the invading Japanese. 2 
In 1994, ‘the framework for patriotic education’ (aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu 
gangling) was enacted whereby a number of ‘patriotic education stations’ (aiguo 
zhuyi jiaoyu jidi) were selected. The framework at the same time obliged all 
                                                           
1
 “Aiguo Zhuyi Jiaoyu Shishi Gangyao [The implementation outline of patriotic education]”, Renmin 
Ribao, 6 Sep 1994. 
2
 Kojima Tomoyuki, Kukkisuru Chūgoku: Nihon Wa Dō Chūgoku To Mukiaunoka? [Rising China: 
How does Japan deal with China?] (Tokyo: Ashi Shobō, 2005), 35. 
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primary and secondary schools to visit those stations. Subsequently, out of a 
long list of patriotic education stations, 200 stations were selected as ‘model 
stations’ (shifan jidi) between 1997 and 2001. Those model stations comprise 
museums, memorials, graves of martyrs, monuments of the Revolutionary War, 
historical heritage, and scenic sites, including the Tiananmen Square, National 
Museum of China, and the Military Museum of Chinese People’s Revolution 
(Zhonguo Renmin Geming Junshi Bowuguan). Also, at the provincial and 
municipal levels, patriotic education stations were independently selected, such 
as the Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, 
Xibaipo Memorial, and the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance 
against Japanese Aggression. 3 When Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited the 
latter museum located near the Marco Polo Bridge in Beijing on the 50th 
anniversary of the end of the Second World War, he emphasised the important 
role of patriotic education stations, saying: “We must continue history education 
on a daily basis especially toward the young by fully exploiting patriotic 
education stations such as the war museum and monument in the Marco Polo 
Bridge.” 4 
                                                           
3
 Ibid., 35, 210-212. 
4
 Renmin Ribao, 16 Aug 1995. 
 4 
In Japan, the 1990s saw the rise of historical revisionism that heavily 
stressed patriotism and strongly criticised the Japanese mainstream 
historiography as ‘masochistic’ on the ground that, according to revisionists, it 
was created by the victors of the Second World War and supported by the leftist 
historians. 5 For example, the Association for Advancement of Unbiased View 
of History (Jiyūshugi Shikan Kenkyūkai), a rightist civil organisation, criticised 
the mainstream history to be leftist as follows: 
 
Many history textbooks used in schools across Japan are written based on the class 
struggle historiography [or the Marxist historiography] - understanding the state as 
an apparatus to oppress people and praising the figures to resist against the state as 
heroes. At the same time, those textbooks portray a pre-modern Japan to be inferior 
to China and Korea in East Asia while denouncing a modern Japan as an aggressor 
to ravage its Asian neighbours. 
Believing that we must slough off such a one-sided historiography and reconstruct a 
right history education, a group of teachers and educators concerned established the 
Association for Advancement of Unbiased View of History in 1995… In 1996, the 
                                                           
5
 Sven Saaler, Politics, Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Controversy and 
Japanese Society (Munchen: IUDICIUM Verlag GmbH, 2005), 23. 
 5 
Association strongly criticised the move that all history textbooks for secondary 
schools began covering a fabricated story - wartime comfort women were carted off 
by the state of Japan. This triggered the formation of the Japanese Society for 
History Textbook Reform in the next year. 6 
 
The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii Rekishi 
Kyōkasho O Tsukuru-kai) was formed in 1997. The Society shared the view of 
the Association with regard to recognising the necessity to ‘correct’ the current 
‘masochistic’ history education. The Society’s prospectus states:   
 
Especially in the field of modern history, the Japanese are treated like criminals 
who must continue apologising for generations to come. After the end of the Cold 
War, this masochistic tendency further increased, and in current history textbooks 
the propaganda of former war enemies is included and treated as if it were the 
truth.7  
                                                           
6
 “Jiyūshugi Shikan Kenkyūkai No Mokuteki [The Purpose of the Association for Advancement of 
Unbiased View of History]”,  Jiyūshugi Shikan Kenkyūkai [The Association for Advancement of 
Unbiased View of History], accessed 12 Jan 2012, http://www.jiyuushikan.org/tokai.html 
7
 Saaler, Politics, Memory and Public Opinion, 40; “Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho O Tsukuru-kai 
Shuisho [The Prospectus for the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform]”, Atarashii Rekishi 
 6 
 
This prospectus implies that the Society was formed to counter the ‘masochistic’ 
moves after the end of the Cold War such as the Japanese government’s 
acknowledgement of the state-run comfort women in 1993 (Kōno Statement), 
Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa’s total acceptance of Japan’s war 
in Asia-Pacific as a war of aggression in the same year, Prime Minister Tomiichi 
Murayama’s apology for Japan’s invasion and colonial rule in 1995, and the 
inclusion of wartime comfort women into history textbooks in the latter half of 
the 1990s. The ‘propaganda of former war enemies’ in the prospectus seems to 
be the Allied Powers’ wartime propaganda such as portraying the war as a just 
war between the right liberals and the cruel fascists. Instead of such a portrait 
authored by the victors, members of the Society claim the war to be a war of 
liberation. One of the influential proponents of the Society, Yoshinori 
Kobayashi, comments in his popular comic, On War (Sensō-ron), as follows:       
 
At that time, Asians did not even believe in their dreams that they could win against 
the Whites. They were completely subdued and living in slavish conditions… 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Kyōkasho O Tsukuru-kai [The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform], accessed 10 Jan 
2012, http://www.tsukurukai.com/02_about_us/01_opinion.html 
 7 
Somebody had to prove that it was possible to fight Euro-American white 
imperialism. This is what Japan has done.  8    
 
A motivation for such a claim, for Kobayashi, displays a lack of patriotism 
among the Japanese. In fact, a survey conducted between 1989 and 1991 
revealed that only ten per cent of Japanese reported a readiness to fight for their 
country in the event of war. This number was not only considerably lower than 
its neighbouring countries such as China (92%), Korea (85%), and Russia (67%) 
but was also the lowest among the 37 countries surveyed. 9 The reason for the 
lack of Japanese patriotism, manifested in their unwillingness to fight for their 
country, is, in Kobayashi’s argument, chiefly attributed to the one-sided and 
guilt-laden historical narrative prevailed in post-war Japan. Kobayashi claims 
that the propagation of a victorious history of Japan, which emphasises only the 
positive aspects but covers up the negative side, can counter this lack of 
patriotism.10  
                                                           
8
 Kobayashi Yoshinori, Sensō-ron [On War] (Tokyo: Gentōsha, 1998), 31; Saaler, Politics, Memory 
and Public Opinion, 33. 
9
 Dentsū Sōken, 37kakoku ‘Sekai Kachikan Chōsa’ Repōto (Tokyo: Dentsū Sōken, 1995), 13. 
10
 Saaler, Politics, Memory and Public Opinion, 33. 
 8 
This view seems to be shared by other members of the Society. Its 
prospectus states that the purpose of establishing the Society is to create new 
history textbooks that “will offer a balanced and dignified portrait of Japan and 
the Japanese”, and they state that their “textbook enables children to take pride 
and responsibility in being Japanese…” 11 In short, the new history textbooks 
they produced were only a means to promote patriotism among the Japanese. 
On the other hand, some Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia, 
Vietnam, and Malaysia, did not actively commemorate the 50th anniversary of 
the Second World War to the end of promoting patriotism or nationalism 
because, according to Kevin Blackburn, the political elite in each country did 
not think that commemoration of the war was conducive to nation-building or 
national unity. 12 The Indonesian government did not actively commemorate the 
war in the Suharto era (1967-1998) because, Anthony Reid claims, the official 
history of Indonesia at that time strongly stressed the importance of the 
Indonesian Revolution and portrayed the pre-1945 past merely as prelude to the 
revolution, thus commemorating the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia as 
                                                           
11
 Saaler, Politics, Memory and Public Opinion, 40; “Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho O Tsukuru-kai 
Shuisho”. 
12
 Kevin Blackburn, “War memory and nation-building in Southeast Asia”, South East Asia Research 
18, no. 1 (2010): 5.  
 9 
turning points would risk diluting Indonesians’ role in revolutionary struggles 
for their independence and giving the Japanese a share in their glory. 13  
On a similar token, the Vietnamese government also did not conduct 
elaborate commemoration programmes of the Japanese Occupation because, 
according to Blackburn, the political elite judged that the remembering of the 
Communist Party’s ‘August Revolution’ – it proclaimed Vietnam’s 
independence a few weeks after Japan’s surrender in August 1945 – was more 
conducive to national unity rather than the recalling of the suffering and 
hardships during the occupation as well as rival nationalist groups that also 
strived for Vietnam’s independence under the Japanese rule. 14 The historical 
role for the independence played by those rival groups during the occupation 
was, according to Tran My-Van, suppressed by the Communist Party, 15 and this 
suggests that the political elite of Vietnam did not want to dilute their historical 
role for Vietnam’s independence due to the war commemoration that would 
inevitably entail shedding a light on the role played by rival nationalist groups.  
                                                           
13
 Anthony Reid, “Remembering and forgetting war and revolution”, in Beginning to Remember: The 
Past in The Indonesian Present, ed. Mary S. Zurbuchen (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
2005), 172-174. 
14
 Blackburn, “War memory and nation-building in Southeast Asia”, 26. 
15
 Tran My-Van, “Japan through Vietnamese eyes (1905-1945)”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 
30, no. 1 (1999): 139-146. 
 10 
The Malaysian government, at least at the national level, also did not mark 
the 50th anniversary. This was because, according to Cheah Boon Kheng, there 
was divisiveness about how to view the period of the Japanese Occupation 
among the major ethnic groups of the country: the Malays, the Chinese, and the 
Indians. During the occupation, an influential number of the Malays from the 
Kesatuan Melayu Muda [Union of Malay Youth] collaborated with the Japanese 
in hope of achieving Malaya’s independence, whereas the Chinese, such as those 
who supported the anti-Japanese movement in China and the members of the 
Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), strongly resisted against the 
Japanese. On the other hand, the Indians were involved in their cause of India’s 
liberation under Subahas Chandra Bose with the Japanese assistance. Such a 
divisiveness among the experiences of the major ethnic groups resulted in the 
absence of war commemoration at the national level in 1995. 16 
On the other hand, other Southeast Asian countries, such as Myanmar, the 
Philippines, and Singapore, actively commemorated the 50th anniversary of the 
war. On 27 March 1995, the 50th anniversary of the starting day of the Burma 
National Army’s resistance against the Japanese, General Than Shwe, the 
                                                           
16
 Cheah Boon Kheng, “The ‘blackout’ syndrome and the ghosts of World War II: the war as a 
‘divisive issue’ in Malaysia”, in Legacies of World War II in South and East Asia, ed. David Koh 
Wee Hock (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studeis, 2007): 47-59. 
 11 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, claimed that: “On 27 March 1945, 
our Tatmadaw [military] made it own decision and legitimately declared war 
and launched the Resistance. Therefore, this day was designated Armed Forces 
Day because it was the day attributes of a national army were attained and the 
Anti-fascist Resistance was launched.” 17  In the speech, he repeated the 
Tatmadaw’s history – although the Japanese initially supported an army set up 
by the Burmese nationalist movement, later they tried to reduce its size – and 
proclaimed the junta’s legitimacy to rule the nation as the vanguard of the 
modern Burmese nationalist movement. In the eyes of the junta, the military 
formed during the Japanese Occupation as the vanguard of the nationalist 
movement freed Burma from the Japanese and the British, and such a portrait of 
the wartime was disseminated on the occasion of the 50th anniversary. 18 
In the Philippines, 9 April – the day of the Filipino and American surrender 
to the Japanese on the Bataan Peninsula in 1942 – is commemorated as the Day 
of Valour every year and the President of the Philippines, or a high-ranking 
political leader, attends a national ceremony to remember the sacrifices of the 
war veterans and the suffering of the Filipino people during the Japanese 
                                                           
17
 New Light of Myanmar, 28 March 1995, cited in Blackburn, “War memory and nation-building in 
Southeast Asia”, 21. 
18
 Blackburn, “War memory and nation-building in Southeast Asia”, 21-22. 
 12 
Occupation. In the next year of the 50th anniversary of the fall of Bataan, 
President Fidel Ramos set up the National Heroes Committee to list up the 
national heroes who fought for the Philippines and its freedom. Included in the 
list were defenders of Bataan and Corregidor and ordinary Filipinos who fought 
against the Japanese to the end. In the Philippines, commemoration of the 
Second World War has been used to praise democratic ideal, to build a nation, 
and to serve the regime. 19 
Singapore’s elaborate programmes to commemorate the 50th anniversary of 
the Second World War can be contextualised in the moves of East and Southeast 
Asian countries that actively marked the anniversary, such as China, Myanmar, 
and the Philippines. Although domestic situations were different from country to 
country, it can be said that the political elite in those countries perhaps judged 
that war commemoration and patriotic education were conducive to national 
unity and served their present interests. Furthermore, at least in the cases of 
China and Singapore, the end of the Cold War prompted each country to make 
attempts to promote patriotism through history education and war 
commemoration. In the case of Singapore, as suggested above, the government 
actively disseminated the official interpretation and message pertaining to the 
                                                           
19
 Ibid., 10, 16-17. 
 13 
war – ‘be prepared for war even in peacetime’ – by referring to a historical 
lesson that Singapore fell due to the British’s unpreparedness, and, instead of 
communist threat, this lesson was used as a new explanation to justify 
Singapore’s burdensome defence posture. To this end, Singapore’s ministries, in 
cooperation with related organisations, held war exhibitions, erected war plaques, 
conducted history camps, and performed commemorative ceremonies despite the 
fact that the government, until the 1970s, was totally indifferent in transmitting 
its national past to the youth. This dissertation analyses the above state-led 
programmes as well as history education focusing on changes in the official 
portrait of the Second World War. 
 
2. Objective of the research and research questions 
The objective of this research is, as suggested above, to reveal how and why 
the Singapore government organised war commemoration activities to spread 
the official portrait and message concerning the war between 1991 and 1995. It 
further looks into the question of how and why different portraits of the war 
were actively, or inactively, disseminated in different times. 
 14 
After the British returned in 1945, different contents of history continued to 
be taught in Singapore’s schools of different language streams by the time that 
the Singapore government completed implementation of a common Malayanised 
history syllabus in the early 1960s. However, after the collapse of Singapore’s 
merger with Malaysia in 1965, the government stopped actively transmitting its 
past to the youth. In the 1980s, the political elite’s interest in history teaching 
resurged and, subsequently, the government actively spread the official portrait 
and message concerning the Second World War through various programmes to 
commemorate the 50th anniversary of the war. Some of the messages were, in 
1997, adopted as the NE (National Education) messages, which were and are 
more systematically sent to Singaporean students through history education and 
commemorative events after the launch of National Education. This study 
examines how and why the Singapore government had been inculcating national 
identity and patriotism in the minds of youth through history education and war 
commemoration from 1945 to 2005 by focusing on the portrayal changes of the 




3. Literature Review  
The literature examining the portrait of the Second World War in 
Singapore’s school textbooks is surprisingly scarce – as far as the author knows, 
there exist only two academic articles. One of the articles is Goh Chor Boon and 
Saravanan Gopinathan’s “History Education and the Construction of National 
Identity in Singapore, 1945-2000”, in which they analyse the portrait of the 
Japanese Occupation of Singapore (1942-1945) in history and social studies 
textbooks for secondary schools published between 1985 and 1999. According 
to the two authors, those textbooks place an emphasis on explaining the 
occupation years, which is depicted in emotive words, such as “Nightmare under 
the Japanese” and “The Syonan Years: Surviving the Horrors of War”. 20 
The textbooks also praise local war heroes, such as Lim Bo Seng and Adnan 
bin Saidi. They conclude that the textbooks stress the period of Japanese 
Occupation because “only the events of the war years could be used to rally 
Singaporeans for the creation of a collective memory that could serve to 
reinforce the nation-building process”. 21 Though the author, in principle, agrees 
to this analysis, their argument was made based on limited sources – only four 
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textbooks published between 1985 and 1999 – the portrait of the war years in 
other textbooks are unknown.  
The second known article dealing with the portrait of the Japanese 
Occupation is Goh Chor Boon’s “Things Japanese in Our History Syllabus: 
Implications for National Education”, in which he claims that, as mentioned 
above, the occupation years in history textbooks “is often described in extreme 
negative tone, with words such as ‘dark’ and ‘horror’”. 22 However, the article 
focuses on pointing out some problems of teaching about Japan in history 
classes and gives some suggestions. The article does not make any comparative 
analysis of the portrait of the war years in different school textbooks. In sum, 
how the Second World War is portrayed in different Singapore’s school 
textbooks is still largely unknown. This dissertation traces the changes in the 
portrait of the war in Singapore’s textbooks and war exhibitions since 1945 and 
reveals why the portrait of the same war change as time advances. 
Similarly, the literature on Singapore’s state-led activities to mark the 50th 
anniversary of the Second World War is also scarce, of which the most 
important work is probably Diana Wong’s “Memory Suppression and Memory 
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Production: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore.” 23  In her article, Wong 
argues that there was a stark contrast between the West and Southeast Asia in 
the ways that the governments commemorated the Second World War. In most 
parts of Southeast Asia, there was nothing to parallel the impressive state-led 
ceremonies and events to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of the war in 
Europe. 24  For instance, as Anthony Reid observed, there was the absence of 
public commemoration of the Japanese era in Indonesia despite its profound 
impact on the history of not only Indonesia but also the entire region of 
Southeast Asia. 25  Similarly, as Wong observed, the state of Malaysia also 
maintained a distanced silence on the Second World War. In contrast to such a 
distanced attitude toward the state-led war commemoration in most parts of 
Southeast Asia, Wong continues, the Singapore government mounted an 
elaborate programme to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end of the war 
to inculcate the war experience together with the official narrative – the 
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Japanese Occupation period as the starting point of local nationalism - into the 
people’s minds. 26  
Subsequently, Wong argues that the predominant narrative of the Second 
World War is humanity’s liberation from the fascists authored by the Allied 
Powers. 27  However, counter narratives also existed. During the war, the 
Japanese authored their version of narrative: the war as a holy war to liberate 
Asian peoples from the yoke of the White man. 28  Similarly, the Malayan 
Communist Party scripted a nation-centred narrative of liberation: the war as an 
opportunity for Malaya’s liberation from all forms of foreign rule. After the end 
of the war, the returned British authored an empire-centred narrative of 
liberation – the British as restorers of peace, freedom, and prosperity of the 
natives – and suppressed the counter war memories such as the British military 
defeat, the Malayan people’s disloyalty to the defeated colonial master, and the 
communists’ heroic resistance against the invaded Japanese. 29 
Similarly, Wong continues, the Singapore government also disavowed not 
only war memories but also its entire colonial past because, in the words of 
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Singapore’s then foreign minister Rajaratnam, “they [most Singaporeans] 
believed this island never really had a history worth remembering” on the 
ground that “all of that history was British colonial history.” 30  In fact, as 
discussed in chapter three, history teaching in primary schools was marginalised 
in the 1970s. However, since 1991, the year of the 50th anniversary of the 
Japanese invasion of Malaya and Singapore, the government started a flood of 
commemorative programmes and erected eleven plaques at war sites. 31 (These 
war sites and background information are introduced in Fortress Singapore: the 
Battlefield Guide, published by Singapore’s defence ministry, and Shinzō 
Hayase’s A Walk through War Memories in Southeast Asia. 32 ) Those war 
plaques comprised six battle sites, three civilian sites, and two memorial sites.33 
The building of the war plaques, Donna Brunero argues, reflected a “localisation 
of the war” which used to be understood as a war between the Japanese and 
British Empires; thus Singapore had been seen only as a battle field between 
them. The evidence of such an argument, according to Brunero, can be found in 
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the fact of the selection of some war sites of local participation as the sites to 
remember: the Battle for Pasir Panjang, in which the Malay Regiment put up a 
fierce fight against the invading Japanese: the Sook Ching Centre, which was 
one of the screening centres set up by the Japanese to eliminate the ‘anti-
Japanese Chinese’: and the Indian National Army (INA) Monument, which 
showed the location of the original monument erected in 1945 (though it was 
destroyed by the British upon their return to Singapore) to commemorate the 
war dead of INA soldiers fighting for the independence of India. 34 
At the unveiling ceremonies held at each of the eleven war sites, according 
to Wong, the message of the necessity of national defence as a lesson of the war 
was constantly reiterated in the official speeches and the mass media.35  For 
instance, Ong Chit Chung, a Member of Parliament (MP) and a military 
historian, said that the lesson of the war was that, “self-reliance, political will 
and unwavering commitment are the only ways to ensure the survival of a small 
country such as Singapore” because the British surrender proved that the 
defence of Singapore could not rely only on foreign powers. In addition, the 
brutal Japanese Occupation taught them that Singapore should seek 
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independence and determine their own future to avoid another foreign 
oppression. 36 
Robin Ramcharan sheds a light on the Japan factor behind the above move. 
Although he does not explicitly link the Japan factor, such as Japanese reluctant 
attitude toward the teaching of their country’s dark side of history to their young 
generation, to a motivation for the Singapore government to launch elaborate 
programmes to mark the 50th anniversary of the Second World War, his book 
shows that Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of Singapore and then Senior 
Minister, repeatedly stated his dissatisfaction at such a reluctant attitude of the 
Japanese whenever he had a chance to speak to the Japanese audience in the 
early 1990s. In May 1991, Lee attended a symposium sponsored by Asahi 
Shimbun, a major Japanese newspaper, and said: 
 
Repressed feelings brought into the open can relieve both sides from the burden of 
terrible memories and what is worse, suspicion about the future… Young Japanese 
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in schools must be part of this catharsis through their teachers and textbooks. When 
this is done, Japan will be able to play a fuller role for peace and stability. 37 
 
Similarly, Lee complained about Japanese history education when he visited 
Kyoto in February 1992: 
 
How you educate your children is your business. But if we see that you are glossing 
over the past, then we must come to some unfavourable conclusions… Because you 
are so secretive, because you do not want to talk about it, you leave people, 
especially your former victims, the impression that really there is no deep regret, no 
acknowledgement that it was wrong, only that you lost the war, which is not a good 
feeling to exist between the rest of East Asia and Japan. 38 
 
His concern behind such repeated assertions was that, despite the fact that Japan 
did not squarely admit its aggression and atrocities committed during Japan’s 
fifteen years war in the Asia-Pacific (1931-1945), it was going to accept its 
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greater military role abroad in response to the US’s request after the 1991 Gulf 
War: At that time, Japan’s failure to send its troops to Iraq was strongly 
criticised by the US, which led to the Japanese Diet’s approval of the 1992 
Peace-Keeping Operations Bill that enabled the Japanese Self-Defence Forces to 
serve the UN Peacekeeping Operations in Cambodia. Although Lee, in principle, 
supported Japan’s greater role to play on the international security issues, at the 
same time, he did not forget to add that the condition of accepting Japan’s 
greater military role in East Asia was its total acknowledgement of their 
wrongdoings in the past and its transmission to the younger generation. 39 
 It was in such a political climate that the Singapore government launched 
elaborate programmes to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Second 
World War between 1991 and 1995. The next question to be discussed should be 
the purpose of such state-led programmes: What were the reasons for the 
government’s attempts to reinsert the official war memory, which was once 
disavowed? On this point, Wong explains in such a way that “the reinstatement 
of history is closely related to a reconceptualisation of Singapore’s geography” 
from a fragile island severed from its economic hinterland due to separation 
from Malaysia into a prosperous global city connecting to the world economy. 
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This reconceptualisation of the national self, Wong continues, created a space 
for the reinsertion of national past and war memory. 40 This argument is parallel 
to Kwa Chong Guan’s analysis on the resurgence of Singapore’s history that 
began to take place in the 1980s. He argues that Singapore, after claiming its 
independence, had to “either ignore, deny or disprove 150 years of colonial 
history” which had proved Singapore’s total dependence on its hinterland, 
Malaya. 41 However, he concludes, if Singapore is seen not as an inseparable 
part of Malaya, but as a global city closely connecting with worldwide 
economies, “the smallness of Singapore, the absence of a hinterland, or raw 
materials and a large domestic market are not fatal or insurmountable 
handicaps.” 42 In short, since history proved by the 1980s that the separation 
from Malaysia was no longer a fatal handicap for Singapore to achieve its 
economic growth, there is no longer necessary to disavow the colonial past of its 
total dependence on Malaya. Although this account explains only a condition in 
which the Singapore government no longer had to disavow history, it does not 
                                                           
40Wong, “Memory Suppression and Memory Production”, 234. 
41
 Kwa Chong Guan, “Remembering Ourselves”, in Our Place in Time: Exploring Heritage and 
Memory in Singapore, ed. Kwok Kian-Woon et al. (Singapore: Singapore Heritage Society, 1999), 
50. 
42
 Kwa, “Remembering Ourselves”, 52; Kwa Chong Guan, “Writing Singapore’s History: From City-
State to Global City”, in S Rajaratnam on Singapore: From Ideas To Reality, ed. Idem (Singapore: 
World Scientific, 2007), 172-173. 
 25 
directly explain the reasons and motivations for the Singapore government to 
actively disseminate the official portrait of the war in the 1990s. 
Similarly, although Kevin Blackburn gives a following account of why the 
Singapore government conducted official war commemorations, as we will see 
below, it also does not directly explain the reasons for the commemoration 
activities launched in the 1990s. 
 
Remembering the victims of the sook ching massacre has been transformed from 
just representing the Chinese community paying tribute to Chinese civilian war 
dead to a commemorative space that all ethnic groups pay homage to on 15 
February each year –  the anniversary of the fall of Singapore. Now it is an occasion 
in which all Singaporeans regardless of racial identity remember their collective 
suffering under the Japanese Occupation and are encouraged to draw the lesson that 
Singapore must remain united and accept military conscription in order to defend 
itself against potentially hostile neighbours…43  
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Here he claims that the Singapore government has taken the opportunity each 
year on the day of the fall of Singapore to tell the people what the lessons of the 
war should be, that is, the importance of people’s unity and that of military 
conscription, or National Service. Although, in the author’s view, his analysis is 
correct, it is mainly directed to the recent war commemorations in Singapore 
(this article was published in 2009) and thus is not intended to directly explain 
the reasons and motivations for the war commemoration activities launched in 
the 1990s during which the government was in a different political climate 
immediately after the end of the Cold War. Also, documentary evidence to 
support Blackburn’s analysis is not presented in the article. 
Nicolas Lai, in his dissertation on Singapore’s collective memory of the 
Japanese Occupation, presents a possible reason for the state-led 
commemoration. With the end of the Cold War and the international society’s 
salvation of Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion under the auspices of the United 
Nations, Lai points out that the Singapore government began to be 
“uncomfortable with the prospect of [the people’s] diminishing support for its 
defence policy.”44 This can be seen in a speech made in 1992 by Lee Boon Yang, 
Second Minister for Defence, saying: “The problem is that with each passing 
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year and the absence of threat some Singaporeans may begin to feel 
complacent… A few may question the length of national service or even the 
need for the whole national service effort.” 45 Under such circumstances, Lai 
argues, “The commemoration of the Occupation provided the state with an 
opportunity to emphasise the Fall of Singapore to be largely caused by a 
spiritual surrender. The state urges the people to believe in the defensibility of 
Singapore despite its physical handicaps. A strong will to fight is seen as the 
vital key to overcome these weaknesses.” 46 Here he suggests that, under the 
circumstance of people’s growing complacency toward Singapore’s defence, the 
Singapore government took the opportunity of the war commemoration to tell 
them the importance to have a strong will to fight.  
Although his argument is acceptable, as argued later, it is only partial: 
Instilling a strong will to fight in the minds of people is only one reason for 
launching the war commemoration activities. Also, apart from Lee Boon Yang’s 
speech noted above, Lai’s argument is not supported by relevant documentary 
evidence. 
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Robin Ramcharan, in a book chapter entitled “Nation-Building in Singapore: 
The Use of the Japanese Occupation History 1992-1995”, points out that: “The 
occasion [of the 50th anniversary of the Second World War] was opportune for 
the Singaporean leadership to exploit this history for the purpose of ‘nation-
building’ and ultimately the preservation of the power of the PAP Government”. 
He further argues that making a collective memory of the war for the purpose of 
nation-building and reminding Singaporeans of the necessity of Total Defence 
are two important aspects of the state-led war commemoration. 47 With regard to 
the issue that the state-led commemoration was exploited for the purpose of 
nation-building, he presents his interpretation that: “The emphasis on this 
wartime history, and in particular the commemoration of the ‘fall’ of Singapore, 
is a further strategy in creating an emotional bond between the history that was 
lived by the war generation with the younger generation of Singaporeans.” 48 
Although the creation of an emotional bond between the older and younger 
generations might be a possible objective of the state-led commemoration, he 
does not present any concrete evidence to support such an argument. With 
regard to the second aspect, he states that: “The second is the theme of defence. 
There was decidedly a ‘military thrust’ to the commemorations.” He then briefly 
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introduces the content of a few books to mark the Second World War published 
around the early 1990s: A Battle to be Remembered (1988), The Battle Field 
Guide (1992), Beyond the Empires (1995), and Force 136 (1995). Of them, 
Beyond the Empires, Ramcharan explains, was designed to remind Singaporeans 
to be vigilant and not complacent about their national defence even in peacetime. 
49
  
In the above discussion, although Ramcharan claims that two important 
aspects, or purposes, of the state-led commemoration are nation-building and 
reminding Singaporeans of the necessity of Total Defence, he does not clearly 
present concrete evidence to support this argument. Although it seems that he 
mentions the publication of commemorative books such as The Battle Field 
Guide and Beyond the Empires as evidence of a ‘military thrust’ to the 
commemorations, this evidence is not very relevant to support the above-
mentioned argument. To advance such a claim, more direct evidence, such as the 
political elite’s statements on the purpose of the commemoration, should be 
examined. 
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4. Contribution and limitation of the research  
The first contribution of this study is to fill the knowledge gap on the ways 
in which the Japanese Occupation had been portrayed in Singapore’s history 
textbooks and war exhibitions and how Singapore’s war commemoration 
activities were conducted. As seen from above, although some researchers have 
touched on the above topics, no comprehensive analysis has been done. Even 
Wong’s article only delineates an outline of the commemoration in a few pages 
albeit Ramcharan’s chapter devotes about fifteen pages to the state-led 
commemoration. Other authors mention the commemoration only in a few 
paragraphs of their articles whose main themes were not the commemoration 
itself.  
This is a surprising knowledge gap despite the significance of the 
examination of a particular portrait of the Second World War widely 
disseminated to the people in Singapore during the period of commemorating its 
50th anniversary. This dissertation argues that an official portrait of the war is 
reconstructed from the present point of view and it is affected by the present 
interest of the political elite. Its implication is that peoples in different countries 
understand the Second World War differently partly because each government, 
especially of authoritarian countries, independently draws a particular portrait of 
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the war and disseminates it through history education and war commemoration 
for present purposes, for instance, to unite people, promote patriotism, and raise 
national pride. To understand this whole picture, it is important, as a first step, to 
examine how and why Singapore’s history education and war commemoration 
was conducted. Nevertheless, a knowledge gap remains. To fill such an 
important knowledge gap is the first contribution of this study. 
The second contribution of this study is to demonstrate why the war 
commemoration activities were actively conducted in the 1990s. As mentioned 
above, Diana Wong, Kwa Chong Guan, and Kevin Blackburn do not directly 
explain the reasons why the commemoration programmes were launched. In 
addition, although Nicholas Lai does suggest one reason, his argument is hardly 
supported by documentary evidence and is only partial. Likewise, Robin 
Ramcharan’s argument was not supported by concrete nor direct evidence. 
This study demonstrates, in later chapters, how and why the Singapore 
government launched elaborate programmes to mark the 50th anniversary of the 
Second World War in the 1990s based on primary sources. This study argues 
that the main purpose of the commemoration programmes was to teach young 
people not only the importance of a strong will to fight when a crisis comes but 
also the significance of Singapore’s defence and independence. Such 
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commemoration programmes were conducted in the 1990s partly due to the end 
of the Cold War that triggered the political elite’s anxiety of the risk that the 
demise of communist threat would lead to Singaporeans’ complacent attitude 
toward defence. To deal with such a situation, capturing the opportunities of the 
50th anniversary of the start and end of the Second World War, the Singapore 
government used various war commemoration activities for young people to 
remember the lesson of the war (be prepared for war even in peacetime because 
the British were defeated due mainly to their unpreparedness) in order to 
convince them of the necessity of Singapore’s Total Defence that was supported 
by National Service and a substantial defence budget. In other words, it was the 
need to justify the continuation of such a burdensome defence posture even after 
the end of the Cold War that constituted a motivation to conduct the 
commemoration programmes. Such commemoration programmes that intended 
to convince people of the importance of independence, defence, and patriotism 
were needed because the government had to maintain defence forces and foster 
patriotism to survive in the current international system in which there were no 
central authorities to effectively settle conflicts between nation-states and war 
was still not totally denied as a method of international conflict resolution. 
Another aspect of the war commemoration activities can be understood as part 
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of a nation-building effort – something that all nation-states need to do in order 
to sustain themselves. As briefly outlined above and to be discussed in detail in 
the following chapters, this study provides a more comprehensive analysis on 
why the commemoration programmes were launched based on primary sources. 
This is another contribution of this study. 
 On the other hand, this research also has limitations. Since the main scope of 
this research is Singapore’s government efforts to spread the official narrative of 
the war to younger Singaporeans on the occasion of 50th anniversary of the 
Second World War, the following topics out of this boundary are excluded: First, 
the commemoration activities that targeted foreign veterans such as the British 
and Australians are excluded. Second, although war memory is transmitted also 
through non-governmental entities such as the family, the clan associations, 
publications, TV dramas, documentaries, the mass media and so forth, those 
activities are out of the scope of this study unless the activities are initiated by 
the government. Straits Times and Lianhe Zaobao, Singapore’s major English 
and Chinese newspapers respectively, conducted commemoration campaigns to 
run a large number of articles related to the Second World War such as 
interviews with war survivors, accounts on how people lived under the Japanese 
reign, and basic historical facts of the war. However, this is also excluded from 
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this study because the link of those commemoration campaigns to the 
government is unclear. 
There are methodological limitations as well. First, the argument of this 
study was made based only on the currently available sources and materials such 
as politician’s speeches, official reports, newspaper articles, history textbooks 
and syllabuses and the author’s interviews with those who were involved in 
history education and war commemoration activities; Singapore’s archives in the 
1990s are still unavailable. Second, people’s responses to the commemoration 
programmes are not the main focus of this study albeit their responses are 
touched on only when materials were available. No questionnaires were 
administered to reveal their responses, which is another limitation of this study. 
       
5. Brief description of the following chapters 
This dissertation is composed of seven chapters. After the Introduction, 
Chapter 2 addresses the question of concepts and theory, which provides 
definitions of key concepts to be used in this dissertation and examines various 
scholars’ conceptual and general arguments revolving around the relationship 
between the nation-state system and the state’s nation-building efforts, such as 
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history education and war commemoration. Chapter 3 traces the development of 
history education in post war Singapore. In this chapter, the questions to be 
discussed are: how and why the government integrated Singapore’s different 
school systems of different language streams and created a common 
Malayanised history syllabus from 1945 to the 1960s; how and why history 
teaching was marginalised in the 1970s; and how and why the political elite’s 
interest in history teaching resurged in the 1980s. In Chapter 4, history education 
and museum development are discussed. The main focus of this chapter is the 
portrait of the Japanese Occupation in history textbooks published between 1965 
and 1994. In Chapter 5, the war commemoration activities in 1991 and 1992 to 
mark the 50th anniversary of the start of Japanese invasion and occupation is 
mainly discussed. Chapter 6 chiefly focuses on the war commemoration 
activities in 1995 to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of the war. Discussed 
in this chapter are the holding of war exhibitions and commemorative 
ceremonies, the erection of war plaques, and people’s responses to the war 
commemoration programmes. Chapter 7 addresses the questions on how and 
why National Education was introduced in 1997 and its effects on history 
textbooks published from 1999 onwards. Subsequently, the conclusion of this 
study is presented in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 2: Concepts and Theory 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, the question of concepts and general arguments related to this 
dissertation are examined. The first half of this chapter discusses some key 
concepts which are used in this thesis, such as nation, national history, collective 
memory, nationalism, communalism, patriotism, and so forth. In the latter half 
of this chapter, the relationship between natures of the nation-state system and 
the state’s nation-building efforts, such as history education and war 
commemoration, is examined chiefly based on conceptual and general 
arguments advanced by various scholars. 
 
 
2. Key concepts 
2.1 The concept of nation 
What is a nation? This is a simple but difficult question because various 
scholars understand the concept differently. Anthony Smith laments that 
defining the concept of nation is “the most problematic and contentious.” 50 
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Definitions of a nation vary from those emphasising ‘objective’ factors such as 
language, religion, customs, and territory, to those stressing ‘subjective’ factors 
such as attitudes, perceptions, and sentiments. One example of the definition 
that emphasises ‘subjective’ factors comes from Benedict Anderson, who 
defines a nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign.” 51 However, as Anthony Smith points out, 
‘subjective’ definitions generally include the cases of non-nations such as 
regions, city-states, and empires as well. On the other hand, ‘objective’ 
definitions often fail to include some nations: for instance, defining a nation to 
be “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis 
of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up 
manifested in a common culture.” 52 The solution to this problem is to find the 
best position on the ‘subjective-objective’ spectrum, though there is no 
scholarly consensus on this matter. 53 
Although there is no consensus on how to demarcate the concept of nation, 
many scholars point out that the essence of nation is the members’ subjective 
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conviction or belief that they share a common past and destiny. For instance, 
Rupert Emerson describes a nation to be “a community of people who feel that 
they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant 
elements of common heritage and that they have a common destiny for the 
future.” 54  In a similar token, Ernest Renan advances the definition to be a 
spiritual principle, which connects the past with the future as seen in a Spartan 
song: “We are what you were; we will be what you are.” For Renan, there are 
two important factors that constitute a nation: the common past of a rich legacy 
of memories and the desire to live together in the future. The essential condition 
for being a nation, Renan continues, is to have the spirit like this: “To have 
common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to have 
performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more.” 55 
Apart from the factors of the shared past and destiny, another important 
ingredient of a nation is the members’ subjective or emotional belief, rather 
than a judgment based on objective reasoning. Walker Connor argues that a 
nation is constructed based on “felt kinship ties” because he understands a 
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nation to be “a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related.” 56 
People’s belief in their separate origin and development, he continues, is an 
important ingredient in a national psyche. 57  Similarly, Anthony Smith also 
stresses the subjective or emotional aspect of the nation by describing nations to 
be “felt and lived communities whose members share a homeland and a 
culture.” 58 
If the essence of a nation is the members’ emotional or subjective belief of 
their common past and future, a corollary of this is that there is a need to create 
some kind of explanation – usually a story of the national origin and 
development – to convince the members in the territory that they share a 
common past and future. Herein lies the vital importance of national ‘history’ in 
order to sustain a nation. In addition, this ‘history’ does not need to be scientific 
or objective; it works as a shaper of national identity as long as it appeals to 
people’s emotion. Therefore, Walker Connor claims, the key to a nation is not 
“chronological or factual history” but “sentiment or felt history” as well as the 
members’ intuitive conviction of their nation’s separate origin and unique 
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evolution. 59 
If national history is sometimes constructed based on its emotional appeal to 
people rather than on scientific or academic reflection and discussion, one 
problem arises concerning whether such history can be indeed called history. 
What is the difference between ‘felt history’ and mythistory or collective 
memory? The next section will discuss this issue.  
 
2.2 National history – history, mythistory or memory? 
What is national history? What are its major features? In this section, these 
questions are discussed in comparison with the features of mythistory and 
memory. First, it is important to discuss a basic feature of national history. It is 
often argued that a core tenet of history is its objectivity and therefore historians 
should seek to find truth when they write history. However, national history is 
not always written for finding objective truth but for serving some other 
purposes: notably, for nation-building – it is written for instilling such a 
conviction into the minds of people that ‘we,’ the members of a nation, share a 
common past and future. To do this, national history does not always need to be 
scientific and objective (though it is often claimed that their histories are 
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scientific and objective). As long as it can strengthen people’s national identity 
and appeal to their emotion, at least for nationalists, it is a ‘good’ national 
history because it works as an effective instrument to build and sustain a nation. 
In Europe, there was a long tradition that acted as the close connection 
between history writing and nation-building that began when the idea of a 
modern nation started to spread across the region in the late-eighteenth century. 
60
 Although history writing became more professionalised and institutionalised 
in the nineteenth century, the writing of national histories in Europe mostly 
developed as an instrument to provide nations with myths of national continuity 
in response to the growing political demand to create that kind of history. 61 
Under such circumstances, many historians claimed that they had to be 
partisans and should take a stance in contemporary politics. Here, history turned 
to be an instrument or weapon to win political battles. 62 For instance, Augustin 
Thierry, a French historian, confessed in his book: “In 1817, motivated by the 
burning desire to contribute to the triumph of constitutionalism, I set about 
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searching in history books for proofs and arguments that would support my 
political ideas.” 63  As seen in the case of Thierry, we can find abundant 
evidence that historians supported particular regimes and participated in the 
nation-building process. 64 However, those historians insisted that their political 
involvement had no influence on the objectivity of their scholarship as seen in 
the case of Marc Bloch, who admitted his patriotism as a value judgment but 
insisted that this did not affect his scholarly objectivity. 65  Although these 
authors argued that their histories were written based on ‘scientific objectivity,’ 
they, in many cases, legitimated the foundational myths of respective nation-
states. 66 
As argued above, national history has been used as an instrument to serve 
another purpose such as nation-building and the present interests of the political 
elite. It is also usually written in the way that people can comfortably identify 
themselves with the members of a nation. Such features of national history can 
be broken down into the following four categories: the emphasis on national 
continuity, the shaper of national identity, the promotion of the positive self-
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image, and a service to the present. 
First, national history as an instrument often stresses national continuity 
because that is the very core of the concept of a nation. For people to have a 
conviction that they share a common past and future, the existence of a same 
nation that has continued from the past and continue into the future must be 
assumed. Therefore, national history tends to be written as the story of the same 
in which the present-day nation is explained as a continuation of a particular 
‘origin’ of the nation. 67 Assuming such a continuity of the nation, national 
historians tend to examine histories backward to discover the birth of nations. 
For instance, the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and/or the Reform Act in 1832 
for Britain, the French Revolution in 1789, the Italian Unification in 1861, and 
the German Unification in 1871 are considered to be important foundational 
dates related to the birth of respective nations. 68  Similarly, in the case of 
Singapore, Lian Kwen Fee argues, the Japanese Occupation of Singapore that 
took place during the Second World War is understood as a “historical ‘myth’ 
in its origin as a nation” in the absence of its independence war against colonial 
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powers. 69 As will be discussed later, Singapore’s official narrative sees the 
Japanese Occupation period as the period that all people suffered from which 
local nationalism began to emerge. 
However, such continuity and sameness is often a fiction or myth. As 
Raphael Sammuel points out, continuous national history conflates essentially 
different things, such as court and country, centre and periphery, in “a single 
false totality”, and authors of national history devise the story of national origin 
and growth by connecting “analytically distinct and chronologically separated” 
phenomena. 70  Herein lies a basis on which national history turns into 
‘mythistory.’  
Mythistory, according to William McNeil, results from “mingling of truth 
and falsehood, blending history with ideology.” 71  Historians, he argues, are 
always tempted to mingle truth with falsehood, and blend history with ideology 
under the continuous temptation to portray the people they write about as they 
wish them to be. They are, he continues, likely to select facts to show that we 
conform to our cherished ideology or principles. For instance, McNeil explains, 
peoples struggling toward self-consciousness are likely to demand vivid and 
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simplified portrait of their virtues and sufferings; in response to this sort of 
demand, historians are tempted to exploit particular words to label historical 
figures as good guys or bad guys. As a result, he concludes, history becomes a 
simplified story between good and evil, ‘us’ and ‘them’, which can be seen in 
most national histories. 72 In short, national history becomes mythistory as long 
as such falsehood is exploited. 
Secondly, national history works as a shaper of national identity. It can be 
said that the concept of identity concerns the question of ‘who I am’ or ‘who we 
are.’ 73 One way to address such a question is to examine ‘where we came from’ 
and ‘where we will go.’ The answers to those questions used to be provided by 
religion in the past, notably in Medieval Europe. However, with the decline of 
religion at the age of enlightenment, nationalism and national history took over 
the role. Namely, national history as a story of national origin and growth 
provides us with some answers to the questions of ‘who we are’, ‘where we 
came from’, and by extension ‘where we will go.’ Therefore, nationalism is 
sometimes called a ‘surrogate religion’ 74  and national history plays an 
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important role in defining ‘who we are’, in defining ‘us’ versus ‘them’. 75  
In this way, the construction of national identity is closely connected with 
the narrative of national history. 76 As mentioned earlier, such a narrative does 
not necessarily need to be scientific history: it can be myth or mythistory; it can 
be collective memory, which can be defined as “a living past, the shared image 
or the collective representation of an event.” 77 Both mythistory and memory – 
as long as it includes the narrative related to defining ‘us’ versus ‘them’ – can 
play a similar role as national history in the construction of national identity. 
For instance, the collective memory of the Second World War shared by the 
mainland Chinese commonly includes the following narrative: Japanese 
invasion was brutal, and a struggle over which Chinese people won in the end. 
This sort of narrative – be it history, mythistory, or memory – plays an 
important role in defining ‘us’ (Chinese) versus ‘them’ (Japanese).  
Then, in what way do social narratives such as history, mythistory, and 
memory play a role in the construction of a national or social identity? Stuart 
Hall claims the inseparability of identity and the narrative of the past by 
                                                           
75
 McNeil, Mythistory and Other Essays, 11. 
76
 On the important role of the narrative in the construction of personal identity, see Alasdair 
MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1985), 190-209. 
77
 Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang (with the assistance of Thomas J. Johnson and Peggy E. 
Roberts), “Collective Memory and the News”, Communication 11 (1989), 126. 
 47 
claiming “identities are the names we give to the different ways we are 
positioned by, and position ourselves in, the narratives of the past.” 78 In his 
argument, identity is considered to be our position in the narrative of the past, 
such as history, mythistory and memory. In other words, the narrative provides 
us with the basis on which we position or identify ourselves. For instance, the 
narrative of ‘Japanese invasion was brutal, and a struggle over which Chinese 
people won in the end’ provides the basis of defining ‘us’ (Chinese) versus 
‘them’ (Japanese) for the originally diverse peoples in China, in which, until 
relatively recently, most people identified themselves to be the people from a 
particular region or a language group such as the Cantonese, the Hainanese, or 
the Hakkas. The above narrative provides those peoples with the basis to 
identify themselves to be the Chinese (not to be the Cantonese, the 
Shanghainese, or any other sub-national group) vis-à-vis the Japanese. 
As seen from above, a narrative of the past constitutes an indispensable part 
of national or social identity. Maurice Halbwachs claims that the individual as a 
member of a society always has to borrow the society’s narrative constructed 
from the ‘social frameworks of memory’ (the society’s perspective to portray a 
past event) to recall and articulate the past. As a result, he concludes, the 
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individual and collective memory becomes indistinguishable. 79 Some scholars 
criticise his argument on the ground that he puts excessive emphasis on the 
social influence over the individual. 80  However, even in present society, 
Halbwachs’ argument would still be acceptable because if individuals want to 
be recognised or accepted as members of a society (i.e. as Chinese), they may 
not be able to ignore the society’s master narrative (i.e. the above-mentioned 
narrative of the Japanese invasion of China) and may have a tendency to 
voluntarily borrow the society’s narrative to articulate their own past. On the 
other hand, the unarticulated individual memories that conflict with the 
society’s master narrative will gradually fade away unless they are recorded.  
The core argument is this: because one wants to be identified or accepted as a 
member of a particular society, he or she voluntarily borrows the master 
narrative of the society. Here we can find a close connection between one’s 
identity and his or her society’s narrative of the past. 
Similarly, Eviatar Zerubavel claims that the ability to feel a society’s past as 
our own past is an important condition to become a member of the society. 81 In 
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other words, in order to be a part of the society we need to merge our individual 
identity with social identity. In this process of socialisation, the narrative of the 
past provides the individual with the basis to become a member of the society. 
In this way, the narrative of the past – be it history, mythistory, or memory – 
plays an important role in the construction of identity and thus all of them can 
work as shapers of national identity. 
Thirdly, national history tends to be portrayed in a way that promotes 
positive self-image by emphasising national character as unique and superior as 
well as by stressing the high points of national past. Stefan Berger argues that 
most alleged national uniqueness was connected with the idea of one’s national 
superiority to other nations. For example, German historians put an emphasis on 
the superiority of German culture, especially of its scholarship, which was the 
heart of nationalist discourse in the nineteenth century. 82 Such celebration of 
German culture entailed the denigration of Western European and Slavic 
cultures. 83  
In a similar token, much of British historiography emphasised their civil 
rights achievements by referring to their support of liberty, constitutional values, 
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and parliamentary tradition. 84  The British concept of ‘liberty’, as well as 
‘progress’, was constructed in comparison with backward and tyrannical Ireland 
and continental Europe. 85 In fact, George Macaulay Trevelyan, a historian of 
the time, described the Irish as irrational in contrast to the rational Englishman 
in his British History in the Nineteenth Century (1922). This perhaps reflected 
the majority’s perception of the time. They believed that British imperialism 
was the carrier of civilisation on the premise that the English were superior to 
its subjects. 86  
Perhaps the idea of the superior English was spread also to the British 
colonies, including Singapore, and affected the subjects’ psyche. Probably 
because some Singaporeans, particularly older generations, still perceived that 
Europeans were superior to Asians, Singapore’s first national history textbook 
for secondary schools, published in 1984, needed to stress the ‘non-inferiority 
of Asians’ by stating that “Europeans were not superior to Asians” because 
“[t]he Japanese had defeated the British in just ten weeks.” 87 This was taught as 
an important lesson of the Second World War. Asians’ awakening of their non-
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inferiority as a lesson of the war continued to appear in the 1994 version of 
Singapore history textbooks. 88  In the 1999 version, it was replaced by the 
emphasis on Asians’ awakening of their superiority to the West as a lesson of 
the war. The textbook reads: 
 
When the Japanese easily defeated the British, the people of Singapore lost their 
respect for the British. They realised that an Asian race such as the Japanese could 
be superior to a western power. The other peoples of Asia who were under western 
colonial rule also felt the same way. 89 
 
These history textbooks show that even the national history of a former 
colonised country tries to promote a positive-self image by denying ‘our’ 
inferiority or celebrating ‘our’ superiority. 
Another way to promote a positive self-image is to stress the high points of 
national past. Raphael Samuel points out that the grand theme for historians in 
the nineteenth century was to elaborate on the foundations of national greatness. 
In Britain, both the liberal and conservative historians attributed ideal properties 
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to ‘national character’ and both preferred to elaborate ‘the high points of 
national life’ while they only lightly mentioned the periods of failure. As a 
result, he argues, history textbooks were filled with stories to emphasise the 
inspirational qualities of historical figures and to register milestones of national 
progress. 90 
In Singapore, national history is taught as a success story: a story of a poor 
and conflict-ridden island-state that transforms into one of the richest and safest 
countries in Asia. Lee Hsien Loong, the third Prime Minister of Singapore, 
concisely outlines the success story of Singapore’s past as follows: 
 
Since independence in 1965, Singapore’s story has been one of success against the 
odds. Born out of a failed union with Malaysia, Singapore was a tiny, crowded 
island of 1.5 million people, beset with racial animosities, plagued by high 
unemployment, with no sense of national identity, and no defences against external 
threats. Out of this unpromising beginning, we created a fast-growing economy, a 
tolerant multi-racial society, a credible armed force based on national service, and a 
strong political leadership with the vision to set long-term objectives and the 
popular support to bring them about. In one generation, an island of slums and 
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indigents had been transformed into a nation with one of the highest standards of 
living in Asia.” 91  
 
It is clear that one of his intentions for portraying Singapore’s past in such a 
way was to promote the positive self-image of the present Singaporeans: 
Singapore in the past was portrayed as poor and divided, in contrast to the 
present rich and harmonious Singapore. The focus here was not the past poor 
conditions but the present betterment: progress, prosperity and improvement. 
Such a portrait of Singapore’s past has been reflected in history textbooks. The 
preface of one 1984 history textbook reads: 
 
The course …. deals with the origins of our multi-racial and multi-cultural society, 
and the gradual transition of an immigrant society to one that is locally oriented and 
possesses a sense of identity with this country. It portrays the hard work and 
enterprise of our forefathers and their contributions to the progress and prosperity of 
Singapore. It depicts the struggle and efforts of the people and their leaders to bring 
about improvements in the social and economic spheres. 92 
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In this way, even in a country that does not seem to have a glorious past, the 
teaching of national history can promote the positive self-image of the present 
by emphasising the progress, prosperity, and improvement of the present in 
contrast to the poor conditions of the past. 
Fourthly, national history as an instrument is almost always written to serve 
the present. In fact, history writing in Europe was often used to legitimate the 
nation-states and existing political systems. 93  One reason for such a 
phenomenon can be explained by the historians’ position. Historians in Europe 
were often close to power. In some cases, they were hired by the state and there 
were powerful incentives to write the sort of national history which served the 
political interest of the time. 94  
The situation was similar even in the European colonies. In British colonies 
of Malaya and Singapore, some historians who wrote colonial histories had a 
close relationship with the British government. For instance, Frank Swettenham, 
who wrote an influential work on the history of Malaya and Singapore that is 
thought to have established the Euro-centric historiographical tradition at the 
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first half of the twentieth century, 95 had worked for the British government as 
Governor of the Straits Settlements (which consisted of Penang, Malacca and 
Singapore) and High Commissioner of the Federated Malay States before he 
entered authorship. In British Malaya, published in 1906, Swettenham justified 
the establishment of British control over the Malay states. 96 Though this topic 
was not national history, it can be said that the history he authored served the 
present interests of the British government. 
The feature of being a service to the present is common to collective 
memory. Collective memory, as mentioned earlier, can be defined as “a living 
past, the shared image or the collective representation of an event.” 97  It is 
defined as ‘a living past’ because it is argued that collective memory is in fact 
reconstructed on the basis of the present beliefs, aspirations, and interests. 98 
The way it reconstructs the past is similar to the way national history is written; 
both are constructed to serve the present. 
So far, this dissertation has examined major features of national history in 
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comparison with those of mythistory and memory, and the next pages will 
identify the commonalities and differences between the three concepts. National 
history is common with mythistory and memory in its instrumental nature to 
serve the present and to shape national identity. In reality, national history and 
mythistory almost overlap one another, but conceptually they are distinguished: 
national history should be distinguished from a narrative which portrays 
scientifically unproven stories (i.e. legends) as historical facts. 
Then, the question still remains concerning what the difference is between 
national history and collective memory. Halbwachs distinguished history from 
memory by defining history as dead memory in which pasts are preserved but 
those pasts are no longer an important part of our lives. In contrast, collective 
memory was defined as a living past that forms our identity. 99  However, 
national history as an instrument to build and sustain a nation cannot be dead 
memory because if national history is perceived to be irrelevant to our present 
lives, it is unlikely to be remembered, and, therefore, it will not be able to shape 
people’s national identity in the present. In this sense, national history also must 
be a living past that forms one’s identity. 
The basic difference between national history and collective memory of a 
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national past is in their construction processes. National history is constructed 
by historians based on materials collected even though they are utilised to serve 
the present purposes. On the other hand, it is argued that collective memory is 
in general constructed as more of a bottom-up process. According to a 
hypothesis advanced by Philip Seaton, social memory is constructed through 
several bottom-up stages in which a narrative shared among a small group 
competes with other narratives and gains a wider audience, competes again with 
other narratives and grows and changes by weaving a common theme with other 
narratives, then emerges as the master narrative accepted by most members of 
the society. In this process, the power of narratives depends largely on access to 
those who wield political and social power. 100  
Even though collective memory is constructed through this bottom-up 
process, as Seaton argues, what constitutes collective memory depends largely 
on the power to disseminate a particular narrative. For instance, in countries 
where history education and the mass media are controlled by the state, such as 
China and Singapore, only an official version of a national history can be taught 
in school education. On a similar vein, most of the information circulated 
through the mass media, including how to portray the national past, is along the 
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lines of an official stance. Strong criticism toward the official stance is 
discouraged by the authorities. If we assume that the general public in such 
countries is largely affected by the official narrative circulated through school 
education and the mass media, a large part of the content of the national history 
and collective memory of a past event, such as the Second World War, are 
likely to overlap each other in such authoritarian countries. 
 
2.3 Nationalism, ethnic nationalism, communalism, and patriotism 
In this dissertation, nationalism is defined as one’s loyalty or emotional 
attachment to his or her nation. 101 The problem here is what a ‘nation’ signifies. 
As argued earlier, the core component of a nation is understood as a people’s 
subjective belief in their sharing of a common past and future, which enables 
them to identify themselves to be members of the nation. To be sure, the term 
‘nation’ here means people; it does not signify a country or state. Accordingly, 
the term nationalism must be attached to the names of the group of people, i.e. 
Chinese, Malay, or Indian nationalism. However, if we follow this usage, some 
problems arise: when we use the term ‘nation’ to signify both a people of the 
nation-state level (i.e. Singapore nation) and that of sub-nation-state level (i.e. 
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Chinese, Malay or Indian nation), readers may confuse nationalism at the sub-
nation-state level (i.e. Chinese nationalism in Singapore) with nationalism at the 
nation-state level (i.e. Chinese nationalism in China). On top of that, in 
Singapore, the term nationalism, in general, signifies only  nation-state level 
nationalism (i.e. Singapore or Malayan nationalism) whereas sub-nation-state 
nationalism is usually called ‘communalism’ or ‘ethnic nationalism’ (i.e. 
Chinese, Malay or Indian communalism). This dissertation follows this 
Singapore usage to avoid confusion: the term ‘nationalism’ is used to signify 
only nation-state level nationalism whereas sub-nation-state nationalism is 
referred to as ‘communalism’ or ‘ethnic nationalism.’ 
The term ‘patriotism’ originally comes from the word ‘patria,’ which means 
‘the fatherland’. Therefore, it is commonly argued that the basic meaning of 
patriotism is one’s love of their fatherland or country. 102  Hence, patriotism 
appeals to ‘all residents in the country’ regardless of their ethnic background, 
whereas nationalism appeals to ‘all members of an ethnic or national group’ 
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regardless of their country of residence. 103 Here, the object of devotion is to 
country, not people. 104 However, one’s love of country does not usually mean 
their obsession with the physical land; rather it is often manifested in the form of 
one’s loyalty to the state that rules their fatherland. Therefore, as Walker Connor 
argues, patriotism can be defined as one’s loyalty to the state. 105 
However, here arises one question: Do we need to distinguish one’s loyalty 
to the state (patriotism) from one’s loyalty to the people (nationalism)? Since 
nation was defined as being only on the nation-state level, by definition, one 
nation exactly accords with one state. Therefore, there is no profoundly 
significant way to distinguish the two concepts. As Walker Connor claims, 
“Loyalty to one’s national group [namely, nationalism] and loyalty to one’s state 
[or patriotism] merge into a single reinforcing blur” 106 : patriotism and 
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nationalism overlap one another. Therefore, in this dissertation, the terms 
‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’ are used interchangeably. 
 
 
3. Natures of the nation-state system and the state’s nation-building efforts 
In this section, the relationship between natures of the nation-state system 
and the state’s nation-building efforts, such as history education and war 
commemoration, is examined chiefly based on conceptual and general 
arguments advanced by various scholars. Firstly, the origin of the nation-state 
system is briefly discussed. It is commonly argued that a basis of the nation-state 
system was first constructed in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, though political 
and territorial settlements were still very different from the current nation-state 
system. 107  The Peace of Westphalia was an epoch-making event because it 
ended the Catholic Church’s political and legal dominance in Western Europe. 
In the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church acted as “the final arbiter in all things” 
108
 and exercised centralised authority across Western Europe; local secular 
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powers were subject to the authority of the Pope and Emperor of the Holy 
Roman Empire. The Westphalian peace put an end to such a hierarchical system 
by recognising more than 300 small states of the Holy Roman Empire as 
independent sovereign states which were no longer subject to the absolute 
authority of the Pope and Emperor. 109 Since the centralised authority of the 
Catholic Church was denied in the Westphalian system, each sovereign state 
was considered to be the highest authority on the globe, therefore, legally equal 
and independent power was given to each state regardless of its unequal size and 
capability. 110  As a consequence of this acknowledgement of the highest 
authority of each state, sovereign states were required to accept the principle of 
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. 111 This is in stark contrast with 
the Medieval system in which the Catholic Church could freely ‘interfere’ in the 
domestic affairs of each state.  
Such a structure was taken over by the nation-state system, and the anti-
hierarchical nature of the international system has continued into the present, 
particularly in the field of security. One thing to note here is that the 
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Westphalian system is not equal to the nation-state system because those states 
to which sovereignty was given at the time of the Westphalian peace were not 
nation-states. Only after the French and American revolutions in the late 
eighteenth century, was there a rise of nationalism across Europe. Then, 
sovereign states changed their shapes into nation-states by merging smaller 
states to form nation-states, achieving national independence from empires, and 
instilling national identity in the minds of people. This emergence of modern 
nations in the nineteenth century altered the Westphalian inter-states system into 
the inter-nation-states system. 112 
As suggested above, the most important feature of the nation-state system is 
its structural anarchy (the absence of a central authority) which resulted that 
sovereignty was granted to each nation-state. Sovereignty here can be defined as 
“supreme authority which recognises no superior and beyond which there is no 
legal appeal.” 113 Sovereignty has two aspects: internal and external. 
Internal sovereignty concerns the absolute authority of the state over other 
groups and individuals within the territory so that the state has the right to 
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govern other alleged rulers whether religious or secular. 114 Such an arrangement 
has often created political order and stability within the territory. 115 In contrast, 
external sovereignty – which concerns the state’s right to non-interference from 
other states as well as its legal equal status in dealing with them 116 – often leads 
to the anarchic condition of international relations. 117  
The second feature of the nation-state system is that war continues to be 
acknowledged as a conflict resolution method between nation-states as long as 
the state abides by some rules. 118 The Westphalian agreements (the treaties of 
Münster and Osnabrück) gave the rulers the right to enter into alliances with 
foreign powers and to wage war. 119  This was justified at the time of the 
Westphalian peace on the ground that, according to R. B. J. Walker, wars 
generated in the Westphalian system would not be much worse than the armed 
conflicts that had occurred under the hierarchical medieval system. It was also 
claimed that, even though sovereignty was given to each state, cooperation 
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between those states might not be impossible. 120 As a result, war continued to 
be accepted as a method of conflict resolution between sovereign states. This 
legacy has been passed down to the nation-state system, in which each nation-
state maintains a right to wage war and to use its armed forces as long as it 
abides by a set of rules, for instance, rules about under which circumstances the 
state can use its military forces (i.e. in case of self-defence), what weapons it can 
use (some weapons are prohibited), and what it can attack (i.e. military targets). 
121
 
Lastly, accepting the state’s sovereignty as the core principle of the nation-
state system has a consequence, which is, according to R. B. J. Walker, our 
binary worldview: Humanity is divided into ‘we’ (i.e. our nation) and ‘they’ (i.e. 
other nations around ‘us’) and different standards are applied between them. He 
argues that the concept of ‘we’, which is always portrayed as civilised, has been 
constructed vis-à-vis the backward ‘they’ who are always painted as a negative 
imagery from ‘our’ point of view. 122 For those who have been indoctrinated 
with such a binary worldview, Walker continues, the world can be portrayed as: 
“Community inside, anarchy outside; justice inside, power and, at best, order 
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outside; effective institutions with legitimate authority inside, shifting alliances 
and fragile balancing mechanisms outside.” 123  Such a worldview was, he 
concludes, created partly due to the acceptance of the state’s sovereignty as the 
core principle of the nation-state system. 124  
Here, one important thing to note is that such a worldview plays a significant 
role in justifying war preparations and the use of force against the uncivilised 
‘them’. Walker succinctly shows this logic. 
 
“We” are rational, enlightened, and developed; We would be happy to cooperate 
with other peoples on the basis of rational and enlightened standards of civilised 
behaviour; but unfortunately “They” are uncivilised and irrational; consequently, 
We must resort to force in order to protect the standards We have striven so hard to 
maintain. 125 
 
With this kind of logic, one is likely to reach the conclusion that ‘we’ need to 
prepare for war to protect ‘ourselves’ even in peacetime. War preparations are 
considered to be a rational choice in the world where the civilised ‘we’ live 
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together with the uncivilised ‘them’. As Walker claims, if the world is divided 
into ‘our world’ and ‘their worlds’ and is organised as a series of sharp divisions 
between “inclusion and exclusion, community and anarchy, civilisation and 
barbarism, then the maxim that preparations for war are the only guarantee of 
peace does make some sense.” 126 
In conclusion, some features of the nation-state system – its structural 
anarchy and war as an accepted method of conflict resolution (as long as the 
state observes some rules) – as well as our binary worldview (‘our world’ and 
‘their worlds’) are likely to lead us to conclude that it is wiser and safer for a 
responsible government to prepare for war in case the uncivilised ‘they’ use 
force to attack or threaten ‘us’. To prepare for war, we need to not only have 
defence capabilities but also to foster patriotism because history shows that, 
unless permeated by patriotism, soldiers, especially those conscripted, do not 
fight to the end. 127 Under such circumstances, in order to secure its survival, 
every nation-state is induced to implement some measures to drum up people’s 
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support to its defence policies and inculcate patriotism in their minds. Among 
such measures are history education and war commemoration.  
 
In Singapore, taking the opportunities of the 50th anniversary of the start 
and end of the Second World War, the government conducted a series of war 
commemoration programmes which mainly targeted young Singaporeans. These 
programmes included war exhibitions, war plaques, history camps, and 
commemorative ceremonies. The Singapore government conducted such 
commemoration programmes because, as will be discussed in later chapters, it 
wanted to remind young people of the importance of independence, defence and 
patriotism. One of the major factors to launch such commemoration programmes, 
as will be argued in detail later, was the end of the Cold War, which necessitated 
devising a new theory to justify its burdensome defence policies instead of 
communist threat. The new theory the government began to stress was a lesson 
from the Second World War – Singapore has to always prepare for war even in 
times of peace since the British defeat in the war was mainly due to their lack of 
preparedness in both morale and military posture. This message was spread 
throughout war commemoration activities between 1991 and 1995. Though the 
end of Cold War was a major factor that made the Singapore government 
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actively disseminate the official portrait of the war in order to remind the people 
of the importance of defence and patriotism, such dissemination was not 
necessary if the basic nature of the international system was not anarchy and if 
war were not accepted as a method of conflict resolution. In other words, due to 
such basic natures of the nation-state system, the Singapore government, as well 
as other governments, needs to maintain defence forces and also needs to 
promote patriotism. It is in such a structure that the Singapore government 
launched war commemoration activities to convince people of the necessity and 
importance of defence and patriotism. 
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Chapter 3: Marginalisation and Resurgence of History Education, 1945-1991 
 
1. Introduction 
As seen in the previous chapter, each nation-state needs to inculcate national 
identity in the minds of people, maintain military forces, and foster patriotism in 
their minds in order to survive under the current nation-state system, and the 
major means of the inculcation of national identity and patriotism are, in many 
cases, history education and war commemoration. Selecting the means of 
inculcating a sense of national consciousness is, however, in the hands of the 
political elite and, accordingly, their interests at the time affect such a selection. 
In the case of Singapore, the government, at one point, actively exploited history 
education to the end of nation-building but, at another point, it was indifferent in 
doing so. Such changes occurred according to changes in the interests of the 
state as well as the political elite. 
Since the early years of the post-war period, the Singapore government has 
clearly seen education policy as a main means of “nation-building.” Even since 
the British rulers returned after the Second World War, under the name of 
Malayanisation, the government has made various efforts to integrate its 
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originally diverse school systems; the main purpose of such an education policy 
was to create a Malayan nation.  
Singapore achieved full independence in 1963 through a merger with 
Malaya, Sarawak, and North Borneo to form the new state of Malaysia. 
However, Singapore was separated from Malaysia in 1965. Subsequently, the 
Singapore government marginalised history education that was designed as a 
means to build a Malaysian nation. Now, the task of the Singapore government 
has changed from that of creating a Malaysian nation to that of forming a 
Singapore nation. Though the textbooks of Singapore history, instead of the 
history of Malaya, for primary schools were published in 1970, they were used 
only until 1974. Thereafter, history was combined with geography and civics to 
form a new subject called Education for Living (EFL). Such a change happened 
because, firstly, the government prioritised the subjects that were seen to be 
conducive to its economic survival – English, mathematics, and science – over 
arts subjects such as history and geography; and secondly, the teaching of 
Singapore history was seen as a factor that would obstruct national harmony by 
the political elite as we will see below. In short, the conditions in the 1970s were 
not favourable for the promotion of history education.  
 72 
However, although history education was not actively used as a means to 
build a Singaporean nation in this period, the Singapore government still needed 
to inculcate a sense of national consciousness or identity in people’s minds to 
unite them and relied on other means such as educational efforts to integrate 
students from different language streams, an integrated housing policy, and 
National Service. National Service, or military conscription, was introduced for 
all male citizens aged eighteen and above in 1967. In the same year, then 
Defence Minister Goh Keng Swee, at Parliament, revealed two reasons for the 
introduction of National Service: “to safeguard and defend” Singapore and “to 
accelerate the process of nation building” by “inculcating values of cooperation, 
tolerance and discipline amongst young men from all walks of life and from all 
groups”. 128 On a similar token, public housing was also used as a means to 
create national unity. Lee Kuan Yew reflected in 2011 that: “Housing was and is 
a most important public policy, one with profound influence on the lives of our 
people and has moulded the cohesive society we have”. 129 As he suggested, one 
of the aims of public housing was to promote ethnic integration, or build a 
Singaporean nation, by relocating people from different ethnic groups to live 
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together on the same public housing estates, 130 and this policy was implemented 
even during the time history education as a means of nation-building was 
marginalised. Similarly, the state’s other educational efforts to integrate students 
from different language streams and inculcate national identity in their minds, 
such as the integrated schools policy, bilingual education, a daily national flag 
raising and lowering ceremony, the singing of the National Anthem, and the 
recitation of the National Pledge, had been continued even in the 1970s during 
which the political elite were indifferent in using history in order to inculcate 
national identity in young Singaporeans. 131 
Subsequently, however, the re-evaluation of history took place among the 
political elite to deal with Singapore’s economic and social change, such as its 
industrialisation and cultural Westernisation of youngsters. The political elite 
began to see the Westernisation of the young as a serious problem at the 
beginning of the 1980s, which was partly because it entailed an inconvenient 
change of value that went against the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) 
authoritative ruling style. Partly in order to deal with it, the PAP government 
started to promote history and traditional values to build a more cooperative 
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relationship between the government and people. The teaching of history was 
also utilised to this end. In this chapter, the above-mentioned development of 
history education is traced in more detail. 
 
 
2. History education under the British, 1945-1959 
2.1 Introduction 
Singapore was established as a British colony in 1819 and then developed its 
multi-ethnic society mainly composed of Chinese, Malays, and Indians. In 1947, 
the ethnic composition of Singapore’s population was Chinese 77.6%, Malays 
12.3%, and Indians 7.3%. 132 After the end of the Second World War, the British 
returned to Singapore and Malaya, and started to prepare for the colonies’ 
independence. Since literacy and education were vital for the ability of the 
people to govern themselves, educational reform was high on the agenda. 133 It is 
in this context that the 1947 Ten Years Programme articulated the major goals of 
education policy in post-war Singapore to be the fostering of the capacity for 
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self-government, the giving of equal educational opportunities, and the provision 
of free primary education. 134 
On the other hand, the British separated Singapore from Malaya. In 1946, 
they dissolved the Straits Settlements comprising of Singapore, Malacca, and 
Penang and then incorporated only Malacca and Penang to the Malayan Union, 
whereas they established a separate colony of Singapore. Thereafter, they 
appointed a separate Director of Education of Singapore apart from that of 
Malaya’s. 135 
 At that time, Singapore had neither a common education system nor 
common syllabuses and textbooks. Respective ethnic communities separately 
provided school education in respective languages: mainly English, Chinese, 
Malay and Tamil. In 1946, there were 36 English medium schools, 136  124 
registered and many other unregistered Chinese schools, 137  27 Malay medium 
schools, 138 and 25 Tamil medium schools. 139 Those schools were staffed with 
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teachers with non-Malayan training using non-Malayan textbooks. In Chinese 
medium schools, Chinese students learned China’s history, while in English 
medium schools, pupils learned the history of the British Empire. In many cases, 
those schools imparted foreign political doctrines. 140  Such diverse education 
practices since the pre-war period led to Singapore’s divided condition 
immediately after the war, which was described by Lee Kuan Yew as: “We did 
not have a common language. We could not speak to each other. Nor did we 
have a common experience, a common sharing of historic events that creates a 
common culture.” 141 
In this dissertation, the focus of discussion will be laid on the development 
of history education in English and Chinese streams because, firstly, the 
harmonisation between the two streams, in other words, reconciliation between 
the English-educated Chinese and the Chinese-educated Chinese, had been one 
of the main concerns of policy makers. One thing to note here is that the great 
majority of pupils in English medium schools in Singapore were Chinese. For 
instance, in 1946, Chinese boys and girls in English medium schools occupied 
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80% and 73% of the total male and female pupils, respectively. 142 Secondly, the 
two language streams had occupied the overwhelming majority of Singapore 
pupils. The percentages of those pupils who went to either English medium 
schools or Chinese medium schools were 91.9% in 1946 (English 31.2%, 
Chinese 60.7%), 143  94.7% in 1957 (English 49.2%, Chinese 45.1%), 144  and 
92.4% in 1965 (English 57.3%, Chinese 35.1%). 145  
 
2.2 History education in English medium schools 
In post-war Singapore, the curriculum of English medium schools was still 
similar to the one used in primary and secondary schools in England, 146 and 
thus the history syllabus used in Singapore also continued to be under the strong 
influence of British curricular models. 147  Even after the end of the war, all 
history textbooks in English medium schools were eventually the same as ones 
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used in the pre-war period, written from the Euro-centric point of view. 148 This 
was partly due to the difficulty in supplying enough amounts of new textbooks 
by publishers immediately after the war. To deal with such a problem, the pre-
war textbooks that avoided the Japanese confiscation were reused. 149  
Under the British rule, Singapore’s history syllabus still had a strong 
emphasis on the European contribution to world history. During the 1940s, a 
“basis of world history associated with great people” and “British Empire 
History” were taught in history classes of English medium schools. 150 Even in 
1958, the history syllabus for Primary III instructed to teach the lives of great 
people but the great majority listed as examples were European heroes: Marco 
Polo, St Paul, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Alfred the Great, Archimedes, 
and so forth. 151 In a similar way, the local history taught in primary schools was 
a local history from the British point of view. For instance, the topics selected to 
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learn in primary schools were, according to the 1958 syllabus, the lives of 
Francis Light and Stamford Raffles (the founders of Penang and Singapore 
respectively), the founding of Penang and Singapore, the opening of the Suez 
Canal and its effects on Malaya, the establishment of the Straits Settlements, and 
the histories of Singapore and Malaya, British Borneo, and Hong Kong. 152 
For the lower secondary students, world history from the Renaissance to the 
aftermath of the Second World War was taught. Though the 1958 syllabus stated 
that the Asian developments were emphasised, the Western emphasis remained 
unchanged. For example, seven and a half chapters out of eleven chapters taught 
in Form II of the lower secondary schools were historical developments in the 
West. 153 The upper secondary pupils (Forms IV and V) were instructed in the 
histories of Malaya and the British Commonwealth, the cultural backgrounds of 
the people of Malaya, and the development of liberty and responsibility. When 
we compare the syllabus of Malayan history with that of the history of the 
British Commonwealth, the latter was more detailed than the former. 154 
Although these syllabuses were written based on the past curriculum for English 
medium schools, Jiaoyu Gongyingshe, a Singapore textbooks publisher for 
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Chinese medium schools, also published history textbooks for Chinese medium 
schools based on the above 1958 syllabus. 155 
Northcote Parkinson, a British historian, observed that the teaching of 
European history was the tradition of history teaching in Malaya and such a 
tradition still remained in 1955:  
 
History teaching in Malayan schools has for long been handicapped by a lack of 
textbooks. Teachers long ago saw the absurdity of attempting to make Malayan 
children learn about the Norman Conquest, the Spanish Armada, the foundation of 
Virginia and the capture of Quebec... Only very recently has there been a tendency 
to teach Malayan history to Malayan children and only very slowly has that 
tendency become general. 156  
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Reading in such Euro-centric or Anglo-centric history classes, students 
unknowingly learned “an Anglo-centric view of the world” and knew little about 
Singapore. 157 This led to developing the idea of Britain as the centre of the 
world that, directly or indirectly, contributed to the promotion of the British 
interests. 
 As seen from above, although the history of Malaya and Singapore was also 
taught in English medium schools, it was portrayed from the Euro-centric point 
of view 158 that was the historiographical tradition of the time. Such a tradition 
was established at the first half of the twentieth century through the works of 
Frank Swettenham and Richard Winstedt. 159 Especially, Swettemham, who had 
worked for the British government as Governor of the Straits Settlements and 
High Commissioner of the Federated Malay States before he entered authorship, 
attempted to justify the establishment of British control over the Malay states in 
British Malaya, published in 1906. 160  The tradition of Euro-centric 
historiography was created in close connection with British interests. 
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Another tradition, the Malaya-centred historiography, was also established in 
close link with Britain’s, as well as in the author’s interests. Due to the demand 
of the British administration in Malaya, the most ambitious civil servants chose 
to study Malay in expectation of being appointed to higher ranks, and those with 
an academic bent concentrated on research into the affairs of the Malay States. 
161
 Such a situation, together with people’s conception that Singapore was part 
of Malaya, contributed to the creation of the Malaya-centred historiography, and 
there was no Singapore-centred historiography at that point in time. 
While, in English medium schools, history was taught by using textbooks 
imported from Britain written from the Euro-centric point of view, in Chinese 
medium schools the history of China was likewise taught by using textbooks 
imported from China, albeit other histories such as world history and the history 
of Southeast Asia were also covered in history classes. 162 Just as what was 
taught in English medium schools reflected British interests, the curriculum used 
in Chinese medium schools was similarly under the strong influence of the 
affairs in China.  
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2.2 History education in Chinese medium schools 
Before the Second World War, Chinese medium schools in Singapore 
mostly followed China’s curriculum with some adjustments to the local context 
and imported all but English textbooks from China. 163 The content of textbooks 
imported from pre-war China strongly emphasised anti-colonialism, patriotism, 
and cultural nationalism. 164  For example, a pre-war textbook for primary 
schools entitled Xinshidai Guoyu Jiaokeshu (New Age National Language 
Textbook) covered the stories of China’s modern history as “National 
Humiliation” (Guochi). According to the textbook, the National Humiliation 
began with Opium Wars by which Hong Kong was ceded to Britain, after which 
Vietnam, Burma, Korea, and Taiwan were deprived by France, Britain and 
Japan, respectively; furthermore, Beijing was occupied in 1900 by the Allied 
forces comprising Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Russia, and the United States, and thereafter in 1915 China was forced to accept 
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the humiliating 21 demands from Japan. To wipe out such humiliation, the 
textbook claimed, the Chinese people must exercise hard, work diligently, and 
nurture a brave spirit to sacrifice and fight fearlessly. 165 The textbooks imported 
to Singapore seemed to contain similar stories. 
However, the British authorities started to censor such incoming textbooks in 
1925 and eliminated inappropriate or inconvenient content from the textbooks 
before they were used in Singapore schools. For instance, the Nanjing 
government published the syllabuses for primary and secondary schools in 1929 
that included the propangandistic subject called “dangyi”, which taught 
Kuomingtang’s achievements and policies including the teaching of Sun Yat 
Sen’s life, the three principles of the people (sanmin zhuyi), and the party’s flag. 
This subject was not allowed to be taught in Singapore. Having faced such a 
situation, China’s textbook publishers, such as Zhonghua Shuju and Shangwu 
Yinshuguan, voluntarily began producing special editions of textbooks for the 
overseas Chinese that the British would allow Singapore schools to use. At the 
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same time, Singapore’s Nanyang Shuju also started to produce history textbooks 
suitable for schools in Singapore and Malaya. 166  
The content of those special editions was, in general, constituted of the 
history of China, world history and the history of the overseas Chinese in 
Southeast Asia (Nanyang Huaqiao). For instance, out of four volumes of history 
textbooks for primary schools of the Nanyang Chinese, entitled Fuxing Lishi 
Jiaokeshu, two volumes were devoted to the history of China and its relation to 
the world, one volume to world history, and another volume the history of the 
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. The last volume taught the origin of the 
Chinese race, their expansion to southern China, their relation with Southeast 
Asia, their immigration to that region, and the development of the overseas 
Chinese in respective Southeast Asian countries. 167  
Such a portrait of that region can be said to be the history of Southeast Asia 
from the Chinese point of view. The teaching of such a history probably had 
some effect on inculcating the Chinese-centric view of the world in the minds of 
Chinese pupils. 
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In 1940, the Malayan Department of Chinese Education’s Committee on 
Revision of Primary Schools’ Curriculum (malaiya huawen jiaoyubu xiugai 
xiaoxue kecheng weiyuanhui), constituted of members from government 
officials and representatives from Chinese medium schools in Singapore and 
Malaya, issued a standardised curriculum for primary schools in that region. 
According to that curriculum, a combined subject of history and geography 
called “shidi” was taught at the level of Primary V and VI for 180 minutes per 
week and at the secondary level for 90 minutes per week. The latter constituted 
6.25% of the total teaching time. Even after the end of the Second World War, 
this 1940 curriculum, as well as textbooks produced based on that curriculum, 
continued to be used in Singapore. 168  This was partly because there was a 
difficulty in importing the latest editions of textbooks from China amidst the 
confusion of the post-war transition in Singapore and a civil war in China. 169  
On the other hand, the Chinese government continued to be involved in 
education affairs in Singapore. In 1946, for instance, the Chinese Consul in 
Singapore invited two representatives from the Education Ministry of China and 
held a meeting with parties interested in Chinese education to discuss the issues 
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of the rehabilitation of schools in Singapore and Malaya. 170 At the same time, 
the Nanjing government attempted to compel Chinese medium schools in that 
region to register in China. 171 However, after the communists’ victory in the 
Chinese Civil War in 1949, the majority of Singapore Chinese had chosen 
Singapore as their new home and began to sever their relationship with the 
mainland. 172  
In 1951, the Malayan government invited Dr. William Fenn and Dr. Wu 
Teh-yao from the United States to conduct a study on Chinese education in 
Singapore and Malaya. In the same year, they released a report called Chinese 
Schools and the Education of Chinese Malayans (the Fenn-Wu Report) that 
sharply pointed out the problems of Malayan education: both English medium 
schools and vernacular schools were essentially “foreign institutions brought in 
from outside” and reflected the practice and interests of China, India, and the 
United Kingdom; and no education provided by any language stream was 
designed from the Malayan-centric point of view. 173 The report subsequently 
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claimed that textbooks used in all of the schools were entirely unsuitable to 
Malaya. They stated that “History should pay greater attention to world history 
than to the history of either China, India, or the British Empire.” 174  In 
conclusion, the Fenn-Wu Report recommended the Malayanisation of textbook 
content. 175  In response to this recommendation, in the following year, the 
Malayan government set up the Central Committee on Textbooks of Chinese 
Medium Schools (huaxiao jiaokeshu zhongyang weiyuanhui, the Central 
Committee) and the Advisory Committee on Textbooks of Chinese Medium 
Schools (huaxiao jiaokeshu zixun weiyuanhui, the Advisory Committee) to 
censor and revise textbooks used in Chinese medium schools in Singapore and 
Malaya. 176 The process of textbooks revision was as follows: firstly, each sub-
committee that examined textbooks of each subject wrote a syllabus proposal, 
which was, secondly, discussed by the Advisory Committee and then by the 
Central Committee; thirdly, the Central Committee released a syllabus proposal 
to seek the public’s feedbacks; and lastly, the proposal was again discussed by 
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both committees and then issued as an officially approved syllabus. The 
difference between the two committees was their membership: the Central 
Committee was composed of members from government officials and Chinese 
school representatives from Singapore and Malaya, whereas the Advisory 
Committee’s members were only non-officials from the two colonies. 177  
In 1952, the Central Committee released syllabuses for Chinese primary 
schools that included a Malayanised history syllabus in which the topics to be 
taught were “the past and present situation in Malaya and Southeast Asia”, 
“modern important events in Malaya and Southeast Asia”, “the period of British 
rule”, “the Japanese Occupation of Malaya”, and so forth. 178 The ratio of each 
teaching area was the history of China 50%, the history of Malaya 30%, and 
world history 20%. 179 This was apparently not a substantial change from the 
previous teaching ratio: it was shown in the Fenn-Wu Report that the teaching 
ratio of the history of China was 50%, the history of Malaya 25%, and world 
history 25% when they conducted the study in 1951. 180 However, according to 
Cui Guiqiang’s study of a few extant pre-war history textbooks used in Chinese 
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medium schools, Malayan history was almost never mentioned in those 
textbooks. For instance, history textbooks for primary schools entitled Xiaoxue 
Lish Keben, published in 1941, gave a description of the modern history of 
China (28%), world history (39%), the history of overseas Chinese (28%), and 
others (6%). Although Malaya was mentioned in chapters of the history of the 
overseas Chinese, it was mentioned only in the background of the history of the 
Chinese. 181 Another set of history textbooks for junior secondary schools (chuji 
zhongxue) entitled Benguoshi, published in 1938, taught only Chinese history 
from ancient to modern times; they never mentioned the history of Malaya. 182  
This tendency still continued in the history textbooks published even after 
1945. For instance, four volumes of history textbooks for primary V and VI 
classes entitled Xiaoxue Lishi Keben, published in 1949, hardly mentioned the 
history of Malaya: out of 72 chapters only one chapter, ‘Malacca during the 
Ming dynasty’, talked about Malayan history and another five chapters 
mentioned Malaya and Southeast Asia only in relation to the overseas Chinese. 
On the other hand, 56 chapters were on the history of China. 183  Likewise, 
another four volumes of history textbooks for primary schools entitled Fuxing 
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Lishi Jiaokeshu, published in 1949, hardly taught the history of Malaya. Out of 
four volumes of textbooks, one volume was devoted to the history of the 
Chinese immigrants to Southeast Asia (Nanyang Yimin Lishi) and that was 
constituted of twenty chapters, out of which merely one chapter discussed the 
overseas Chinese in Malaya. 184 Here, an important point to note is that it was a 
history of the Chinese in Malaya rather than a Malayan history from the 
Malayan point of view. On the other hand, two volumes out of four volumes 
were devoted to the history of China and its relation to the world.  
As seen from above, the main content of those textbooks was the history of 
China, not that of Malaya. This is also stated in the editorial policy in the 
textbook: “The key points that this textbook instructs overseas Chinese pupils to 
understand are the development of their motherland, the general trend of the 
world, and the significance of cultural development.” 185  Here, ‘motherland’ 
means China and China is frequently termed as ‘our country’ (wo guo) in the 
textbooks. It is obvious that the priority to teach the history of Malaya in those 
textbooks was considerably low. If such history textbooks that hardly mentioned 
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Malayan history were generally used in the region, it can be considered as a 
substantial change that the 1952 syllabus set the teaching of Malayan history to 
comprise 30% of the total history teaching. 
The 1952 syllabus for primary schools was designed in such a way that 
would teach the pupils’ immediate environment, such as family, from which 
teaching would gradually expand to the learning about school, society, and 
Malaya. In history classes, for instance, Primary I pupils would  learn about each 
pupil’s family history, their school’s founding and development, the stories of 
historic sites and public buildings in their local community, and the past and 
present situation of Malaya and Southeast Asia. Subsequently, Primary II and III 
pupils would learn historic sites, great people and important events of Malaya, 
Southeast Asia, China and other countries, human history of early time, and 
China’s early inventions. In Primary IV, V, and VI, pupils would learn the 
history of Malaya and Southeast Asia, of China, and of the world, respectively. 
186
 
After the release of the standard syllabuses in 1952, local textbook 
publishers started to produce textbooks in line with the guideline. However, it 
was not compulsory for all Chinese medium schools to adopt the revised 
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textbooks at that point in time, and schools still had a right to decide which 
textbooks to use in their schools. For instance, five Chinese medium schools 
under Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan, in 1953, made a decision not to use the 
new textbooks and to continue to use the old textbooks. 187 However, in 1956, 
Singapore’s Ministry of Education issued a notification to instruct all Chinese 
medium primary schools to adopt textbooks produced based on the syllabuses 
released by the Central Committee and approved by the Singapore government. 
188
 In around 1956, the Singapore and Malayan governments banned the import 
of books including textbooks from 53 publishers located in China and Hong 
Kong: almost all the publishers that exported Chinese books to Singapore and 
Malaya. 189 
In this way, the colonial governments in Singapore and Malaya promoted the 
Malayanisation of textbooks.  However, responses from the Chinese community 
were not positive. Many people in the Chinese community feared that once 
Chinese education was Malayanised, that might ultimately lead to the extinction 
of Chinese culture in that region, regardless of the governments’ repeated claim 
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that the aim of creating new textbooks was to improve teaching materials and 
adjust to Singapore and Malaya’s environment. The Singapore Chinese Schools’ 
Conference issued a statement in 1952 asserting that each ethnic group’s 
textbooks should lay more emphasis on its own traditional culture, customs, and 
characters, and the younger generation should have a global perspective rather 
than a narrow Malayan perspective. 190 In a similar token, teachers from four 
Chinese medium schools sponsored by Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan held a 
conference and released a statement in 1952 claiming that the revised textbooks 
should put an emphasis on Chinese history and geography as well as on the lives, 
ethics, and culture of the Chinese. 191 A reason behind such assertions was their 
suspicion toward the British education policy: they suspected that the education 
authorities in truth intended to change the content of history textbooks from the 
history of Chinese into that of Malay under the name of ‘Malayanisation’ as a 
cover that would lead to the complete removal of Chinese culture in the Malay 
Peninsula. Such a feeling of fear among the Chinese, according to the Fenn-Wu 
Report, was very real. 192 
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Although the context was slightly different, the fear of the extinction of 
Chinese culture and the suspicion toward the colonial government were shared 
by the Singapore Chinese as well. Such fear and suspicion can be found in 
editorials of Chinese newspapers such as Sinchew Jitpoh and Nanyang Siang 
Pau, one of which claimed that the implementation of the 1947 Ten Years 
Programme that declared basic education policies to pursue in post-war 
Singapore might lead to a crisis that would eliminate Chinese education because 
the Programme gave preference to English education on the ground that only 
English medium schools would ensure the intermingling of pupils of all ethnic 
groups.193 Another editorial further asserted that though the colonial government 
did not openly state its intention to eliminate Chinese education, it did not take 
any measures to stop the decline of Chinese education even when such a trend 
became more and more obvious. 194 In short, the Chinese community suspected 
that a hidden aim of the British education policy was to eliminate Chinese 
education and culture.195 
On the other hand, the British scepticism toward vernacular education was 
also seen in the Ten Years Programme in that it recognised the need to ‘correct’ 
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the Indian and Chinese education that was under the strong influence of 
respective ‘motherlands’ and suggested the expansion of English education. 196 
Under such a scheme of the 1947 Ten Years Programme along with the 
Supplementary Five Years Plan that started in 1950, the colonial government 
constructed many more English medium schools than vernacular schools: it had 
constructed 96 new primary and eleven new secondary schools in ten years since 
1947, but most of those new schools were English medium schools and no 
government-run Chinese schools were constructed by the second-to-last year of 
the end of the Programme. 197 On a similar token, the colonial government had 
invested much more money and resources to English medium schools than 
Chinese medium schools. For instance, in 1946, the government expenditure on 
English medium schools ($1,493,997) was seven times that of Chinese medium 
schools ($213,051). 198 This ratio almost did not change in the 1953 budget: the 
spending for English medium schools ($15,692,545) was 6.8 times that for 
Chinese medium schools ($2,295,591). 199 
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Such an education policy was defended by the British as follows: Firstly, as 
mentioned above, they claimed that English medium schools alone could offer 
“any hope of breaking down communal barriers,” 200 while Chinese, Malay, and 
Tamil medium schools served only children of each ethnic group, which might 
bring forth further racial segregation. Secondly, a majority of parents were in 
favour of sending their children to English medium schools, while no striking 
increase was found in the enrolments in vernacular schools. 201 In fact, students 
of English medium schools outnumbered those of Chinese medium schools in 
1954 for the first time, and thereafter this trend never changed. 202 Lastly, some 
of the Chinese medium schools were seen by the British as a hotbed of 
communist infiltration. 203  
The colonial government had been concerned especially about the growing 
communist influence on Chinese medium schools. In the 1930s, it was said that 
communists had already established a foothold in Chinese medium schools, and 
with the Communist Party’s victory in establishing the government in mainland 
China in 1949, their influence on Chinese workers and students in Singapore and 
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Malaya strengthened. 204 During the 1950s, in the face of communist insurgency 
in Malaya and Singapore, the British authorities made attempts to sever the link 
between the local Chinese medium schools and the curricula in Communist 
China to prevent communist propaganda from influencing the local Chinese 
teachers and students, and became more cautious to the ideological infiltration to 
the Chinese medium schools. 205  
For example, in 1950, the colonial government closed the Chinese High 
School and Nanyang Middle School for two and a half months on the ground 
that those schools were involved in political activities. In fact, according to a 
government report, communist documents and other seditious materials were 
found in the school compounds. Many students and teachers were arrested. 
Thereafter, Li Chi Wah, the Inspector of Chinese Schools, was shot by a 
Chinese youth and was seriously injured. 206 
In 1954, another incident happened. When about 900 Chinese medium 
school students took part in a demonstration against compulsory registration for 
National Service, or conscription, which had just begun in the same year, the 
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police under the British stopped the demonstration. In this process, many 
protesters were injured and 36 students were arrested. Students then continued to 
protest by going on a hunger strike at the premises of Chung Cheng High School 
and the Chinese High School until school directors persuaded them to go home 
several days later. The student leaders employed communist slogans and 
protested that they would be forced to fight against communists to protect the 
British if they followed the procedure of registration for National Service. 207    
In 1955, Chinese medium school students, mainly from the Chinese High 
School and Chung Cheng High School, skipped classes and participated in 
industrial disputes, especially in the Hock Lee Bus strike. In the following year, 
when the government banned the Singapore Chinese Middle Schools Students’ 
Union on the ground that the Union was involved in political activities, Chinese 
students who were unsatisfied with such a measure began to gather at the 
compounds of the Chinese High School and Chung Cheng High School to 
protest against the government. A few days later, the government ordered the 
police to clear the schools. 208 Thereafter, riots broke out. It was reported that a 
mob of over 4,000 attacked police stations, overturned police cars, and set fire 
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on cars on the street. A curfew was then imposed 209 and several students and 
teachers were arrested. After the riots, the government closed the above two 
Chinese medium schools for some time and instead opened three government-
run Chinese secondary schools as an emergency measure. 210 
It was in such a climate that the government set up, in 1955, the All-Party 
Committee of the Singapore Legislative Assembly on Chinese Education. There 
was a grave fear that antipathy and divided loyalty would increase unless the 
Chinese-educated and English-educated were brought closer together. 211 After 
discussions among the committee members comprised of the representatives of 
all political parties in the Singapore Legislative Assembly, the committee 
released its report (All-Party Report) in 1956. The Report identified two major 
reasons for disturbances caused by Chinese medium schools to be “the historical 
development of the Chinese schools system” and “the exploitation of the 
dissatisfaction and frustration to which that system has given rise.” 212 It was 
then recommended that schools and pupils of all language streams should be 
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equally treated, respected, and fostered. 213  At the same time, it was also 
recommended that the curriculum in Chinese medium schools should be 
designed in line with an overall education plan, and the textbooks used in all 
schools should be Malayanised in order to inculcate “a Singapore-centred 
loyalty and a Malayan-consciousness”. 214 As for the language education, the 
Report proposed multi-lingualism: bilingualism in the primary stage and 
trilingualism in the secondary stage. 215 
In response to the submission of the All-Party Report, Singapore’s newly 
elected Labour Front government – the first locally elected government sharing 
power with the British that already assumed power in 1955 – presented an 
outline of the education policy of the new government in a White Paper on 
Education Policy issued in 1956. The White Paper accepted many 
recommendations of the All-Party Report such as the equal treatment for all 
schools of the four language streams, the need to Malayanise the syllabuses and 
textbooks, and the introduction of multi-lingualism. Albeit the White Paper was 
suspicious toward the practicality of the compulsory teaching of three languages 
at the secondary level and thus proposed experimental tryouts in a few selected 
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schools. 216 The emphasis laid in the White Paper was the explicit declaration of 
education policy as a main means for nation-building. It declared that “the main 
aim of this Government’s education policy is to build a Malayan nation. The 
Government will not support any school which lacks this emphasis on a 
common Malayan loyalty.” 217 To this end, other policies were articulated, such 
as the Malayanisation of syllabuses and textbooks, the compulsory bilingual 
education in both English medium and vernacular schools, and the equal 
treatment for all schools of the four language streams.  
With regard to the Malayanisation of syllabuses and textbooks, the White 
Paper showed the government’s discontent with the progress made by a Pan-
Malayan Textbook Committee composed of the Central and Advisory 
Committees even though it released the first standard syllabuses for Chinese 
medium schools in Singapore and Malaya in 1952. Thus, the Singapore 
government alone set up a joint committee to produce new Malayanised 
syllabuses and textbooks. Those syllabuses were created within the following 
framework, stated in the Fenn-Wu Report: (1) no attempts would be made to 
create a nation as an unwilling fusion of different cultures, (2) mutual tolerance 
and appreciation of cultural differences would be promoted, and (3) Malayan 
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loyalty without deculturalisation would be fostered. 218 Based on such principles, 
as mentioned earlier, the Singapore government released the new history 
syllabuses for primary and secondary schools in 1958. 
 
 
3. Striving for a Malayan nation: One step forward for a Malayanised history 
education, 1959-1965 
In 1959, Singapore attained internal self-government under the PAP. The 
PAP, along the line already declared in its manifesto of 1954, set out on a 
journey to create a Malayan nation. 219 As part of its Malayanisation efforts, the 
PAP government, in 1959, designated Malay as the National Language of 
Singapore and promoted Malay language education. Soon after the new 
government was in place, it organised language and literacy classes for Malay, 
English, Chinese, and Tamil. Among the four language courses, Malay was the 
most popular: 15,271 students attended 421 Malay classes organised by the 
government, whereas the number of English learners of the same course was less 
than a half of Malay learners; merely 6,686 students attended 258 English 
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classes in 1959. 220 In a similar vein, Malay language education received due 
emphasis in the school curriculum as well. Even in English, Chinese, and Tamil 
medium schools, Malay was taught as either a second or third language. 221 More 
than 60 percent of non-Malay students at the primary and secondary levels chose 
to study Malay in 1965.222  
In addition to promoting the study of Malay, the Singapore government, in 
1960, started to provide free education for the Malays from the primary to 
university level with benefits such as free textbooks, free transport, allowances, 
and scholarships. 223 Emphasis was given on the Malay language and the Malays 
in this period because the PAP leaders thought that Singapore’s merger with 
Malaya would not be able to succeed if Singapore did not highlight the role of 
the Malays. 224 The PAP then pursued Singapore’s merger with Malaya (Malaya 
had already achieved independence from Britain in 1957) and recognised that an 
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important pre-condition for the merger was the ‘Malayanisation’ of Singapore’s 
education. A PAP publication states:  
 
The people of Singapore strongly desire a political merger with Federation of 
Malaya. An important pre-condition for such a Merger is that our own education 
system in Singapore should appropriate as closely as possible, in essentials, with 
that of the Federation of Malaya.  225 
 
Along this line, the PAP government, in 1960, began implementing its 
education policy to build a new Malayan nation through “the unification and 
integration of a hitherto diverse educational pattern.” 226  As part of its 
integration policy, the Ministry of Education changed the Chinese school system 
by shortening its six years of junior and senior secondary education into four 
years, the same system as that of English medium schools. 227 
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Another government attempt to integrate a diverse education system under 
the name of Malayanisation was to require all the four language streams in 
Singapore to use the Malayan-centric syllabuses and textbooks. 228  In 1959, 
Yong Nyuk Lin, the newly appointed Minister for Education, established two 
main standing committees. 229 One of those was the Committee on Syllabuses 
and Textbooks that was entrusted with the task to revise all syllabuses of all 
subjects for primary and secondary schools. 230 In 1961, a new history syllabus 
together with another 36 syllabuses was released. 231 
In the new history syllabus, as Cui Guiqiang and Ng Teik Heng point out, 
more emphasis was placed on the teaching of historical events and figures of 
Asia. 232 For example, the 1958 syllabus for Primary III instructed to teach the 
lives of great people but 8 out of the 10 great people listed were European 
heroes, however, Asian heroes dominated in the 1961 syllabus for Primary III: 
22 out of 30 were Asian historical figures. Under the category of ‘Rulers and 
Conquerors’, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Alfred the Great, listed as 
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examples in the 1958 syllabus, were replaced by Shih Huang Ti, Han Wu Ti, 
Akbar, Kublai Khan, and Alexandra the Great in the 1961 syllabus. 233  
In a similar token, the 1961 syllabus for Secondary III that covered world 
history from 1600 to 1945 laid more emphasis on the histories of Asia compared 
to the equivalent part of the 1958 syllabus. In the 1961 syllabus, four out of nine 
chapters (44%) were devoted to the histories of Asia, whereas only five out of 
fifteen chapters (33%) covered the same region in the 1958 syllabus. In addition, 
the number of sub-headings under a chapter on each Asian country also 
increased: in the case of China, only six sub-headings stated in the 1958 syllabus 
rose to fifteen sub-headings in the 1961 syllabus; likewise, three sub-headings 
rose to eleven sub-headings in the case of India, three to five in the case of Japan, 
and two to four in the case of Southeast Asia. In short, the coverage of the 
histories of Asia was greatly increased in the 1961 syllabus. Instead, that of the 
histories of Europe was reduced: five chapters devoted to the histories of Europe 
in the 1958 syllabus (‘French Revolution’, ‘Nineteenth Century England and 
West Europe’, ‘The Industrial Revolution in the West’, ‘Nineteenth Century 
Russia’, and ‘The Unification of Italy and The Unification of Germany’) were 
                                                           
233
 Colony of Singapore, History for Primary and Secondary Schools, 7; The Ministry of Education, 
Singapore, Syllabus for History in Primary and Secondary Schools (Singapore: Authority,  1963), 1. 
 108 
integrated into one chapter under the heading of ‘Europe’ in the 1961 syllabus. 
234
       
Based on such a ‘Malayanised’ syllabus, new history textbooks were 
published not only in English but also in Chinese. This time, it was reported that 
textbook writers and publishers for the four language streams responded 
splendidly to the new syllabus. 235 Then, history textbooks for English medium 
schools, such as K. R. Memon’s History in Singapore Schools and Tan Keng 
Kang’s A Primary History Course for Singapore Schools, were published. The 
chapter headings in both authors’ books followed almost exactly the headings 
and sub-headings stated in the 1961 syllabus. 236 Because the 1961 syllabus had 
much more detailed sub-headings than the 1958 syllabus did, there seemed to be 
almost no freedom for the author to select topics. This is also the same in the 
case of history textbooks for Chinese medium schools. According to Cui 
Guiqiang’s study, four chapters out of a total of six chapters in a Chinese history 
textbook for Primary VI were devoted to Southeast Asia, Malaya, and Singapore 
under chapter titles of ‘Malacca and her Neighbours’, ‘The Coming of 
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Europeans to Southeast Asia’, ‘European Dominance in Southeast Asia’, and 
‘Malaya in the Modern World’, which exactly followed the headings stated in 
the 1961 syllabus. Similarly, another Chinese history textbook for Secondary IV 
covered two chapters entitled ‘Malayan history (1200-1960)’ and ‘Cultural 
background of Malayan people’, which were the same as the headings stated in 
the 1961 syllabus. 237 In this way, the 1961 syllabus strengthened its grip on the 
content of textbooks to ensure the Malayanisation of education that the PAP 
government pursued in this period. 
On the other hand, the 1961 syllabus of the history of Malaya for Secondary 
IV hardly changed from the equivalent part of the 1958 syllabus written from the 
largely Euro-centric point of view. Only a few Asian events that were not 
incorporated to the 1958 syllabus (Temasik and Singapura, the Anglo-Siamese 
treaty of 1826, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902, the Washington Treaty 1922, 
and the Chinese and Indians in Malaya) were added to the 1961 syllabus while 
the rest remained the same. 238 One of the important factors behind this, as we 
will see below, was the fact that the very Malayan-centric history was still in the 
process of making even in historian’s circles at that time. 
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After releasing the 1961 syllabuses, the Syllabuses and Textbooks Division 
in the Ministry of Education formed an ad hoc committee to revise syllabuses 
for the senior secondary classes (gaoji zhongxue) of the Chinese medium 
schools, and released ten new syllabuses including a history syllabus in 1963. 239 
Based on this syllabus, Youlian Chubanshe, a textbook publisher for Chinese 
medium schools, produced a series of history textbooks for Senior Secondary I 
and II, entitled Gaozhong Lishi, that constituted six volumes: the first and 
second volumes were devoted to the history of East Asia, the third volume to the 
history of Southeast Asia, the fourth and fifth volumes to the history of Europe, 
and the sixth volume to the history of Southwest Asia. 240  
In the early 1960s, it was still difficult to produce a Malayanised textbook 
that could draw a consensus from various parties involved. For, as mentioned 
above, a Malayan-centric historiography had not yet been firmly established 
even in historian’s circles. According to John Smail, even the term ‘Europe-
centric’ was not given wide currency until D. G. E. Hall published History of 
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South-east Asia in 1955. 241 Following that, the 1950s and 60s was the time of a 
heated historiographical debate as to the question of “how much weight should 
be given to the indigenous component as opposed to the European” between 
Malayan and Western historians. 242  In this debate, Malayan nationalist 
historians claimed a need to reinterpret its colonial past from the Malayan point 
of view. For instance, Lim Say Hup argued that:  
 
… we cannot help but note that up to date, much of the history of Malaya has been 
written mainly by Westerners, based almost entirely on English or Dutch sources. 
There is, therefore, a strong need for a reinterpretation and a reassessment of 
Malayan history from the Malayan point of view and based not only on Western 
sources, but also on Malay, Chinese, Indian, and Siamese sources. 243  
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Similarly, K. G. Tregonning also criticised that the previous history of 
Malaya was written only from the Euro-centric point of view and asserted a need 
to rewrite Malayan history from the local viewpoint:  
 
Nearly all the authors have been Europeans brought up in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century historical attitude of surveying the world through Europe-
centric views. The predominant theme to them in Asian history (or African) is 
European expansion into that continent, the European in Asia, not Asia itself. This 
is out-of-date: it has always been incorrect, and to think of the Malay Peninsula 
during those three centuries as experiencing a Portuguese and a Dutch period is to 
be very wrong. It is a false balance. Asia, not the European in Asia, must be our 
theme. 244 
 
Based on such an idea, Tregonning authored a book of a Malayan-centric 
history, entitled A History of Modern Malaya, in 1964, in which he claimed that 
it was not the history of the European in Malaya but of the Malayan community 
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itself that should be the centre of studies. 245 Against the backdrop of such a 
nationalistic trend in historian’s circles during the 1950s and 60s, John Bastin 
warned in his paper entitled “The Western Element in Modern Southeast Asian 
History” that historians should not merely follow such a political trend without 
paying due regard to its danger: 
 
It would be extremely dangerous if, in an anxiety to meet the political demands of a 
resurgent Asian consciousness, historians of Southeast Asia began to minimise too 
much the part played by the westerners in the region… Surely the plea for 
reinterpreting Southeast Asian history from an Asian point of view means 
something more than the convenient removal of Westerners from the historical 
narrative?  246 
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Bastin’s criticism toward nationalists’ claim to rewrite a colonial history invited 
various responses from Malayan and Western historians. D. P. Singhal advanced 
his view that Bastin’s “gallant defence of ‘western honour’” 247  was his 
excessive response to an imaginary attack and claimed, “let us stop thinking of 
ourselves as the defenders of either the ‘western’ or the ‘eastern’ honour.” 248 On 
the other hand, John Smail pointed out that Bastin confused a problem of 
perspective (how much importance we should assign to the role of the 
Westerners in Malaya) with that of value judgment (how good or bad they were 
in the colony); therefore, “the more emotion-laden moral problem” tended to 
“overshadow the perspective problem” when he discussed the danger of too 
much of a shift toward the Asian-centric history. 249 G. I. T. Machin agreed with 
Smail’s argument and stressed the importance of moral neutrality particularly 
amid the nationalistic trend of the time. 250 As seen from above, the debate on 
how much weight should be placed on the Malayan element vis-à-vis the 
Western element in the history writing of that country had just started in the late 
1950s; and, therefore, according to Singhal, ‘the Asian viewpoint’ still remained 
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undefined in the early 1960s. 251 Under such circumstances, since the Malayan-
centric history was still in the making even in the academic world, the 
Malayanisation of history education had also not yet fully blossomed. 
 
 
4. Gearing up for economic growth: Marginalisation of history education, 
1965-1979 
In 1965, Singapore unexpectedly achieved independence as a result of its 
sudden separation from Malaysia with which was spent a short but bitter time 
since 1963. The abrupt separation from its economic hinterland, followed by 
Britain’s announcement in 1968 of its withdrawal from the east of Suez 
including the bases in Singapore, set a course for the newly independent state to 
be preoccupied with its economic and political survival. Due to the 
government’s priority on the urgent demand of economic survival, the school 
subjects which were considered to be conducive to economic growth – English, 
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mathematics, and science – were prioritised. As a result, history education was 
marginalised until Singapore achieved an economic miracle in the late 1970s. 252   
Though in secondary schools the same history syllabus continued to be used 
from 1960 to 1984, in the primary level history education was marginalised.253 
In primary schools, history became non-examinable in 1968 and was dropped 
from the Primary School Leaving Examinations in 1972. 254  Although new 
history textbooks for primary schools were published in 1970, those textbooks 
survived only until 1974. 255 Thereafter, history was absorbed to a new non-
examinable subject called Education for Living (EFL) in 1975, 256  a subject that 
combined civics, ethics, history, and geography. The textbooks of EFL were 
produced in Chinese, Malay and Tamil. 257 The Ministry of Education devised 
EFL because it believed that the integration “would reduce the number of 
subjects taught in primary schools so that pupils could concentrate on language 
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learning.” 258 In addition, the Ministry of Education expected it to deal with the 
problem of “the rise of juvenile delinquency and drag taking.” 259  
However, EFL was criticised as “irrelevant to moral instruction” and, 
therefore, the Moral Education Committee recommended making an end of EFL. 
260
 EFL failed to inculcate moral values in the minds of Singapore youths partly 
because there was a tendency for Chinese, Malay or Tamil language teachers in 
English medium schools to be assigned to teach EFL only because they were 
proficient in those languages. Such teachers tended to teach EFL as if it were a 
language class. As a result, the pupils in the English stream were unlikely to 
attend EFL as a class to learn moral messages. 261 Furthermore, it was pointed 
out by the Report on the Ministry of Education in 1978 (the Goh Report) that a 
good deal of the material in the EFL textbooks was irrelevant and useless to 
inculcate moral beliefs in children. 262 Thus, the Report recommended scrapping 
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the subject, and EFL was abolished in 1979 and replaced by Social Studies: a 
new subject constituting of history and geography. 263  In this way, history 
education in primary schools was continuously marginalised from Singapore’s 
independence until the 1970s. But why was the learning of history not 
encouraged as a means of nation-building in this period? 
Firstly, as mentioned above, after the sudden separation from Malaysia, as 
Dhanabalan pointed out that Singaporeans were “all too preoccupied with 
surviving the present to worry about recording it for the future.” 264  The 
immediate pressing issues such as economic survival forced Singaporeans to 
“examine the present, think of the future, and forget the past.” 265 Under such 
circumstances, it was natural that the subjects seen to enhance industrial skills 
such as English, mathematics, and science were prioritised over other subjects 
such as history. “History,” according to Ong Pang Boon, a then minister, “has no 
immediate practical use… It does not help us compute our way through life. 
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Thus in schools, history together with geography, is being pushed out of the 
curriculum to make room for more useful studies.” 266 
Secondly, Singapore’s past was seen as useless to raise national pride or 
patriotism, so it was not encouraged to be remembered. A fact we need to note is 
that Singapore was still an unwealthy, unstable, and conflict-ridden society after 
its independence; therefore, its national history up to the 1960s was “the story of 
how immigrants from many countries came and settled down and how 
communal tension and suspicion led to mass riots and destruction.” 267 It was 
natural for Singapore’s leaders to draw the conclusion that the teaching of such 
history was not useful to raise pupils’ national pride. On this point, S. 
Rajaratnam, a founding father of Singapore, confessed, in 1987:  
 
Until very recently Singapore’s past was a matter of supreme indifference for most 
Singaporeans simply because they believed this island never really had a history 
worth remembering … because all of that history was British colonial history. The 
only proven history Singapore had was in the eyes of most nationalists a shameful 
episode of exploitation, oppression and humiliation of a people who nevertheless 
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insisted on remaining in Singapore. Patriotism required that we performed some 
sort of collective lobotomy to wipe out all traces of 146 years of shame.268  
 
Such a shameful history of exploitation, oppression, and humiliation, as Kwa 
Chong Guan argues, could not be encouraged to be remembered in schools.269 
Similarly, Janadas Devan points out that the events that happened before 
1965 cannot be absorbed into a “triumphant nationalist narrative” because the 
history leading up to Singapore’s independence is filled with inconvenient facts 
to write a victorious history. First of all, he argues, the PAP, after taking office 
in 1959, had been making all out efforts for the merger with Malaysia achieved 
in 1963; but it turned out to be a mistake: in 1965, Singapore was expelled from 
Malaysia. Such a story cannot be narrated as a victorious national narrative. 
Therefore, it was conveniently forgotten. 270  
In addition, Devan points out that the period from 1942 to 1959 is also 
fraught with inconvenient facts. The Japanese Occupation produced Malayan 
nationalism, not Singapore nationalism. Lim Bo Seng is now praised as a 
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Singapore hero but he was, in fact, working with the Chinese government under 
a British commander, which was also conveniently forgotten. A pro-communist 
MPAJA received medals for bravery from the British and different ethnic groups 
responded differently to the Japanese Occupation. These inconvenient events 
were forgotten as well. Then, Devan lamented how one could absorb all this to 
write a coherent triumphant history of Singapore. The history of pre-independent 
Singapore is, he continues, part of pan-Asian history, at the same time it is a 
collection of fragmented stories.271 
A similar historiographical problem was shared by John Gullick. He also 
lamented the complexities of Singapore’s history up to 1965: 
 
The special circumstances of Malaysia make it particularly difficult to give an 
integrated account of events prior to its formation as recently as 1963 … Still more 
difficult is how to treat Singapore. How does one deal with a territory which until 
1945 was as much a part of Malaya as any other; was then set on a path of separate 
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evolution for almost twenty years; then brought into the new Malaysia in 1963 only 
to be expelled for unruly behaviour in 1965? 272  
 
Such a historiographical difficulty in Singapore’s history leads Devan to 
conclude that it was impossible to construct a victorious nationalistic history of 
Singapore without forgetting some of the inconvenient facts such as Malayan 
nationalism and ethnic nationalisms. 273 
Thirdly, the political elite feared dividing a multi-ethnic society of Singapore 
and reminded people of their own roots, especially in China and India. At the 
point of independence, still fresh in the minds of people were memories of 
strikes, boycotts, and incidents caused by the Chinese medium school students 
under the strong influence of communist China, along with the communal riots 
between the Chinese and the Malays, which killed 36 people and injured 560 
people in July and September 1964. Under such circumstances, the political elite 
were worried that communal jealousies and rivalries were further strengthened 
by teaching a history emphasising the story of how immigrants came from their 
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ancestral homelands to Singapore where communal tension and suspicion 
developed to riots between the Chinese and the Malays. 274 Rajaratnam well 
explained such worries:  
 
We could have contrived a more lengthy and eye-boggling lineage by tracing our 
ancestry back to the lands from which our forefathers emigrated – China, India, Sri 
Lanka, the Middle East and Indonesia. The price we would have to pay for this 
more impressive genealogical table would be to turn Singapore into a battleground 
for endless racial and communal conflicts and interventionalist politics by the more 
powerful and bigger nations from which Singapore had emigrated. 275  
 
Therefore, people’s memories connecting them to ancestral homelands, 
Rajaratnam argued, must be severed. For those memories were the obstacles to 
building a new nation of Singapore. 276 
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To sever the link with ancestral homelands, according to Rajaratnam, 
Raffles’ landing in 1819 was chosen as the starting point of the history of 
modern Singapore. It was largely a political decision that established such a 
historiographical tradition. After independence, the question of who should be 
the founder of Singapore, there was a heated debate. However, the debate was 
brought to an “abrupt end” when the government officially declared Stamford 
Raffles to be the founder. 277  This episode suggests that Singapore’s 
historiography was formed under the strong influence of the political elite. On 
the reasons for devising such a historiography, Rajaratnam justified himself on 
the grounds that (1) documents on Singapore’s past before 1819 were scarce and 
(2) as mentioned above, tracing back to the histories of ancestral homelands 
such as China and India would fuel communalisms which might turn Singapore 
into a “battleground for endless racial and communal conflicts.” 278 Therefore, 
from a political elite’s point of view, “to push a Singaporean’s historical 
awareness beyond 1819 would have been a misuse of history.” 279  
However, some scholars argue that fixing the founding of Singapore in 1819 
is questionable from the legal point of view. First, in 1819, Raffles was not 
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involved in a cession of sovereignty and was provided only with a ‘factory’ on 
the coast. 280 Second, Raffles’ treaty was signed only by a claimant to the throne 
of Johore, who did not actually govern the Singapore area. 281 In spite of such 
criticism, once the historiographical tradition of Singapore’s founding being 
1819 was formed, other writers followed suit. However, such a historiography 
was created in close connection with the political elite’s interests at the time. 
Sometimes, political interests strongly affect academic discussion. 
Fourthly, a factor that affected the marginalisation of history education was 
that Singapore history written from the Singapore point of view was not firmly 
established until the latter part of the 1970s. In fact, Singapore had always been 
seen as part of Malaya and a separate history of Singapore had not been written 
by 1956. Although, since the 1950s, some Singapore history books written from 
a Singapore-centred historiography had appeared, those books, such as H. F. 
Pearson’s A History of Singapore published in 1956 282 and Donald and Joanna 
Moore’s The First 150 Years of Singapore appearing in 1969, 283  were not 
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written by professional historians. Surprisingly, the latter authors candidly 
admitted that their book was “not an academic work of scholarship.” 284  
The first well-documented history of Singapore (the Straits Settlements), 
according to Albert Lau, was Mary Turnbull’s The Straits Settlements 1826-67, 
285
 which appeared in 1972.286 The first scholarly work of general history of 
Singapore was, according to Edwin Lee, 287  also Turnbull’s A History of 
Singapore, 1819-1975, published in 1977. 288 This suggests that only in the late 
1970s did an academic work of general history of Singapore appear that 
textbook writers could refer to. Although, in the 1970s, in the primary level 
attempts were made to publish new history textbooks written from Singapore’s 
point of view, 289 in the secondary level a Singapore-centred history textbook 
had not yet appeared by 1984. 
Fifthly, history education was marginalised soon after independence because 
it was necessary for Singapore to discard such an understanding that Singapore 
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needed Malaya to survive. The teaching of the history of Singapore and Malaya 
goes against such a direction. Kwa Chong Guan elaborates this argument as 
follows. Singapore, he explains, had fought for the merger with Malaysia in the 
preceding twenty years on the assumption that their economic well-being, 
security, and future was integrally connected to the Malay peninsula, as 150 
years of colonial history proved. However, he continues, Singapore had been 
suddenly ejected from Malaysia, and thereafter the Singaporeans had to 
demonstrate that they could stand on their own without depending upon 
Malaysia. To prove this, he concludes, the Singaporeans had to either ignore or 
disavow their 150 years of colonial history. 290  
Sixthly, there was a need to quit a negative past and legacy. Kwa argues that 
the British left the burden of a plural society in which different ethnic groups 
spent most of their time within their own ethnic community except for the time 
spent in the market and workplace. This was seen, he continues, as the legacy 
from the past that the Singaporeans had to discard, and they had to search for 
new foundations for their new nation-state. 291 In such a situation, the Singapore 
government seemed to not be interested in transmitting such a past to the 
younger generation.    
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Lastly, it is argued that the post-1965 history was too recent to write about. 
When asked why the lower secondary history textbooks stopped the story at 
1965, an official from the Ministry of Education remarked, “In terms of what to 
write, it is easier to write up to 1965. After 1965, we see personalities coming 
into the picture of people who made history at that time and are still alive. And 
one wonders actually whether you have a historical perspective to explain 




5. Countering Westernisation: The resurgence of traditional cultures and 
history teaching, 1979-1991 
In the 1970s, Singapore witnessed an ‘economic miracle’ and had enjoyed 
several years of double-digit economic growth. 293  By the early 1970s, 
Singapore’s per capita income was second in Asia only next to Japan. 294 By 
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1980, per capita income had increased by more than five times since 
independence. 295 Unexpectedly, Singapore not only survived but also began to 
prosper.     
 Keeping pace with the economic miracle and modernisation, Singapore also 
saw young people’s Westernisation partly as a result of the growing number of 
the English-educated. The political elite were concerned with this phenomenon, 
especially after the ‘Anson loss’, the PAP’s defeat by J. B. Jeyaratnam in a by-
election in 1981. This ended the PAP’s thirteen-year-dominance of Parliament. 
Later, the PAP analysed the loss and reached the conclusion that they had lost 
partly due to the prevalence of Western values among the young people on the 
ground that many young voters supported Jeyaratnam. 296  
To deal with such a situation, by the 1980s, Asian values primarily based on 
Confucian values were actively promoted. 297 At the same time, in the 1980s, the 
political elite began to worry about the loss of historical heritage and claimed the 
need to remind people of the importance of history. For instance, Dhanabalan 
revealed: “There is a growing awareness among Singaporeans, in official and 
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private circles, of the need to preserve records of our past. We are more 
conscious of the need to collect written records and are beginning to have a new 
view of the buildings and artefacts of our past. There is increasing concern that 
we may create a sparkling new Singapore with no trace of the past.” 298  In 
addition, Rajaratnam, who once had a cautious attitude toward the teaching of 
history, now claimed: “A sense of a common history is what provides the links 
to hold together a people who came from the four corners of the earth. Because 
our history is short and because what is worth preserving from the past are not 
plentiful, we should try to save what is worthwhile from the past from the 
vandalism of the speculator and the developer, from a government and a 
bureaucracy which believes that anything that cannot be translated into cold cash 
is not worth investing in.” 299 Likewise, Lee Kuan Yew also urged:  
 
To understand the present and anticipate the future, one must know enough of the 
past, enough to have a sense of the history of a people ... This is as true of 
individuals, as it is of nations. The personal experience of a person determines 
whether he likes or hates certain things, welcomes them, or fears them when they 
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recur. So it is with nations: it is the collective memory of people, the composite 
learning from the past events, which led to successes or disasters, that makes a 
people welcome or fear new events because they recognise parts in new events 
which have similarities with past experience.” 300  
 
In such an atmosphere, in 1980, Goh Chok Tong, then the Second Assistant 
Secretary-General of the PAP, called for the revision of history education and 
claimed that Singapore history should focus on “the struggle for independence 
and against the communists, the building of a modern state, the values that were 
taught, the society that was formed and the nation that was built.” 301  He 
suggested that the History Department at the University of Singapore would be 
called upon to offer its resources and manpower. 302  
In 1984, Social and Economic History of Modern Singapore for secondary 
schools was published with a new syllabus revised for the first time since 1960.    
The new textbook, which covered from Raffles’ landing in 1819 to 
independence in 1965, was to tell Singapore students the “story of the founding 
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fathers, the independence fighters, visionary builders, and entrepreneurs and 
their blood, sweat and tears” by highlighting the Second World War and the 
struggle for independence. 303  
In other words, in the textbook, Singapore’s history starts with “the origin of 
our multi-racial and multi-cultural society, and the gradual transition of an 
immigrant society to one that is locally oriented.” 304   
Unlike previous textbooks, the new textbook also emphasised the negative 
side of the British rule by showing how ordinary Singaporeans suffered under 
the British as a result of inadequate public health care and social welfare 
programmes as well as poor standards of living in general. 305 Such a portrait of 
the British is in stark contrast with the previous textbooks which emphasised the 
positive aspects of the British rule. The publication of a Singapore-centred new 
history textbook reflected the resurgence of the political elite’s interest in history 
and cultural heritage. The question is why their interest in history was resurged 
in the 1980s.  
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First of all, several authors point out that the political elite’s interest in 
history resurged in the condition that they no longer needed to be preoccupied 
with economic survival. For example, Kwa Chong Guan argues that by the early 
1980s Singapore’s economy had taken off, by which Singapore leaders who had 
been preoccupied with Singapore’s economic survival after independence could 
now afford to reflect and reconfigure their memories of why Singapore survived 
and prospered. 306  Albert Lau, similarly, points out that since Singapore had 
survived and started to prosper in the late 1970s, the future had become less 
fearsome. 307 Such a change in prospect was observed by Lee Kuan Yew as well. 
He states: “Vividly stored in my memory were the early years from 1955 to 
1975. There was a tense and drama-packed series of crises that left an indelible 
mark in my mind. There were struggles for survival.” 308 This suggests that, in 
the eyes of Lee Kuan Yew, ‘struggles for survival’ ended in 1975. Singapore 
became more stable and started to prosper, which provided the political elite 
with room to look back, leading to the resurgence of history in the 1980s. 
Secondly, due to Singapore’s experience of the economic miracle and 
modernisation, its history could now be narrated as a success story from a poor, 
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transient, and racial-explosive society to a stable, modern, and prosperous nation. 
This was impossible before the economic miracle. Singapore’s social change 
that enabled the country’s history to be portrayed as a success story attracted the 
political elite’s interest in history. 
Thirdly, due to the construction of a separate history of Singapore, as seen in 
Mary Turnbull’s 1977 book, A History of Singapore, 1819-1975, 309 Singapore 
now had an academic work of its history from its own point of view, which 
could leave readers with a sense of continuity as Singaporeans. 310 In addition, 
Turnbull's approach, which told “the story of Singapore based on the lives of 
politicians and leaders”, 311 could provide a useful reference point to textbook 
writers (Later in the 1990s, her understanding of Singapore history provided the 
basis for the official ‘Singapore Story’. 312). This laid the groundwork for the 
resurgence of Singapore history in the 1980s. 
Fourthly, Kwok Kian Woon argues that “the very achievement of economic 
growth is at the same time corrosive of the sense of national purpose and 
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solidarity that supports it.” 313 In other words, the government could no longer 
rely only on economic growth to bind people as Singapore continued to survive 
and prosper. Therefore, the government recognised the need to use the teaching 
of national history as a means to unite people. Such a necessity attracted the 
political elite’s interest in history. 
Lastly, as mentioned above, soon after independence the government made 
attempts to sever the links with ancestral homelands such as China and India. 
However, since the 1980s, the political elite in Singapore began claiming that it 
was knowing their own cultural roots in China, India, Southeast Asia etc. that 
was an important key for nation-building. 314 Such a reinterpretation of history 
occurred in close connection with the interests of the political elite of the time. 
As mentioned earlier, the prevalence of Western values among the young was 
problematised especially after the PAP’s 1981 by-election defeat. The political 
elite observed that one of the important factors of this defeat was the young 
people’s increasing critical attitude against authorities with the growing 
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preference of Western-style democracy. 315 To deal with such a situation, the 
PAP government changed its policy and began to promote cultural heritages 
from ancestral homelands, especially from China, and exploited the traditional 
Chinese moralistic system of Confucianism under the name of ‘Asian Values’. 
316 Asian Values here, as Michael Barr points out, were constructed mainly from 
the state-centric version of Confucianism developed since the Second Century in 
China which advocates the relationship between rulers and subjects to be likened 
to that between fathers and sons; the subject is expected to obey his ruler and the 
ruler is urged to be a junzi or virtuous gentleman. 317 Against the backdrop of 
young people’s growing critical attitude against authorities, Asian Values were 
actively promoted by the PAP government. 
In addition, the celebration of Asian Values was accelerated by the economic 
rise of East Asian countries – Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore – which were said to share Asian Values that led to their economic 
success. Goh and Gopinathan argue that such a discourse in the 1980s affected 
Singaporean leaders’ view toward ancestral cultures, which were once seen as 
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the source of division but were now considered as the source of a ‘new sense of 
Singaporeanness’ that stressed a consensual and group-oriented culture based on 
Asian Values. 318 Similarly, as Hussin Mutalib points out, against the backdrop 
of the young Singaporeans’ growing preference of Western-style democracy, the 
celebration of Asian Values that stressed the fiduciary relationship between the 
ruler and the ruled was now not considered to be a divisive but a ‘unifying’ 
factor between the PAP government and people. 319 It was in such a context that 
history education resurged in the 1980s. 
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Chapter 4: Inculcating Singapore’s Identity: History Education and Museum 
Development 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed how the political elite actively, or inactively, 
exploited history education as a means to inculcate national identity in young 
people according to changes in political environment and interests of the 
political elite. Before the separation from Malaysia in 1965, history education 
was utilised as a means to build a Malayan nation. However, after the separation, 
the political elite became indifferent in transmitting Singapore’s past to the 
youth because they thought that it was not conducive to national unity or nation-
building. In the 1980s, however, the political elite’s interest in history teaching 
resurged because they thought that the teaching of Asian traditions, such as 
Confucian values, could contribute to building a fiduciary relationship between 
the PAP government and people.  
This chapter begins with the examination of the effects of the 
marginalisation and resurgence of the political elite’s interest in history on the 
portrait of the Japanese Occupation in history textbooks. This examination’s 
focus is the investigation on whether the present interest and aspirations of the 
political elite affected the process of reconstructing the portrait of the Japanese 
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Occupation in history textbooks published between 1965 and 1994. 
Subsequently, this chapter addresses the questions on how the official portrait 
and understanding of the Japanese Occupation was disseminated through extra-
curricular activities between 1991 and 1995, such as a history study camp, war 
sites tours, and students’ visiting to the history museum. 
 
 
2. Changes in the portrait of the Japanese Occupation in Singapore’s textbooks 
2.1 Introduction 
This section traces changes in the portrait of the Japanese Occupation in 
history textbooks for Secondary schools published between 1965 and 1994. 
Before proceeding to the investigation of this topic, the question of history 
syllabus changes in Singapore should be briefly addressed. At the time of its 
independence (1965), the history syllabus for lower secondary schools 
(Secondary I and II) issued in 1960 was used. This syllabus had been valid until 
the syllabus revision in 1984, 320 after which further revision was made in 1994. 
The 1960 syllabus designated Secondary I students to study world history from 
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prehistory to 600 A.D. while Secondary II students were required to learn world 
history from 600 to 1600 A.D.. 321 Hence, lower secondary students did not 
study the Second World War under this syllabus. However, the Singapore 
government had completely changed such an arrangement of history learning 
with the introduction of the 1984 syllabus. Under this syllabus, Secondary I 
students were instructed to learn Singapore’s history from 1819 to 1900 while 
Singapore’s history from 1901 to 1965 was taught to Secondary II students.322 
Accordingly, the Japanese Occupation appeared in a Secondary II textbook. The 
1994 syllabus is a relatively minor revision of the 1984 syllabus, under which 
lower secondary students needed to learn Singapore’s history, including the 
Japanese Occupation.323 
On the other hand, the history syllabus for upper secondary schools 
(Secondary III and IV) with effect from 1964 had been used until the mid-1990s. 
According to this syllabus, upper secondary students who wished to take the 
elective subject of history were required to study Section A (History of Malaya 
from 1400 to 1963) and either Section B (History of Southeast Asia, 1500-1945) 
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or Section C (History of the Commonwealth, 1740-1960). 324 Therefore, from 
Singapore’s independence until 1983, the history of the Japanese Occupation 
had been taught only to the upper secondary students who chose the elective 
module of history. As mentioned above, lower secondary students before 1983 
were not given an opportunity to learn modern history including the history of 
the Japanese Occupation. In the next section, changes of the portrait in English 
and Chinese textbooks since 1965 until 1994 are discussed. 
 
2.2 Unchanging aspects of the portrait – hardship and suffering 
Although there have been several changes in the ways the Japanese 
Occupation was portrayed in school textbooks published from 1965 to the 1990s 
(to be discussed in detail later), what has remained unchanged is the portrait of 
the occupation years as a period of hardship and suffering. For instance, a 
Chinese history textbook for Secondary IV published in 1967 describes the 
occupation years as a “dark world”. It continues to say that different ethnic 
groups in Malaya suffered and were humiliated under the cruel Japanese rule 
which lasted for three years and eight months. 325 Similarly, an English history 
                                                           
324
 Ong, “The Development of the History Curriculum”, 75. 
325
 Zhongxue Lishi Si-shang [History for Secondary Schools Vol. 4 No. 1] (Singapore: Xingjiapo 
Shijie-shuju,1967), 136. 
 142 
textbook published in 1969 portrays the occupation years as “a period of terrible 
hardship for the people” 326 while another textbook appeared in 1988 describes 
that period to be “a period of great hardship and suffering for the population”. 327 
As seen from above, the portrait of the Japanese Occupation in Singapore’s 
history textbooks are painted with negative words and depicted as a period of 
hardship and suffering. This portrait in history textbooks has not changed since 
the time of Singapore’s independence. 
 
2.3 From Malayan-centric to Singapore-centric history 
Although there has been no change in portraying the Japanese Occupation as 
a period of hardship and suffering, the focus of the portrait shifted from a 
Malayan-centric portrait of the war to a Singapore-centric picture with the 
introduction of the teaching of Singapore’s national history in secondary schools 
under the new syllabus issued in 1984. This shift can be clearly seen in the 
changes of the portrait of the Malayan campaign - Japan’s military campaign 
that started with its invasion of northern Malaya and southern Thailand in 
December 1941 and ended with the British surrender in Singapore ten weeks 
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later. All Malayan history textbooks portray the Malayan campaign from a 
Malayan-centric point of view; in those textbooks the focus is placed on major 
battles in Malaya; battles in Singapore are mentioned only as a part of the entire 
Malayan campaign. For instance, a Chinese history textbook published in 1975 
portrays the Malayan campaign with the following three sub-sections: Japan’s 
landings in northern Malaya, Japan’s advancement in three routes, and the fall of 
Singapore. The fall of Singapore is portrayed only as a part of the entire 
Malayan campaign and merely takes up one third of the space in the section of 
“the process of Japan’s invasion of Malaya and Singapore”. 328 The focus of the 
textbook is on the invasion of Malaya, not on that of Singapore. 
On the other hand, more emphasis is placed on battles fought in Singapore in 
a series of textbooks on the national history of Singapore, which was first 
published in 1984 and revised in 1994. This feature is particularly clear in the 
1994 edition, in which battles in Malaya are portrayed only in three pages, while 
battles in Singapore are explained in more detail using five pages, despite the 
fact that the Singapore battles ended only in one week, out of the ten weeks of 
the entire Malayan campaign. 329 Here we can clearly see the shift of focus from 
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the Malayan-centric portrait of the war to the Singapore-centric depiction of the 
war with the introduction of Singapore’s national history under the new syllabus 
in 1984. 
The question here is why it took almost twenty years to produce a 
Singapore-centric history syllabus after its independence in 1965. That was 
because, as discussed in Chapter 3, Singapore’s political elite during the 1960s 
and the 1970s recognised that the teaching of national history would be 
detrimental to Singaporeans’ unity. S. Rajaratnam confessed that, until the mid-
1980s, most Singaporeans were indifferent to Singapore’s history because it had 
only a shameful colonial history, which was not conducive to fostering national 
pride in the minds of Singaporeans. 330 Furthermore, he was worried that the 
teaching of history tracing back to Singaporeans’ ancestral homelands like 
China and India would boost ethno-centric sentiments and might turn Singapore 
into a “battleground for endless racial and communal conflicts”. 331 To avoid this 
danger, history education was not encouraged and a Singapore-centric history 
syllabus was not produced. 
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In the 1980s, as argued in Chapter 3, the political elite’s interest in history 
education resurged due mainly to Singapore’s economic miracle during the 
1970s (Now, Singapore’s history can be narrated as a success story) and the 
necessity to counter Western values, such as individualism, critical attitude to 
authorities and Western-style democracy, which were spread among young 
Singaporeans. To counter such a situation, the political elite started to promote 
traditional Chinese values such as filial piety under the name of Asian Values to 
create a more fiduciary relationship between the People’s Action Party (PAP) 
government and people. 332 In this context, as discussed in Chapter 3, the 
political elite’s interest in tradition and history was revived, the 1960 history 
syllabus was revised, and the first textbooks of national history of Singapore for 
Secondary schools were published in the 1980s.    
 
2.4 Stronger emphasis on the war years 
Another change with regard to the portrait of the war in history textbooks is 
that more pages were devoted to the war years after the introduction of the 1984 
syllabus. Various Malayan history textbooks published under the 1964 syllabus 
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devote only five to nine pages to the portrait of the war years, which consist of 
merely 2.0 to 5.6 per cent of the whole book. 333 By contrast, textbooks of 
Singapore’s history published in 1984 and 1994 place a stronger emphasis on 
the teaching of the Japanese Occupation. The 1984 edition devotes 76 pages out 
of 538 pages (14.1%) to the occupation years. 334 Similarly, the 1994 edition 
portrays the Japanese Occupation in 37 pages out of 194 pages (19.1%). 335 
 
Figure 1. Pages and percentages devoted to the portrait  
of the Japanese Occupation in history textbooks of different years 
 
  Pages Percentages 
1964 syllabus 5-9 pages 2.0-5.6% 
1984 syllabus 76 pages 14.1% 
1994 syllabus 37 pages 19.1% 
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There are two possible reasons for such a significant increase in pages and 
percentages devoted to the portrait of the Japanese Occupation period, after the 
introduction of Singapore’s national history in 1984. Firstly, the 1964 syllabus 
covers a long history of Malaya from 1400 to 1963 while the scope of the 1984 
and 1994 syllabuses only covers the history of Singapore from 1819 to 1965. 336 
Since the 1984 and 1994 syllabuses cover a shorter period than that of the 1964 
syllabus, as a result, the percentage of the book covering the war years increased 
in the history textbooks published under the 1984 and 1994 syllabuses. Secondly, 
the learning of the Japanese Occupation is seen to be important from the official 
viewpoint of the national history of Singapore because, as Lian Kwen Fee 
argues, the period of Japanese Occupation is understood as “an important 
recourse as a historical ‘myth’ in its origin as a nation”. 337 In other words, it is 
understood in the official discourse that peoples from China, Malaya, India etc. 
who had different identities temporarily living in Singapore, for the first time, 
had a common desire to build their own independent nation due to the common 
suffering they went through during the occupation, which is seen as the 
historical origin of a Singaporean nation. Because of such a special place of the 
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war years in the official understanding of Singapore’s history, stronger emphasis 
was placed on the teaching of the Japanese Occupation in the textbooks 
published under the 1984 and 1994 syllabuses. 
 
2.5 More emphasis on the celebration of local war heroes 
Local war heroes such as Lim Bo Seng from Force 136 and Adnan bin Saidi 
from the Malay Regiment are more strongly celebrated in the 1984 and 1994 
editions of the history textbook. Although names of anti-Japanese resistance 
forces such as the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), Force 136, 
and its leader Lim Bo Seng repeatedly appeared in history textbooks even before 
1983, 338 the 1984 edition was the first history textbook to feature the life history 
of Lim Bo Seng on two pages of supplementary reading passages. The textbook 
starts Lim’s story with his young adulthood (the fact that he was born in China is 
omitted). He was a successful businessman in Singapore who collected 
donations to help the Chinese government fight against the Japanese after they 
invaded China in 1937. Subsequently, when the Japanese attacked Malaya and 
Singapore in 1941, he began working for Force 136, a British secret agency, 
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collecting information for the British. When he was in Malaya doing his work in 
1944, he was captured, imprisoned, and tortured by the Japanese. Despite the 
harsh torture, he refused to reveal the names of his colleagues. He died at Batu 
Gajah prison in the same year. 339  
The 1984 textbook stresses how he is revered by a wide range of people and 
governments, referring to the fact that the Chinese government promoted Lim 
posthumously to the rank of Major-General while the British government gave a 
yearly pension of £400 to his widow in Singapore. The column in the textbook 
ends with a comment from Malcolm MacDonald (the British Commissioner-
General for Southeast Asia) who acclaimed Lim’s role: “He died so that 
Singapore and Malaya might be the home of free people who could enjoy once 
again peace, prosperity and happiness”. 340 In this way, Lim’s historical role was 
highlighted. Also, Lim is depicted as a man of bravery, patriotism and sacrifice, 
who should be emulated by young people. A similar portrait of Lim appears in 
the 1994 edition of History of Modern Singapore 341 and also in Social Studies 
published in 1994. 342 
                                                           
339
 C.D.I.S., Social and Economic History of Modern Singapore 2, 170. 
340
 Ibid., 171. 
341
 C.D.I.S., Modern History of Singapore, 152. 
342
 C.D.I.S., Social Studies, 109-112. 
 150 
Another featured war hero is Adnan bin Saidi, who led the Malay Regiment 
in a fierce fight against the Japanese. The Malay Regiment was first mentioned 
in the 1984 history textbook but with only two sentences. The textbook reads: 
“At Pasir Panjang Ridge (Hill), a small force of Chinese Volunteers together 
with the Malay regiment fought bravely to defend the ridge. Most of the Chinese 
Volunteers and Malay soldiers were killed”. 343 In the 1984 edition, the name of 
Adnan was not mentioned. 
Adnan’s episode was first highlighted in the 1994 edition. It reads: “some 
men of the Malay Regiment, led by Lieutenant (Lt.) Adnan bin Saidi fought 
bravely. Many of the Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded”. 344 The 
textbook then praised his great insight in detecting the enemy’s trick of 
disguising themselves as Allied soldiers to attack the Malay Regiment: Lt. 
Adnan “ordered his soldiers to open fire, killing several of them. This caused the 
rest of the Japanese to flee down the hill”. 345 However, on the last day of the 
battle, he was finally hit by the enemy’s fire but, “[i]n spite of his wounds, he 
kept on fighting. He was later captured by the Japanese and stabbed to death”.346 
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As seen from above, the 1994 edition celebrates Adnan as a war hero. 
Singapore’s celebration of the Malay Regiment and Adnan started in the 1990s 
probably because the government wanted to counter an increasing sense of 
political alienation felt by the Malay Singaporeans. 347 Such a political or social 
climate at that time might have affected the syllabus change in 1994. 
 
2.6 The ways in which the Japanese treated different ethnic groups 
History textbooks published before 1993 portrayed the occupation years in 
such a way that the Japanese had treated different ethnic groups in Malaya 
differently. For example, the 1974 edition of Xinmashi (The History of Malaysia 
and Singapore) says that the Japanese treated the Malays well because they 
wanted to exploit the Malays to counter the Chinese; the Japanese instigated the 
Malays to suppress the Chinese especially at the last part of the occupation 
period. 348  Similarly, Xingmashi (The History of Malaysia and Singapore) 
published in 1975 portrays the occupation period in such a way that not a few 
anti-Chinese incidents took place in Malaya because the Japanese utilised 
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antagonism between the Chinese and Malays and tried to exploit the Malays in 
order to counter the Chinese. 349 
A similar portrait of the occupation years can also be seen in a Malayan 
history textbook published in 1988. It reads: 
 
The Japanese had varying attitudes about the various races in Malaya and Singapore 
and treated them differently. The Japanese had always considered the Chinese as 
their traditional enemies… 
The Japanese treated the Malays better than they treated the Chinese. As they 
were in the majority and natives of Malaya, the Japanese tried to win their support 
by promising them independence in the near future … They even caused clashes 
between the Chinese and Malays with their anti-Chinese propaganda… 
The Indians were treated quite well too. The Japanese utilized Indian 
nationalism to get Indian support for their war efforts. 350 
 
Similarly, the 1984 edition of Singapore’s history textbook goes: 
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The Japanese treated the Malays and Indians better than the Chinese or Eurasians. 
This was because the Japanese did not regard the Malays and the Indians as their 
enemies. They also needed their help. A number of Malay soldiers and civilians 
joined the Japanese Volunteer Force. But the majority of the Malays did not do so. 
Thousands of Indian soldiers and a number of Indian civilians joined the Indian 
National Army organised by the Japanese to fight against the British in Burma and 
India. However, a fairly large number of Indian soldiers (mainly Sikhs) and most of 
the Gurkhas in the British Army were loyal to the British and refused to join the 
Indian National Army. 351 
 
In contrast to such a portrait, the 1994 edition of history textbook portrays 
the occupation years in such a way that ‘all ethnic groups suffered.’ It states: 
 
The Japanese had told the people of Singapore that they had come to set them free 
from British rule. However, the people of all races found that they were not freed…  
The Malays suffered under the Japanese. Some Malays were arrested from the 
streets by Japanese soldiers and sent to Thailand to build the Death Railway. They 
                                                           
351
 C.D.I.S., Social and Economic History of Modern Singapore 2, 162. 
 154 
were not spared if they did something wrong as the Japanese did not hesitate to beat 
them or chop off their heads. 
The Japanese wanted the Indians to join the Indian National Army (I.N.A.) to fight 
against the British in India. However, many Indian soldiers (mainly Sikhs) and the 
Gurkhas in the British Army refused to join the I.N.A.. Some of those who refused 
were killed. The Indians, too, were not spared from the Death Railway. 352 
 
In this way, the 1994 textbook masks the fact that the Japanese treated 
different ethnic groups differently and gives an impression that all people in 
Singapore, regardless of ethnic differences, suffered during the Japanese 
Occupation. In the official history, as mentioned above, the Japanese Occupation 
is understood as a starting point of local nationalism: since all people regardless 
of ethnic group suffered during the occupation, they concluded that they needed 
to get rid of foreign masters and build an independent nation. Probably, in order 
to instil such a picture of Singapore’s past in young Singaporeans, the portrait of 
the occupation period in the 1984 edition which deviated from the official 
storyline (i.e. the text that gives the impression that Malays and Indians did not 
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suffer very much during the Japanese Occupation) was ‘corrected’ in the 1994 
edition.  
Such a ‘correction’ was made probably because, as argued above, it was 
understood that a Singaporean nationalism originated from the period of the 
Japanese Occupation, 353  and thus the aspect of the common suffering of 
Singapore as a whole nation was stressed, but the episodes that showed social 
divisions were masked.  
 
     2.7 Reasons for the Japanese victory and lessons from the war 
Reasons for the swift Japanese victory in the Malayan campaign can be 
found in various Malayan history textbooks. For instance, a history textbook 
published in 1975 claims that there are three reasons for the Japanese success: 
the Japanese well-preparedness for the war, the complete co-ordination of land, 
sea and air forces of the Japanese army, and high spirit and morale of the 
Japanese soldiers. 354 Another textbook appeared in 1975, which stated that there 
were eight reasons for the Japanese victory: Japan’s preparedness, the loss of 
British control of the air, the Japanese control of the sea, Britain’s wrong 
strategy, Britain’s preoccupation with the war in Europe, Japan’s rich experience 
                                                           
353
 Lian, “In Search of a History of Singapore?”, 104. 
354
 Tan, A Portrait of Malaysia and Singapore, 162-164. 
 156 
in war, Japan’s anti-British propaganda, and the high morale of the Japanese 
soldiers. 355 In a similar way, the 1984 edition of the history textbook lists three 
reasons for the British defeat: Britain’s preoccupation with the war in Europe, 
Britain’s unpreparedness and Japan’s preparedness for the war in Malaya. 356  
In addition, the 1984 textbook indicates three lessons from the Japanese 
conquest and occupation. The first lesson to be learned is that “Europeans were 
not superior to Asians” because “[t]he Japanese had defeated the British in just 
ten weeks”. 357  The second lesson is that “[t]he British had lost the war in 
Malaya and Singapore partly because they had not been well prepared for it. 
From this, one can learn that the government and people of a country should 
always be well prepared to defend the country against its enemy”. 358 The third 
lesson is, according to the textbook, as a result of their experiences from the 
Japanese Occupation “certain groups of people [started] to think of the need to 
get rid of their foreign masters”. 359 These three lessons are reprinted in the 1994 
edition of the history textbook. 360 
                                                           
355
 F.L.B., Xingmashi, 121-122 
356
 C.D.I.S., Social and Economic History of Modern Singapore 2, 153-154. 
357
 C.D.I.S., Social and Economic History of Modern Singapore 2, 165. 
358




 C.D.I.S., Modern History of Singapore, 153. 
 157 
Although it is not a history textbook, some of those lessons are also reprinted 
in the 1994 edition of social studies textbook for secondary schools. As Kevin 
Blackburn points out, the textbook seems to make a direct connection between 
the British defeat and the necessity of National Service. 361 The textbook states: 
 
From the British defeat, we can learn some important lessons. A country must 
always be well-prepared for any attacks from enemies. No matter how small a 
country is, it has to build up its land, sea and air defences. 
It must not depend on others to protect its people. The people must be trained to 
defend their own country. In 1967, the government started National Service. This 
was to enable all young men to be trained to defend Singapore in case of war. 362 
 
After this passage, an explanation of Singapore’s defence strategy, Total 
Defence, follows. Such a connection between the lessons of the British defeat 
and the necessity of Total Defence can often be seen in the discourse among 
Singapore’s political elite during the first half of the 1990s. That is because, as 
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will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, the political elite were concerned about 
people’s complacent attitude toward defence, and the public support for National 
Service, an important pillar of Total Defence, was seen to be weakening due to 
the end of the Cold War and the dissipation of the communist threat. Thus, the 
political elite started to spread the message of ‘be prepared for war even in 
peacetime’ because the British were defeated due mainly to their unpreparedness. 
This move also seems to be reflected in the textbook revision in 1994, and here 
we can see another example of how the contemporary interests of the 
government affect the way the war years are portrayed and understood.  
 
 
3. History camps and war sites tours 
3.1 Introduction 
The state’s efforts to inculcate national identity in young Singaporeans 
through history education were not confined to the teaching in class room. The 
extra-curricular activities such as history camps and war sites tours were also 
conducted or promoted by the government in line with its policy to encourage 
young people to remember the Second World War. To this end, the Ministry of 
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Education (Curriculum Planning Institute of Singapore) organised a history 
study camp in 1993 in which students relived the life during the Japanese 
Occupation, 363 whereas the Ministry of Defence (Mindef) started to promote 
war sites tours as part of history education in 1991. The Mindef was involved in 
such an effort because, as will be discussed below, one of the important 
purposes of the war sites tours was to tell young Singaporeans the following 
messages: be prepared for war even in peacetime; National Service is still 
necessary even after the end of the Cold War. 
 
3.2 History study camps 
At the beginning of June 1993, a three-day history study camp, organised by 
the Curriculum Planning Institute of Singapore (CPIS) of the Ministry of 
Education, was held for the first time to teach students about the Japanese 
Occupation. This idea was, according to Doreen Tan who was working for the 
CPIS at that time, launched by the CPIS itself and that was not initiated by high-
ranking officials of the Ministry of Education. The CPIS invited three Secondary 
school students per school to the camp on a first-come-first-served basis. 364 As 
a result, 120 Secondary II and III students from 31 schools participated in the 
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camp. They stayed in the halls of National Technological University, but the key 
programme of the camp was conducted in Fort Canning. 365 
At the open space in Fort Canning Park, a live drama of the Sook Ching 
massacre was performed in front of the camp participants. In the show, the 
Japanese soldiers, acted by the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel, 
shouted and slapped the ordinary Chinese, performed by other SAF soldiers.  366 
When they found a Chinese intellectual or a Chinese man who had a tattoo, they 
drew the conclusion that he was an anti-Japanese and was sent to another place 
to be slaughtered. Some Chinese suspects, due to torture, were forced to admit 
being anti-Japanese even though, in fact, they were not. As a result, in the show, 
they were killed. 367  
After watching and participating in the Sook Ching show, the students were 
instructed to experience the Japanese school. There, they had to study the 
Japanese language, sing Japanese songs, and bow in the direction of Tokyo to 
show their respect to the Japanese Emperor. After that, those students 
experienced a lack of food and water: they had to use ‘ration coupons’ to get 
food and go to a designated area to have tap water. They also experienced a 
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typical lunch during the occupation: porridge mixed with a xiandan (salt egg) or 
jiangyuzi (roe). 368 This rationing simulation was conducted with a help from 
members of the Civil Defence. 369 
 Furthermore, the students also experienced an ‘air raid’. When the SAF 
personnel threw a smoke bomb into the open space, the alarm immediately 
sounded and the students had to escape to the shelter in Fort Canning Park. 
Subsequently, they had to wait in the dark and hot shelter for half an hour. 
During that time, they were not allowed to speak or they risked being found by 
the ‘Japanese soldiers’. Apart from the above activities in Fort Canning, the 
history study camp had other activities, like visits to war sites such as Changi 
Chapel, a visit to the National Museum, and a history skit planned and 
performed by the students. 370 
The responses from the students were mixed. However, many said that they 
were shocked to learn about the brutality of the Japanese soldiers. For instance, 
Zheng Kun, age 15, a participant from Nanhua Secondary, said that he never 
knew the Japanese army at that time was so brutal. When he saw the fearful 
‘Sook Ching’ with his own eyes, he was shocked: “I am very happy to be able to 
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live in Singapore in the 90s. I am really doubt myself being able to survive in 
such an era”. 371 Shen Qiu Ling, 14, a participant from Fuchun Secondary, said 
that her grandmother had told her that the Japanese army during the war had 
been cruel, but she had never thought that it was at such an extreme level. She 
continued: “Now I think that a small country like Singapore does need its own 
army to protect itself. Otherwise, a nation will easily perish, people will be 
killed. Even though they survive, they will be hungry and suffer because of the 
enemy”. 372 Another participant, Cai De Xing, 14, a Peicai Secondary student, 
agreed: “Now I understand more about the reason why Singapore males have to 
do National Service. If I lived in that period, I certainly would have risked my 
life in order not to have a chance for the enemy to suffer us”. 373 It seems that the 
message from the government – National Service is necessary to defend 
Singapore – was well received by at least some of the history study camp 
participants. Though the government’s message seemed to be well received, the 
focus of the history study camp in the following years shifted from the study of 
the occupation period to the post-war period.  
 








3.3 Promotion of war sites tours 
On top of conducting the history study camps, the Singapore government 
promoted school visits to the historical sites related to the Second World War. In 
1991 and 1992, the Mindef briefed about 70 school principals and teachers on 
the war sites tours. Teachers were also provided with a guide to help them 
arrange visits for their students. The 16 war sites were identified in three tour 
packages, which comprised of a half-day visit to four to eight sites located in the 
northern, central, and eastern parts of Singapore.374 If one joins the northern tour, 
he or she will visit Kranji Reservoir Park (the site where the Japanese troops 
first landed), Kranji War Memorial (the Allied cemetery for war victims), Bukit 
Batok Hilltop (the site where the Japanese and POW’s memorials were erected), 
Ford Motor Factory (the site where the British signed the surrender document), 
and RSN Museum (the Naval Museum of the Republic of Singapore Navy). The 
central tour was composed of seven sites: Kent Ridge Park (the site where the 
Malay Regiment fought against the Japanese), Labrador Park (the site where the 
Labrador Battery was located), Alexandra Hospital (the site where the Japanese 
indiscriminately killed patients and medical personnel), Padang and City Hall 
(the site where the Japanese surrender ceremony was conducted), Kandahar 
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Street (one of the screening centres in the Sook Ching operation), Fort Canning 
Park (the site where the British underground bunker was located), and Fort 
Siloso (a former British fortress). In the eastern tour, one visits three POW 
prison camps (Changi Prison, Selarang Barracks, and Changi Camp) and RSAF 
Museum (the Air Force Museum of the Republic of Singapore). 375 
Responding to the Mindef’s request, some schools conducted a war sites tour 
as an extra-curricular activity. For instance, some students from Anderson 
Secondary School visited the Battle Box in Fort Canning on 20 May 1993. They 
spent 30 to 40 minutes in the underground bunker during a simulated air raid. 
Pansy, a Secondary II student, said that she found the bunker quite eerie. Her 
friend, Tan Yick Fung, 14, had a suggestion: “They should install an aircon! It’s 
so hot!” 376 
Similarly, on 9 Sep 1995, 37 Secondary II students visited the Battle Box in 
the Fort Canning as a school tour. History teachers of the school, Sun Yan Ping 
and Su Yue Yuan, said that on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of 
the Second World War the school authorities arranged the war sites tours to 
leave a strong impression on the minds of students. Except for Fort Canning, 
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students had already visited the war sites such as Changi Prison and Kranji War 
Memorial. Students who visited Kranji War Memorial laid a wreath for the souls 
of soldiers killed in action. 377  
The students’ responses to the war sites tours were mixed. For instance, 
Hong Bo Lin, 14, a secondary student, said: “Since school does not have a 
history class, our generation does not have even basic knowledge about our 
country’s past, and does not have a sense of history at all. Of course, some 
students take Singapore’s prosperity today for granted, and [they think] they 
should enjoy [their lives] to their heart’s content. However, this is a thought for 
only a small amount of people.” Therefore, she said, adults should not believe 
that all young people did not know history. 378 Another student, Zheng Jing Wei, 
14, revealed his thought that the Pacific War had broken out because the 
Japanese army’s ambition had been extremely big and they had blindly tried to 
occupy others’ lands; as a result, Japan lost more than it gained. 379   
According to the Registered Tourist Guide Association of Singapore 
(RTGAS) that, in 1992, started battlefield tours for schools, about 40 schools 
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and 5,000 students had joined the war sites tours between 1992 and 1996. 380 In 
addition to conducting war sites tours on its own, the RTGAS, together with the 
Singapore Tourist Promotion Board, organised a battlefield tour course for its 
freelance tour guides in September 1995. More than 70 tour guides participated 
in the two-day course, in which they attended a lecture on the history lessons of 
the war and battles and toured the war sites to learn their significance and the 
anecdotes associated with them. Tan Khey Cheow, president of the association, 
commented: “This way, guides are trained for the future in case schools want to 
have these specialised tours too.” Originally, the course was prepared for the 
influx of war veterans coming to Singapore to commemorate the 50th 
anniversary of the end of the Second World War. 381 
On 14 February 1992, Defence Minister Yeo Ning Hong made a comment 
on the purpose of promoting war sites tours: “Singaporeans who are carried 
away with peace and prosperity will realise the real story of the war in 
Singapore and how innocent civilians can suffer, after visits to such sites”. Then 
he added that, hopefully, they would make an extra effort to contribute to Total 
Defence including National Service and left with the message that “we should 
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never be caught unprepared again.” 382 In the official analysis, Singapore fell 
due mainly to the British unpreparedness for the Japanese invasion. This factor 
was stressed because such an interpretation of the fall of Singapore could serve 
the interests of the state and the political elite especially in the early 1990s. As 
will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, one of the motivations for 
the political elite to launch various activities to commemorate the 50th 
anniversary of the Second World War was to convince Singapore youth of the 
necessity of National Service even after the end of the Cold War by referring to 
a lesson from the fall of Singapore: Singapore fell because it was unprepared; 
thus, Singapore should prepare for war even in peacetime. This rhetoric was 
used to counter such an argument that Singapore should also enjoy dividends of 
peace after the dissipation of communist threat. Under such circumstances, war 
sites tours were promoted to spread the official message of ‘be prepared for war 
even in peacetime’ intending to maintain the state’s policy of Total Defence. In 
this way, the learning of the Japanese Occupation was encouraged to serve the 
political interests of the time. 
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4. Developing national museums 
4.1 Museums construction project 
In January 1992, George Yeo, Minister for the Ministry of the Information 
and the Arts (MITA), first revealed the government’s plan concerning the 
construction of five museums in the civic district: the Singapore History 
Museum, the Asian Civilisations Museum, the Singapore Arts Museum, a 
People’s Museum, and a Children’s Museum. 383 This project was part of the 
state’s efforts to inculcate national identity – more exactly speaking, Singapore’s 
dual identity (to be discussed in detail below) – in the people of Singapore and, 
to this end, these museums were expected to provide a platform for history 
education and war commemoration activities. Yeo revealed the objective of the 
project as follows: “Our objective is to help Singapore find its soul, for it cannot 
be by bread alone that we live.” 384  This implies that the political elite’s 
motivation to build museums was to unite Singaporeans by inculcating 
Singapore’s identity in their minds because they recognised that they could no 
longer bind them by economic progress alone. 
 The planning of the museums construction project, according to Kwa Chong 
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Guan who was involved in drawing up its blue print, started in 1986 with the 
formation of the Museum Task Force set up by Wong Kan Seng, then Acting 
Minister for Community Development. He named Tay Kheng Soon as chairman 
of the Task Force, and Kwa, then director of the Oral History Department, was 
appointed as one of its members. 385 The Task Force grappled with the concept 
of museums in Singapore as a public good that enhanced Singaporeans’ 
understanding of where they came from, where they were now, and where they 
would go in the future. To enhance such an understanding, the Task Force 
thought that museums should promote a deeper awareness of the link between 
Singapore’s historical development and that of the surrounding region from 
where their ancestors emigrated. 386  To achieve such goals, in the report 
submitted to Wong Kan Seng in 1987, the Task Force proposed to establish or 
expand five galleries: a Singapore History Gallery, a Southeast Asian 
Ethnographic Gallery, an Art Gallery, a People’s Gallery, and a Children’s 
Gallery.387 This report provided a basis to further discuss matters of heritage in 
an Advisory Council on Culture and Arts formed in 1988. Second Deputy Prime 
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Minister Ong Teng Chong was appointed by Goh Chok Tong as chairman of the 
Advisory Council. Under the Council, four committees were set up: committees 
on heritage, the literary arts, performing arts, and visual arts. Tay Kheng Soon, 
former chairman of the Museum Task Force, was asked to chair the Committee 
on Heritage, and he then expanded the arguments discussed earlier within the 
Task Force. After a series of discussions, the Committee proposed the expansion 
of the National Museum into a Singapore History Museum, a People’s Gallery, a 
National Art Gallery, and a Children’s Museum. These proposals were reviewed 
by the Advisory Council and adopted in its report issued in 1989. 
Recommendations in the report were, in principle, accepted by the government 
and then fell into the hands of the Ministry of Community Development to 
implement the plans. 388 
In 1990, a new ministry, the Ministry of Information and the Arts (MITA), 
was formed by combining the Cultural Affairs Division of the Ministry of 
Community Development with the Information Division of the Ministry of 
Communications and Information. Accordingly, the National Museum, the 
National Archives, and the Oral History Centre were moved from the Ministry 
of Community Development to the new ministry. In the new ministry, its 
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Minister, George Yeo, pointed out that Singapore had historical links not only 
with Southeast Asia but also with China, India, and West Asia from where 
Singapore’s multi-ethnic population migrated. He argued that an Asian 
Civilisations Museum, rather than the People’s Gallery within a Southeast Asian 
Ethnology Gallery, was a more suitable frame for Singapore’s history and that 
would enable younger Singaporeans to better understand their ancestral roots. 389 
Afterwards, the plan to construct five museums was announced by Yeo in 1992. 
Out of the five museums, the construction of the Singapore History 
Museum and the Asian Civilisations Museum was more closely linked with 
history education and war commemoration activities. Thus, the following pages 
will focus on the construction process of the two museums. The nucleus of the 
collection of the present Singapore History Museum was the exhibits displayed 
in 1980 at the National Museum. It was only in 1979, according to Kwa, that the 
government recognised the need to restructure and upgrade the almost neglected 
National Museum; at that time, the government was first aware of the necessity 
to change the museum’s focus into Singapore’s history and visual arts. 390 This 
idea was shared by Goh Chok Tong. On the occasion of the reopening of the 
National Museum in 1990, he declared that the content of the National Museum 
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had now been changed from a ‘natural history museum’ to a true ‘national 
museum’, saying: 
 
It [the old National Museum] was an interesting museum, full of butterflies, 
stuffed animals and strange smells. But it was not quite a national museum. It was 
more like a natural history museum than a national museum. 391 
 
It is now no longer a natural history museum … In their place, the museum has 
galleries that portray our heritage, our lifestyle, and our history. On show are the 
tools used by our forefathers a hundred years ago, the clothes they wore and the 
things they made. There are exhibits showing our diverse cultures and traditions, 
and a section that traces our history as a nation. 
This is what a national museum should be. Our museum must capture, within its 
walls, the collective memories of our nation. Like a photo album, it should record 
our origins, our life, and our effort to transform a fishing village into a global city. 
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As seen from above, Goh claimed that the content of the National Museum 
should include Singaporeans’ collective memories, their origins, their lifestyle, 
and Singapore’s national history portrayed as a story of a fishing village 
transforming into a global city. Then, he elaborated on what the National 
Museum should tell Singaporeans and what they should remember. He said: 
“Remember how our forefathers came all the way here to seek an opportunity – 
from China, India, Indonesia and Malaya. Remember our lifeline that was based 
on trade in rubber, tin and spice. Remember how we suffered in the Second 
World War - and recovered. The museum should tell this story, the story of who 
we are, where we came from, and what we did.” 393 This storyline that he was 
eager to spread through the museum is the quintessence of national history as 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
Based on such an idea, the plan to establish the Singapore History Museum 
was announced in 1992, and it was housed in the National Museum in 1993. 394 
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On this project, Kwa revealed his idea on what exhibits would be showcased in 
the museum: “We’ll provide the exhibits and the information for the visitor to 
work out for themselves how the development of Singapore took place.” 395 The 
major challenge in developing the Singapore History Museum was, according to 
Kwa, “how to respond to Lee [Kuan Yew]’s agenda of explaining Singapore’s 
prosperity against the odds of its survival after 1965”. 396  Many complex 
questions arose in choosing which artefacts to be showcased in which museum 
even though a basic storyline was given. For instance, Kwa and his colleagues 
struggled to decide whether the Peranakan collection should be displayed in the 
Singapore History Museum to showcase the multiculturalism of Singapore or 
should be transferred to the Asian Civilisations Museum as the artefacts on 
ancestral roots and diaspora communities. (Later in 2008 the Peranakan Museum 
was open.) They also struggled on how to portray Singapore’s past: should the 
focus be laid on the great men from Stamford Raffles to Lee Kuan Yew, or on 
the bigger forces of commerce and colonialism that framed the great men? How 
much emphasis should be given to social history vis-à-vis political history? 397 
Efforts to struggle with such questions can be seen in the new National Museum 
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that opened in 2006. The Singapore History Gallery at this new museum has two 
storylines that set up not only ‘the events path’ tracing Singapore’s major events 
from the vision of great men but also ‘the personal path’ telling stories through 
the eyes of a man on the street. 398 The two kinds of stories are told in the 
museum under the overarching story of Singapore’s climb from a Third to First 
World under the PAP leadership. 399 It is not surprising that such a storyline was 
given to museum curators because it gives an impression that the PAP 
leadership brought about Singapore’s success, which met with interests of the 
political elite.  
On the other hand, as mentioned above, the Asian Civilisations Museum was 
originally planned as a Southeast Asia museum by expanding the National 
Museum’s Southeast Asia ethnographic collections, but George Yeo further 
expanded the plan into the construction of the Asian Civilisations Museum by 
adding East, South, and West Asian collections to the original plan. 400  The 
museum opened in 1997 at the old Tao Nan School with exhibits of Chinese 
ceramics, paintings, and furniture loaned by Hong Kong collectors. In 2003, the 
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restored Empress Place was added to the museum in which over 1300 artefacts 
mainly loaned from the Tareq Rajab Museum in Kuwait were showcased. 401 
The approval of various tax incentives for significant donations attracted a 
number of such donations from corporations and individuals inside and outside 
Singapore. However, disparate donations from collectors did not make for the 
telling of a coherent story of Asian Civilisations. Museum’s advisors, like John 
Miksic and Kwa Chong Guan, argued for a wide and dynamic understanding of 
civilisations as information systems that interacted and borrowed from others to 
adapt over time. But the artefacts to tell such a story were not easily available. In 
the end, the artefacts displayed in the Asian Civilisations Museum were, in the 
words of Kwa, “objects as symbols of different ways of living, different ways of 
perceiving our worlds and others and finally different ways of thinking about 
who we are within our religious cosmologies and systems.”  402 
Incidentally, as mentioned above, the original plan of the construction of a 
Southeast Asia museum was expanded by Yeo into the building of an Asian 
Civilisations Museum based on his idea that Singapore’s cultural roots came not 
only from the civilisation of Southeast Asia but also from those of China, India, 
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and the Middle East. 403 On his intention of such an expansion, Yeo explained: 
“Although we are a young nation, we are an ancient people” because 
“Singaporean is not only a Singaporean: he is also a Chinese, a Malay, an Indian, 
an Eurasian, an Arab or a Jew, the inheritor of an ancient culture and a 
contributor for it… Thus, in discovering Singapore, we also discover Asia and 
the world.” 404 As will be seen below in more detail, Yeo intended to instil a 
pride in the minds of Singaporeans by tracing back their ancestors in China, 
India, and so forth who have long histories and rich traditions. 
 
4.2 George Yeo’s view on Singapore’s dual identity and history education 
Singapore is a young nation, whereas Singaporeans are composed of ancient 
peoples: Chinese, Indians, and Malays who have a ‘cultural depth’. To grasp this 
idea, we need to touch on George Yeo’s understanding of Singapore’s dual 
identity. To him, both ethic and national identities are essential components of 
Singapore’s identity. This is something which is rare to see in the sense that the 
Singapore government has been trying to inculcate both ethnic and national 
identities in the minds of all Singaporeans by the institutionalised means such as 
                                                           
403
 Business Times, 31 Jan 1992; Lianhe Zaobao, 31 Jan 1992. 
404
 Yeo, “Celebrating our heritage with museums”, 55; Straits Times, 30 Nov 1992.   
 178 
bi-lingual education and other ethnic-based classifications in the public sphere, 
which is manifested, for instance, in the ethnic-based registration in the national 
ID card (the IC card), the ethnic-based quota in the public housing (the HDB 
flat), and the ethnic-based TV channels and radio stations. In ‘typical’ nation-
states such as France and Japan, the ethnic identities of minorities, at least in the 
past, have been strongly frowned upon rather than encouraged by the national 
governments. Even in immigrant states like the United States and Australia, the 
national governments do not encourage the citizens to maintain their ethnic 
identities by institutionalised means like Singapore doing. 405 
The structure of the dual identity must be explained. Dual identity has two 
elements. One element is, as mentioned above, that Singapore’s identity is 
composed of national and ethnic identities. On this point, Yeo elaborated: “The 
special qualities of Singaporeans are that we can remain Chinese without 
becoming a part of China; we can remain Malay without having to be a part of 
Malaysia or Indonesia; we can remain Indian without having to be an Indian, Sri 
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Lankan, Bangladeshi or Pakistani citizen.” 406 On another occasion, he claimed 
that Singapore youth would remain Singaporeans in their hearts only when both 
their ethnic cultures and Singapore’s culture would be successfully transmitted. 
407
 These remarks suggest that the political elite were trying to construct a 
Singapore identity which is composed of ethnic and national identities. 
Another element of the dual identity is the separation of political loyalty and 
cultural identity. Using the example of the Chinese, Yeo pointed out that 
although it was fine to celebrate one’s cultural connections with China, their 
political loyalty must be to the countries they belong to. 408 He emphasised this 
separation partly because of Singapore’s history: some of the Chinese-educated 
Chinese were sympathetic to a communist China and supported China’s effort to 
realise a communist revolution in Malaya and Singapore. Probably, taking such 
history into consideration, Yeo stressed that political loyalty must be to 
Singapore even though one can have a Chinese identity: “Because many Chinese 
did not or could not make a clear distinction between the political and cultural 
ideas of being Chinese, some Nantah [Nanyang University] students at that time 
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got caught up with Mainland Chinese nationalism, especially its leftwing 
manifestation, and instigated student unrests”. 409 These remarks suggest that the 
political elite have been promoting a separation of political and cultural 
identities. 
As a natural result of such a framework, Singapore’s ethnic or cultural 
identity has some limitations. In addition to the above-mentioned limitation (the 
government’s oppression of a political loyalty to one’s ancestral country), there 
is another limitation: one’s ethnic or cultural identity can be expressed only 
within the framework of Singapore’s national unity and racial and religious 
harmony. On this point, Yeo stated that the development of Chinese language, 
art, and culture must take place within the multi-racial context of Singapore and 
Southeast Asia. Only then can the Chinese in Singapore live in harmony with 
the other races. 410  In other words, it is permissible to develop one’s ethnic 
language, art, and culture, but it should be “inclusive, tolerant and non-
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threatening to others”, 411  and all Singaporeans “must strive for mutual 
understanding and develop an affection for each other’s culture.” 412  
Similarly, under the framework of racial and religious harmony, Yeo 
emphasised the importance of learning about other cultures. He claimed that the 
ethnic cultures had a potential to grow to be Singapore’s national culture by 
increasing the area of overlap across different cultures: the greater the overlap, 
the greater a sense of being Singaporeans. 413 Similarly, on another occasion he 
claimed: “We must also have values and interests which cut across racial and 
religious lines. Indeed, this is the essence of what it means to be Singaporean.” 
414
  In essence, a main component of Singaporeaness is, according to Yeo, the 
enlargement of one’s identity beyond its national border while embracing others 
different from him/her with a big heart and mind. 415 
Incidentally, the reasons for the continuous government’s attempt to instil 
the dual identity in the minds of Singaporeans must be identified. Firstly, in the 
White Paper on Education (1956) the Singapore government announced its basic 
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policy to avoid building a Singaporean nation as an unwilling fusion of different 
cultures and this policy has continued. 416  In addition, since the 1980s, the 
Singapore government has promoted ethnic traditions and values to counter the 
spread of Western values among the Singapore youth. Due partly to their 
emphasis on ethnic cultures, the government was slow to build Singapore’s 
national culture and thus, even in the 1990s, the political elite recognised that the 
cultural identity as a Singaporean was still being formed. 417 On this matter, 
James Gomez makes a similar analysis as follows: 
 
National identity, in practical terms, comes second to ethnic identity for most Singaporeans. 
This is because the state has successfully socialised most of its citizens towards accepting 
ethnic identity as their primary identity… As a result, apart from identification with the 
island state and the PAP government, national identity as a common cultural identity shared 
by all citizen is absent in Singapore. 418 
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In the absence of a widely shared national culture, there was a need for 
conventional ethnic cultures to make up for that vacuum. This is a reason for the 
continuous attempt to inculcate the dual identity in the minds of Singaporeans: 
the ethnic identity for their cultural identity and the national identity for their 
political identity.  
Secondly, the growing number of emigrants – 5,040 in 1984 doubled to 
11,770 in 1988 419 – was understood by the political elite as a sign of weakening 
patriotism among Singaporeans, or a lack of people’s loyalty to Singapore, that 
made the government continue its nation-building efforts. Since its 
independence in 1965, the political elite sometimes publicly showed their 
concern that people might give their first loyalty to their countries of birth or 
ethnic groups rather than to Singapore. In this context, they often interpreted 
emigration as an act of disloyalty. 420 In 1989, Lee Kuan Yew’s concern over the 
emigration problem grew to the extent that he called for research and open 
discussion on the problem in that year’s National Day Speech. 421 Similarly, Yeo 
was also concerned about the fact that Singaporeans always fit into a Chinese or 
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Indian diaspora so easily; 422 if Singaporean emigrants lost their sense of being 
Singaporean, they would melt into a worldwide Chinese or Indian community. 
423
 Under such circumstances, Yeo claimed that “we should also strengthen our 
own self-identity as Singaporeans. Otherwise, regionalisation and 
internationalisation will weaken our sense of solidarity as a people.” 424  To 
reduce the effect of internationalisation on the further increase of emigration, it 
seems that the government had to continue its efforts to inculcate Singapore’s 
national identity in the minds of its citizens so that no citizens would emigrate or 
escape overseas even when a foreign invasion occurs.  
Thirdly, the government has been celebrating the dual identity partly because 
people seem to think that they cannot be themselves with only an ethnic identity: 
they appear to feel, as Yeo points out, that Singaporeans cannot be Europeans or 
Americans, whereas they are not completely the same as the Chinese in China or 
the Indians in India. 425 In other words, to be a Singaporean, both ethnic and 
national identities are indispensable.  
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The fourth reason for the government’s celebration of the dual identity is to 
inculcate pride in the minds of young Singaporeans: they expect that a strong 
pride in Singapore will be converted into a strong will to fight for the nation. 
Yeo claimed that Singaporeans were ancient peoples, whether they were 
Chinese, Indians, Malays or Eurasians; they must never lose this sense of their 
past that was a great source of spiritual strength in a crisis. 426  At another 
occasion, he again insisted: “Being an ancient people gives us spiritual strength. 
If you are down or starving, knowing this gives you new strength to go on.” 427  
What we can know from above is that one of the important purposes of 
instilling Singapore’s national and ethnic identities appears to be for the defence 
of Singapore. Yeo gave a speech at SAFTI Military Institute in 1996 in which he 
argued that neither economic growth nor military strength nor technology were 
the key to Singapore’s survival; it was “our sense of identity as Singaporeans” 
that was the key. Then he continued: “Whatever may be our race, language or 
religion, provided we have deep within us a sense of being Singaporean, we 
would survive. It is that spirit which will sustain us and which will turn moral 
strength into physical strength.” The question then becomes how they can turn 
moral strength into physical strength. The answer is simple: by picking up the 
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gun. In the same speech, Yeo said: “From the security standpoint, keeping our 
identity as Singaporeans means picking up the gun, mastering it and having the 
will to use it when there is no choice … there is no substitute for our collective 
will to stand firm.” 428  
A major purpose to continue inculcating an ethnic identity in addition to the 
national identity was to nurture a ‘cultural depth’ in the mind of each 
Singaporean. The term ‘cultural depth’ seems to mean a cultural pride created by 
a long tradition of one’s ancestors, such as the traditions of Chinese, Indian, and 
Indonesian civilisations. Yeo seems to understand that when Singapore faces a 
crisis, such as a foreign invasion, one’s cultural depth or cultural pride can be a 
source of mental strength because people may believe in such a way that ‘since 
we are culturally superior, we must not be defeated by inferior invaders’. With 
such a belief, all Singaporeans are expected to fight to the end in the case of war. 
The Singapore government continues to instil ethnic identity in addition to 
national identity because, as seen from above, the political elite think that it is 
conducive to Singapore’s survival as a nation-state. 
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Next, the effectiveness of history education in inculcating a cultural depth in 
students is discussed. Yeo was sceptical about automatic transmission of a 
cultural heritage to young people if the government made history a compulsory 
subject for all students. This was because, he claimed, it was common for 
students to start forgetting what they have learned once the finals were over. 429 
However, he did not totally deny the role of history education. In the face of the 
growing number of Singaporeans’ emigration to Australia, Canada, and America, 
Yeo stressed the importance of the teaching of history and the imparting of 
culture at home, in school, and in any place where there are such opportunities. 
430
 However, for him, teaching history in school curriculum was only one way of 
instilling a cultural depth, but it was certainly not, by any means, the most 
important way. 431 He recognised that the decisive influence was coming from 
parents and teachers, 432 and claimed that traditions should exist in the culture 
itself that should be passed on to children through family in such a way that “At 
the end of the day, they will still have reunion dinners, they will still visit their 
relatives, they will still eat rou zong [Chinese traditional snack], they will still 
make tang yuan [Chinese traditional dessert], some old people would explain 
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when it came about.” 433  Although history education might not be the ideal 
transmitter of a cultural heritage, it was, all in all, a means to unite people as a 
way to maintain the nation-state of Singapore. On another occasion, Yeo 
candidly revealed his view that “the long-term goal of our effort in education” 
must be “our children and their progeny to celebrate Singapore’s 100th and 200th 
National Day.” 434  His ultimate purpose to provide history education with 
Singapore youth seemed to be for the sake of the survival of Singapore as a 
nation-state. 
 
4.3 Promotion of school visits to museums 
In line with the government policy to promote history education after the 
resurgence of the political elite’s interest in history, the government began 
encouraging school visits to the existing museums. In October 1993, the 
government set up a committee to increase the number of school children 
visitors. However, even before that, it had already started programmes to 
achieve the same aim. For example, on 1 March 1992, more than 100 secondary 
and junior college (high school) history teachers were invited to the National 
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Museum where they learned how to conduct a tour of the ‘When Singapore was 
Syonan-to’ exhibition, which was held to mark the 50th anniversary of the fall of 
Singapore (Singapore was renamed as Syonan-to during the Japanese 
Occupation, 1942-1945.). The purpose of this session was to help history 
teachers understand more about the Syonan-to exhibition and to make more 
students to visit the National Museum so that they would be able to have a sense 
of the past. 435 On this issue, George Yeo commented that if teachers did not 
“succeed in instilling this sense of the past into their students, they would have 
failed. Education is not just about language, science and mathematics; it’s also 
about culture and values.” 436  Lim How Seng, assistant director of the Oral 
History Department, told a reporter that he hoped that after receiving the training 
the teachers would take their all students to the museum and would help them 
understand the important points of the exhibition. 437 
In these training sessions at the National Museum, teachers were divided 
into small groups in which they learned about the museum displays through 
detailed explanations from the people who organised the Syonan-to exhibition. 
Those people included Kwa Chong Guan (director of the National Museum cum 
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director of the Oral History Department), Lily Tan (director of the National 
Archives), and Lim How Seng (assistant director of the Oral History 
Department). After viewing the Syonan-to exhibition, the teachers had 
discussions with the organisers on topics like how to make students take the 
exhibition seriously and how to attract their interest. 438 Some history teachers 
were glad to join in such a training course. Ms. Chen, a history teacher from 
Queenstown Secondary, said that if history teachers had a chance to receive the 
exhibition organisers’ special training, they would understand more about the 
exhibition. At the same time, they would know how to lead students to enjoy 
learning about the Syonan-to period. Another history teacher, Qiu Meng Qi from 
Ghim Moh Secondary also shared a similar view. 439 When it came to the effect 
of school visits to the museum, several students from Queenstown Secondary 
unanimously stated that if teachers or war survivors would explain the exhibition 
to students when they visit the museum, the students would be able to deepen 
and broaden their understanding of the war. 440        
In the following year, a committee to promote school visits to museums was 
formed. Ker Sin Tze, Minister of State (Information and the Arts and Education), 








was appointed as its head. 441 Other members (as of 3 May 1994) included Lim 
Siam Kim (chief executive officer of the National Heritage Board (NHB) cum 
MITA deputy secretary), Shirley Loo-Lim (NHB’s senior director of corporate 
affairs), Mok Choon Hoe (director of curriculum planning at the Education 
Ministry), Lee Fong Seng (principal of Raffles Junior College), Chia Choon Kiat 
(principal of Bishan Park Secondary), Leong Weng Kee (manager of the 
Empress Place Museum), Koh Buck Song (Straits Times journalist), and Ng 
Yew Kang (MITA director in charge of arts and heritage policy). 442 
The committee, according to Yeo, was set up to encourage school principals 
and teachers to instil a sense of the past in their students. In this way, students 
were expected to have “a sense of their own cultural inheritance” and “the 
cultural inheritance of Singaporeans of other ethnicities.” A society, he 
continued, without cultural depth would not be able to survive when a major 
crisis came. Therefore, he implied, the task of teachers, which was to impart a 
sense of history to young people, was important. 443 Similarly, Lim Siam Kim, 
one of the committee members, told reporters that the purpose of promoting 
school visits to the National Museum: “If we actively promote, we will not only 
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be able to let the young people be aware of the existence of the past, but also be 
able to let them feel thankful to all their ancestors did. All this will help us to 
mould the better Singaporean of next generation”. 444 To achieve such a purpose, 
the concrete targets to increase the number of museum visitors were set by the 
committee. Its long-term target was, according to Lim Siam Kim, for every child 
to visit museums at least once in primary school, at least once in Secondary I 
and II and at least once in Secondary III and IV. In the short-term, the committee 
hoped to increase the number of student visitors by 10 per cent every year. In 
1993, 39,758 students visited the National Museum on school tours, which was a 
48 per cent increase compared to the previous year. The target number of 
student visitors in 1994 was 45,000. 445  
Shirley Loo-Lim, another committee member, said that the committee would 
persuade more schools, from primary schools to junior colleges, to become 
members of the NHB, by which unlimited free admission to the National 
Museum would be provided to all students of the member schools. 446  In 
addition, the member schools had the privilege to book and ride a free special 
bus called the National Museum Express, which ferries students to the museum. 
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This service started in October 1994. 447 To become a member school, the school 
needed to pay an annual fee of either $150 (for 500 students and less) or $200 
(for more than 500 students).448 Though the number of member schools stood at 
233 in May 1994, 449 it rose by 8 per cent to 251, only within four months. 450 
As one of the short term projects, Lim Siam Kim revealed the plan that the 
museum’s education officers would draw up a programme to give briefings on 
exhibitions as well as to provide worksheets on them for school teachers. Under 
such programmes, teachers would be given answers for the worksheets to follow 
up with in class. One of the education officers, She Ya An, revealed that the 
National Museum was planning to have briefing sessions for history and arts 
teachers to let them know the latest activities and exhibitions in the museum; in 
addition, it was also planning to have a tea party with principals of primary and 
secondary schools for the same purpose. 451  In addition, the NHB issued a 
quarterly magazine that would inform all schools across Singapore of the 
activities and services that the board provided. 452      
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Lim confessed the reasons for the promotion of school visits. He said: “If 
students have to choose to visit either a zoo or a museum, they will probably 
choose the former. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to encourage them to 
voluntarily come to visit a museum without a guide of teachers.” Therefore, the 
NHB, together with the school visits promotion committee, held briefings for 
school teachers to promote school visits to the National Museum. 453 Perhaps 
partly due to such concerted efforts, the number of visitors to the National 
Museum rose by about fifteen per cent from 237,7000 in 1992 to 273,000 in 
1994.454 
 
4.4 Formation of the National Heritage Board 
On top of the museums construction project and the government’s promotion 
of school visits to museums, another move closely related to history education 
was the formation of the National Heritage Board (NHB), which aimed to 
provide a more flexible and effective platform for planning and implementing 
heritage transmission to the younger generation. 455 
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In early 1992, MITA began considering whether it should follow the 
Advisory Council’s recommendation to establish a National Heritage Trust, 
modelled after the British National Heritage Trust, in order to bring a more 
coordinated approach to the preservation of Singapore’s heritage. 456 Thereafter, 
George Yeo asked the Singapore Heritage Society to propose the feasibility of a 
National Heritage Trust. Society Chairman William Lim and its executive 
committee member Kwa Chong Guan undertook a study on this matter in 
England and Scotland. They recommended the formation of a statutory board 
that could take on the management of the Singapore History, the Asian 
Civilisations, and the Singapore Art Museums as well as the National Archives. 
In 1993, the National Heritage Board was established by combining the National 
Museum (which was to be restructured into the Singapore History, the Asian 
Civilisations, and the Singapore Art Museums), the National Archives, and the 
Oral History Centre. 457 
The mission of the NHB was, Yeo revealed, “to explore and present the 
heritage of the people of Singapore – in the context of their ancestral cultures, 
their links to Southeast Asia and the rest of the world, and their nationhood – by 
the collection, preservation, interpretation and display of objects and 
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documents.” 458 To achieve such a mission the main tasks of the board were 
assigned as follows: (1) explore and present the heritage and nationhood of the 
people of Singapore, (2) promote public awareness, appreciation, and 
understanding of the arts, culture, and heritage, (3) provide a permanent place to 
keep records of national or historical significance and to facilitate access to such 
records, and (4) record, preserve, and disseminate the history of Singapore 
through oral history or other means.459  
Yeo appointed Lim Chee Onn, a former MP, as the NHB’s chairman. 16 
members of the board were also appointed. Goh Kim Leong, who had been 
involved in the museums construction project from the onset, was selected as 
deputy chairman. Another board member, a government official, was Liu Thai 
Ker, who had been involved in civic district planning as the head of Urban 
Redevelopment Authority. 460  The board’s senior director (corporate affairs) 
position went to Shirley Loo-Lim, who joined MITA in 1992 to help plan the 
museums construction project. 461  Other members were representatives from 
each ethnic community and major benefactors of the National Museum. 462  
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A reason for the formation of the new statutory board, according to Yeo, was 
to “give it more flexibility to recruit good staff and to go into commercial 
activities.”  For example, he continued, it was very difficult for a museum shop 
to be run as a civil service operation. It was important for a museum to have 
good restaurants and good museum shops. By setting up a more flexible NHB, 
museums would be able to provide exhibitions and services which were both 
professionally competent and commercially enterprising. 463 
Another reason to set up the NHB seemed to be the more effective 
transmission of Singapore’s heritage to the younger generation. Yeo claimed 
that the work of the NHB would be very important in imparting a sense of 
history to young people. 464 Similarly, he said: “Indeed, it’s very difficult to 
justify spending public monies on rare art objects purely for aesthetic 
appreciation ... I think what we are interested in, in the end, is making sure that 
Singaporeans have a deep sense of the past”. 465 In addition, Lim, chairman of 
the NHB, said that the mission of the NHB was to make people have a sense that 
“we are Singaporeans, we share common destiny” by using the cohesive factor 
such as Singapore’s common past whether it was the British colonial period or 
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the Japanese Occupation period. The NHB, he continued, would remind the 
younger generation of such cohesive factors through various means including 
exhibitions and programmes. 466 It can be said that the NHB was formed mainly 
to transmit cohesive factors that would help build a Singapore nation in a more 
effective way. One such cohesive factor seemed to be the official portrait of the 
Japanese Occupation understood as a ‘national suffering’, as well as the birth of 
national consciousness, which was intended to be transmitted to the younger 
generation through museum exhibitions. 
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Chapter 5: Commemorating the Second World War, 1991-1994 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Outline of the war commemoration programmes 
In parallel with the above-mentioned efforts to inculcate national 
consciousness in people through the museums construction and the promotion of 
school visits to museums, the Singapore government, in the first half of the 
1990s, actively encouraged young Singaporeans to remember the Second World 
War. On the 50th anniversary of the war, the government, in cooperation with 
related organisations, held war exhibitions, erected war plaques, conducted 
commemorative ceremonies, etc. These commemorative programmes had two 
highlights: the 50th anniversary of the start of the Japanese invasion and 
occupation (1991 and 1992) and the end of the occupation (1995). 
In these activities, as will be discussed below, the political elite intended to 
spread the message of ‘be prepared for war even in peacetime’ and highlighted a 
historical analysis that the British were easily defeated because of their 
unpreparedness for the Japanese invasion. In addition, they portrayed the 
Japanese Occupation as the starting point of a local nationalism, painted the 
period as that of ‘terror, fear, and atrocities’ and ‘bravery, patriotism, and 
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sacrifice’, albeit such political intentions were not always exactly reflected in the 
war exhibitions. 
The portrait of ‘terror, fear, and atrocities’ highlighted people’s suffering 
under the Japanese rule that aimed to send the message that “[t]he suffering that 
the people went through during the Japanese Occupation also taught the people 
to see the need to get rid of their foreign masters.” 467  In other words, the 
importance of independence was stressed in this portrait. Another implication of 
this portrait is that, since all people suffered during the Japanese Occupation, 
they started to seriously think about the founding of their own nation-state; this 
led to an interpretation of the Japanese Occupation as birth of a nation, or the 
starting point of a local nationalism. To support this logic, the official narrative 
stressed the common suffering of all ethnic groups despite the fact that different 
ethnic groups had responded to the Japanese Occupation differently.  
The second portrait of the occupation – bravery, patriotism, and sacrifice –
was manifested in the behaviour and actions of local war heroes such as Lim Bo 
Seng and Adnan Saidi. Both of them were portrayed in history textbooks as 
brave patriots. The political elite intended to spread such a portrait of war heroes, 
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probably, as role models for young Singaporeans in hoping that they would then 
fiercely defend Singapore when a crisis comes.  
The driving force of the dissemination of such portraits and message through 
the state-led programmes was created from the interplay between contextual and 
structural factors. As will be discussed below in more detail, the political elite 
were concerned about the danger that the end of the Cold War would invite 
Singaporean youth’s complacent attitude toward national defence. Under such 
circumstances, instead of communist threat, the lesson of the war – the British 
were defeated due to their unpreparedness; the Singaporeans, thus, need to be 
prepared for war even in peacetime – was used as a new explanation to justify 
Singapore’s burdensome defence policies even after the end of the Cold War. It 
was the interplay between this contextual factor in the 1990s and structural 
factors – anarchical nature of the nation-state system (every nation-state needs to 
prepare for war by maintaining defence forces as well as fostering patriotism) 
and the mechanism that a nation-state unites people (every nation-state needs to 
inculcate national identity in people in order to unite them) that created the 
driving force of the state-led war commemoration conducted between 1991 and 
1995. 
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In the state-led commemoration, one of the most important players was 
George Yeo (Minister for MITA) who was the minister in charge of the 50th 
anniversary to mark the Second World War. Under his ministry were the 
National Museum, the National Archives, and the Oral History Centre, which 
were the main actors in the activities. Apart from Minister Yeo, Kwa Chong 
Guan, director of the National Museum cum director of the Oral History 
Department, played an important role. He convinced the individual parties 
related to the commemoration activities, such as the Singapore Heritage Society, 
the owner of the old Ford Factory, and the Singapore Armed Forces, to hold war 
exhibitions in cooperation with them. In addition, he played a major role in 
erecting war plaques to mark eleven sites related to the war located across 
Singapore. 468 On top of MITA and its subordinate organisations, the Mindef 
and the Ministry of Education also supported the commemorative activities. 
On 4 November 1991, during a dinner organised by the Singapore Heritage 
Society, Yeo announced various programmes to commemorate the 50th 
anniversary. In his speech, he announced that the commemorative programmes 
would start on 8 December 1991, the day of 50th anniversary of the first 
Japanese bombing in Singapore. The activities he revealed were the publication 
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of a pictorial book on the Japanese Occupation, a heritage hunt (a competition to 
find documents and artefacts related to the Second World War), an exhibition at 
the old Ford Factory, and the opening of the underground British command 
centre at Fort Canning (the Battle Box). 469 To prepare for the first highlight, it 
was reported that the government set up a working committee for the 
commemorative activities to which Kwa was appointed as chair person. 470 
However, according to Kwa, though he played a major role in the 
commemorative activities, there was neither an overall committee nor a clear 
overall plan for the war commemoration. The war commemoration activities 
were, he said, planned and implemented in an incremental way rather than an 
organised way. 471  
On 12 November 1991, a MITA spokesman concisely revealed the purpose 
of the war commemoration activities. He said: “The activities would inform 
younger Singaporeans on the impact of the war, in addition to highlighting the 
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importance of Total Defence.” 472  Total Defence, which comprises Military, 
Civil, Economic, Social, and Psychological Defence, is “the cornerstone of 
Singapore’s strategy of deterrence… formulated on the basis that modern wars 
are no longer mere confrontations between armies but are conflicts involving 
nations and peoples. Total Defence unites the government, businesses, and the 
people in the defence of Singapore.” 473 Each of the above five components of 
Total Defence is supported by a particular ministry: Military Defence is, 
needless to say, in charge of the Mindef, Civil Defence is supported by Ministry 
of Home Affairs, Economic Defence, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Social 
Defence, Ministry of Community Development, and Psychological Defence, 
MITA. Civil Defence is supported by a large Singapore Civilian Defence Force 
composed of regulars, National Service, volunteers, reservists, and one 
construction brigade. Economic Defence aims at the building of an economy 
that will not break down when faced an external attack. Social Defence attempts 
to create a harmonious society so that an enemy will not be able to divide 
Singaporeans along the lines of ethnic and religious differences. Psychological 
Defence promotes people’s emotional attachment to the country, their 
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willingness to stay and fight for the nation. 474 In short, Total Defence means that 
“Everyone has a role to play in ensuring that we have peace and security”, and 
in the case of emergency the Singapore government aims to mobilise “the entire 
population into an integrated defence force.” 475  To support such a posture, 
Singapore has not only National Service but also compulsory reservist services. 
In addition, Richard Deck claims, of the five components of Total Defence, 
Psychological Defence – the promotion of patriotism – is most important. 476 
Although the above-mentioned MITA spokesman used the term ‘Total Defence’, 
what he especially bore in mind might be, as will be seen below, the promotion 
of patriotism and the maintenance of National Service. 
 
1.2 The purpose of the war commemoration programmes 
The purpose of the various programmes to mark the 50th anniversary of the 
Second World War conducted between 1991 and 1995 was to remind 
Singaporeans of the importance of Singapore’s independence, defence, and 
patriotism. On this matter, Yeo revealed his intention to conduct such 
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programmes during an interview in July 1995 with Singapore’s Chinese 
newspaper Lianhe Zaobao: “The lessons we learned from [the Second World 
War] are very important: national defence and National Service are very 
important.” Thereafter, he pointed out the importance of Singapore’s 
independence as a lesson from the war saying: “And it is very happy to have our 
own sovereignty.” Subsequently, he concluded that instilling sovereign 
consciousness in the minds of all Singaporeans was a purpose of the war 
commemoration programmes. He said: “All Singaporeans, regardless of men 
and women, young and old, should internalise this kind of sovereign 
consciousness, and should cherish it, defend it and maintain it. Here in lies the 
meaningfulness of commemorating the Second World War.” 477 
Such a way of understanding of the Second World War seemed to be widely 
shared among the political elite in Singapore. Firstly, they seemed to understand 
that a reason for the fall of Singapore was the lack of the British military’s 
preparedness; therefore, to prevent from making similar mistakes again, they 
understood that Singapore would need strong armed forces and ‘eternal 
vigilance’ albeit, as discussed in Chapter 2, such a position makes some sense in 
the current anarchical structure of the nation-state system. For instance, Dr. Ong 
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Chit Chung, MP for Bukit Batok and also a military historian, claimed: “The 
defence forces and resources allocated to this region were inadequate ... We 
must therefore build up and maintain a fighting fit armed forces, backed up by 
reservists”. 478  As for military preparedness, Teo Chee Hean, then Senior 
Minister of State for Defence, claimed: “We should remember never again to be 
unprepared to defend our country, our families and our way of life. We should 
remember that the price of peace is eternal vigilance”. 479  George Yeo also 
echoed his position: “It is very important that we do not take peace for granted – 
that we do not assume that … there will be no more war; that there’s no need to 
defend ourselves.” 480 He also stated: “We must always be prepared to stand up 
for ourselves”. 481 
These politicians’ remarks placing a strong emphasis on eternal vigilance as 
a lesson of the war can be explained by the situation in the early 1990s. It seems 
that, as mentioned above, some of the political elite were anxious about the risk 
that the end of the Cold War would accelerate young people’s complacent 
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attitude toward defence. Lee Boon Yang, Second Minister of Defence, expressed 
his concern in 1992: 
 
The problem is that with each passing year and the absence of threat some 
Singaporeans may begin to feel complacent … A few may question the length of 
national service or even the need for the whole national service effort … Despite 
the absence of visible danger, the end of the Cold War has not guaranteed peace at 
all … Since security cannot be assumed, we must continue to maintain a capable 
and vigilant defence force … We must maintain a strong SAF and be committed to 
the security of our nation at all times. National service will continue to serve as the 
bedrock of our defence force and our efforts to build a nation. The current period of 
two or two and a half years of national service will be maintained … 482 
 
Under such circumstances, instead of communist threat, the lesson from the war 
came to the fore to justify Singapore’s burdensome defence policies, though 
such an analysis itself already existed even before the end of the Cold War. On 
this issue, Low Seow Chay, MP for Choa Chu Kang, said: “In peacetime, some 
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people may complain about National Service and reservist trainings. These 
commemorative plaques of the Second World War will remind them of the 
importance of National Service and Total Defence.” 483  Then, he concluded that 
it was extremely important not only to purchase advanced military equipment 
but also to train people. Furthermore, he requested that the people tolerate the 
inconvenience caused by military trainings: “Our land is limited. And there is 
lack of the land for military trainings. Therefore, sometimes military trainings 
may cause some inconvenience to the residents. But if they understand the 
importance of defence, they will be able to tolerate such inconvenience in their 
daily life.” 484 In this way, the activities to mark the 50th anniversary of the war, 
such as the erection of eleven war plaques, were exploited by the political elite 
to justify Singapore’s burdensome defence policies. 
Secondly, the political elite in Singapore seemed to assume that the lesson 
from the war – Singapore needs to be independent – was the self-evident 
premise for justifying the heavy defence burdens. On this issue, Lee Kuan Yew 
said: 
 
                                                           
483




My colleagues and I are of that generation of young men who went through the 
Second World War and the Japanese Occupation and became determined that no 
one – neither the Japanese nor the British – had the right to push and kick us around. 
We were determined that we could govern ourselves and bring up our children in a 
country where we can be a self-respecting people. 485 
 
This quote is adopted in many history and social studies textbooks for secondary 
schools as a lesson from the war. 486 A textbook published in 1994 explains the 
above quote saying: “The sufferings that the people went through during the 
Japanese occupation also taught the people to see the need to get rid of their 
foreign masters.” 487  Its implication is that Singapore needs to maintain its 
independent status to protect the people from a possible foreign oppression in 
the future. 
On that premise, the political elite tended to make claims about the necessity 
of the heavy defence burden. For instance, Yeo claimed as follows: 
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We must always be prepared to stand up for ourselves. This is what independence 
means and there is no greater expression of our independence than the Singapore 
Armed Forces (SAF) ... The price we pay for our independence is six per cent of 
our annual GDP and the effort of our entire citizenry in Total Defence, as national 
servicemen, as reservists and volunteers, as supporting wives and mothers. We need 
not to be as helpless as we were fifty years ago. 488  
 
Here, again, a lesson from the Japanese Occupation was utilised for justifying 
Singapore’s defence policies. Singapore’s independence seems to be considered 
as a self-evident premise, as a means to avoid people’s sufferings in the future. 
 Thirdly, the political elite in Singapore seemed to understand that the fall of 
Singapore had occurred partly because, as Dr. Ong Chit Chung explained, “[t]he 
British troops also lacked the will to fight to the end.” 489  However, this is 
understandable because Singapore was not the home country for the British and 
other Allied soldiers fighting against the Japanese; there was, therefore, no 
strong reason for them to die for Singapore. In addition to the Allied soldiers, 
even most people in Singapore, except for some volunteers, also seemed to be 
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indifferent to fighting for a mere British colony even when they faced the 
Japanese invasion. A war survivor, Chan Kwee Sung, observed the atmosphere 
at that time: “They did not feel they had anything to fight for.” 490  This is 
probably because many Chinese immigrants living in Singapore at that time 
thought of their home country as China; they did not think of Singapore or 
Malaya as their own country, which was in fact a British possession. Unless 
people feel they are part of a nation and the land they live in is their homeland, 
they will not have a strong will to fight against the enemy, even when the 
country is invaded; therefore, strengthening Singapore’s nationalism is vital for 
its independence. 
This seems to be another important lesson learned from the Second World 
War for the political elite. On this point, Yeo claimed that one purpose of 
conducting the war commemoration programmes was to encourage 
Singaporeans to remember the spirit of nationalism. He said that the “Purpose is 
not to nurse a hatred … Not all those [from Japan] who were here were bad … 
we should remember other things as well – the spirit of nationalism”. 491 
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Similarly, Goh Chok Tong, the Prime Minister at the time of the 50th 
anniversary, stressed the importance of patriotism, bravery, and sacrifice in his 
speech made at the opening ceremony of the “When Singapore was Syonan-to” 
exhibition. In this speech, he portrayed the Japanese Occupation as a period of 
not only “terror, fear and atrocities” but also “bravery, patriotism and sacrifice.” 
Then, he enumerated local war heroes who demonstrated such a spirit – the 
Malay Regiment, the Singapore Volunteer Corps, Force 136, and its leader Lim 
Bo Seng 492  – as the role models that Singaporean youth should remember 
because they showed “great resilience, courage and resourcefulness in coping 
with the Occupation” despite facing such great odds. 493 In this way, the political 
elite intended to internalise the spirit of patriotism, bravery, and sacrifice 
manifested in the behaviour of war heroes into the minds of young Singaporeans 
so that they also would fight to the end like those war heroes did. 
Fourthly, the Japanese Occupation seems to be understood as an important 
common experience shared by all Singaporeans from which Singapore 
nationalism emerged. In other words, as Lian Kwen Fee points out, the Japanese 
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Occupation is understood as a “historical ‘myth’ in its origin as a nation” of 
Singapore in the absence of its independence war against colonial powers. 494  
On this issue, George Yeo pointed out: “Our first common experience was 
the Second World War and Japanese Occupation … Out of war, revolution and 
civil strife emerged an independent Singapore spirit which now binds us 
together.”  495 In the author’s interview with Yeo, a similar portrait of Singapore 
history was told. He said that Singapore’s nationalism emerged first in the form 
of anti-Japanese, which was subsequently expressed as anti-British; then Lee 
Kuan Yew united various groups in Singapore, such as communists, non-
communists, the Chinese-educated, the English-educated, the Chinese, the 
Indians, and the Malays, though later communists separated; Singaporean 
nationalism evolved in such a historical development. 496 
In addition, Yeo claimed that national identity of a people would be 
developed in the process of overcoming great odds together. He said: “… the 
soul of a people is created when they are struggling to overcome great odds. In 
overcoming these odds together, they develop their identity as a group, and this 
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identity is carried from generation to generation in the form of myths”. 497 In this 
argument, the Japanese Occupation is perceived as a great odd that Singaporeans 
overcame together: from such a common experience, he argues, a myth of the 
birth of a Singaporean nation was created and this myth plays an important role 
in passing on national identity from generation to generation. To inculcate 
national identity in Singaporeans’ minds, according to the above argument, 
Singapore’s national experience of the Second World War should be 
remembered and internalised. This was and is still being done, as already 
mentioned, in hoping that all Singaporeans fight to the end when a crisis comes.   
Lastly, Yeo understands that if you do not have a deep sense of history, you 
cannot be a strong people; the history of the post-1965 Singapore is too shallow 
so that Singaporeans should be rooted to their ancestors’ ancient civilisations. 498  
As can be seen above, in his view, the teaching of ancient histories is important 
in building a strong people who can defend themselves when a crisis comes. 
History education and defence are closely connected.  
It seems that Yeo learned this logic from the history of China in the 1930s. 
According to him, despite the ruin and hardship facing them during the war 
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against Japan, the oppressed Chinese never once doubted the superiority of their 
civilisation; it was this deep-rooted belief that helped them finally overthrow the 
invaders. Based on such a belief, as already mentioned, Yeo initiated a plan to 
renovate or build the Singapore History Museum and the Asian Civilisations 
Museum in order for Singaporeans to develop a sense of cultural pride. 499 He 
claimed that the Singapore History Museum would remind Singaporeans not just 
of Singapore’s history, but also of their ancestral cultures, of South-east Asian, 
Chinese, Indian, and Islamic civilisations: “So, in this way, even though we are a 
young nation, our people have a sense that they are an ancient people. Because 
when there is a crisis, our debate … will be about life and death… To stand firm, 
you need that cultural depth.” Then he revealed that it was for this reason that 
MITA had coordinated a series of events to mark the 50th anniversary of the fall 
of Singapore. 500 
In sum, taking the opportunity of the 50th anniversary, the Singapore 
government conducted war commemoration programmes, such as war 
exhibitions, to remind people, especially young people, of the lessons from the 
war, that is, Singapore fell because they lacked a will to fight and had weak 
defence capabilities; the maintenance of Singapore’s independence is 
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indispensable to avoid suffering from foreign rule. In other words, in order to 
defend the nation-state of Singapore, the political elite seemed to understand that 
the government needed to “instil in young Singaporeans a sense of loyalty, 
patriotism, pride, and the need to maintain a strong national defence” (Chew 
Heng Ching, MP for Eunos Group Representative Constituency ). 501 This seems 
to be a major purpose for organising state-led programmes to mark the 50th 
anniversary of the war. 
 
2. Exhibitions on the Second World War 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous section indicates some politicians’ remarks intending to instil 
in young people a sense of patriotism, national pride, and the necessity of a 
strong army through various commemoration programmes. Next, this section 
examines how the political elite’s intentions were, or were not, translated into 
displays and exhibits in the state-led war exhibitions. Kwa Chong Guan stated 
that he was in charge of all seven war exhibitions conducted between 1991 and 
1992, namely, the Fall of Singapore exhibition, the Internment Years exhibition, 
the History of the Battle of Singapore multimedia show, the exhibition in the 
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Battle Box, the Volunteer Corps in the Defence of Singapore exhibition, the 
When Singapore was Syonan-to exhibition, and the Singapore Surrenders! 
exhibition. Most of those exhibitions were initiated by Kwa and implemented 
through his acquaintances. 502   
For example, Kwa persuaded his friend at the National Parks Board to put up 
a small exhibition in the Battle Box. 503 The archival resources were provided 
from the National Archives. 504  In the case of the Volunteer Corps in the 
Defence of Singapore exhibition, Kwa convinced his acquaintances in the SAF 
to put up an exhibition regarding the role and contribution of the volunteer corps. 
Similarly, he persuaded his friends in The Singapore Heritage Society to do the 
Heritage Hunt as well as the Singapore Surrenders! exhibition at the old Ford 
Factory. Since the old Ford Factory was owned by a private company at that 
time, Kwa managed to get permission from the company to use the factory’s 
office where the British surrendered to the Japanese. 505 Although the Fall of 
Singapore and the Internment Years exhibitions, organised by the Sentosa 
Development Corporation, a government’s statutory board under the Ministry of 
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Trade and Industry, was initiated by itself without Kwa’s suggestion,506  the 
archives exhibited were provided by the National Archives. 507 
In the following pages, each war exhibition is discussed in more detail. 
There were three exhibitions to mark 8 December (the day of the start of the 
Japanese invasion) and four exhibitions to commemorate 15 February (the day 
of the fall of Singapore). The first three exhibitions were the fall of Singapore 
exhibition, the Internment Years exhibition, and the History of the Battle of 
Singapore multimedia show. 
 
The Fall of Singapore exhibition 
The Sentosa Development Corporation organised two exhibitions on Sentosa 
Island, one of which was the Fall of Singapore exhibition. 508 This exhibition 
was conducted in the Pioneers of Singapore and Surrender Chamber on the 
island from 8 November 1991 to 31 March 1992. The purpose of the exhibition 
was, according to Yeo Eng Leng, senior organising manager, to remind 
Singaporeans of the importance of defence by showing the cruelty of war. He 
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said:  “The exhibition will show younger people what life could be like if one’s 
country is stricken by war. It will be especially poignant for those who lived 
through those years – they will probably get very emotional.” 509 
The exhibition traced back the history through the Japanese invasion of 
Malaya: the first Japanese landings on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, 
their capture of the peninsula, and the subsequent defeat of the British navy with 
the destruction of the battleship HMS Price of Wales and the battle cruiser HMS 
Repulse. Many photographs during the invasion were also on display. Some of 
those were the photos of 8 December 1941, the first day that the Japanese 
bombed Singapore. Some of those pictures showed the fear of people. 510 TV 
sets, audio visual equipment, and sound effects such as the whistling of bombs 
falling and radio broadcasts of the wartime were also used. Short documentary 
film clips of the British surrender to the Japanese and the scene of the Japanese 
surrender to the Allied forces were screened on TV. 511   
Having visited the exhibition, Nicholas Leong, a Straits Times reporter, 
wrote about his impressions. He described the exhibits as ‘efficient’ in a sense 
that complex historical events were portrayed as a clear story in a perfect 
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chronological order; it could be an efficient study material for history students. 
But, he continued, there was little more than what was given in the history text 
books. He could not gain a sense of how peace should be valued from the 
exhibition. 512 
However, as far as the comments and impressions appearing on newspapers 
are concerned (though there is a possibility that the comments along the lines of 
the official stance were mostly selected due to the mass media’s editorial 
policies 513), the exhibition seemed to be educational for most young visitors. 
One such visitor, Jasmine Goh, a student at National University of Singapore, 19, 
was surprised to learn about the hard living condition of the people and admitted 
that peace, food, and education were things that young people of her age often 
took for granted. 514 She said: “It set me wondering about how people managed 
to survive during that time.” Then, she pointed out that her grandparents 
constantly gave her accounts of their lives during the occupation, emphasising 
thrift, hard work, and the value of good nutritious food. The exhibition made her 
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appreciate why they did so. She said: “Seeing real pictures of people who 
suffered in the war … has driven the point home more strongly … It has made 
me see how lucky we are today, except that we tend to forget too soon about it.” 
515
 According to a spokesperson for the exhibition organiser, the Sentosa 
Development Corporation, the number of visitors to the exhibition for the first 
three months amounted to more than 300,000. 516  
 
The Internment Years exhibition 
The Internment Years exhibition, organised by the Sentosa Development 
Corporation, was held in Fort Siloso in Sentosa from 8 November 1991 to 31 
March 1992. The exhibition featured some 87 exhibits and highlighted the harsh 
living conditions of prison camps, including information on the signing of the 
“no escape” document at the Selarang Barracks. Also displayed was the 
Thai/Burma Railway, for which some of the 61,000 Allied prisoners of war 
(POWs) and 300,000 Asian workers were deployed to construct. It also included 
an original letter written by a POW and a book written by Karel Van Der 
Seterren. In addition, two samurai swords left by Japanese soldiers, an original 
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Geneva Convention document, and 25 cartoon sketches drawn by a Dutch 
soldier, illustrating his life as a POW, were displayed. 517 
Leong also visited this exhibition and commented that, even though its target 
visitors might be tourists from the West, he was disappointed with the fact that 
all the exhibits were about British and European hardships; there was not a 
solitary photograph of the death of the 90,000 Asians. 518 Mervyn Moss, a visitor, 
saw the exhibition from a different perspective. While at the exhibit, he, as a war 
survivor, repeatedly told his grandchild that how fortunate the young today 
were. 519  According to the spokesperson for the Sentosa Development 
Corporation, the number of visitors to the exhibition for the first three months 
amounted to more than 200,000. 520  
 
The History of the Battle of Singapore multimedia show  
Also commemorating the start of the Japanese invasion, the History of the 
Battle of Singapore multimedia show was held in the National Museum from 8 
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December 1991 to 31 March 1992. 521  It was organised by MITA and its 
heritage departments. 522  
The show was presented on a computer screen in the National Museum, 
which taught visitors the history of the Battle for Singapore in an interactive way. 
523
 Through three computer stations installed in the museum, visitors could see 
actual war film footage, hear radio announcements and aircrafts crashing, and 
get a feel for the pulse of the battle. For example, the first page of The War 
Chronicle on the computer screen takes the user to 8 December 1941. The 
headline reads: “Japan invades Malaya. Singapore bombed.” One could read the 
front page article about the invasion and see a picture of Raffles Place in ruin. 
By clicking on different items on the screen, one could choose to hear radio 
news commentary by Malayan Broadcasting, see a film clip of the Japanese 
Cabinet declaring war, and hear the proclamation of war by Japanese Prime 
Minister Hideki Tōjō. In this way, the fully interactive computer software 
allowed visitors to examine, discover, and reconstruct the history of the Japanese 
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invasion of Malaya and Singapore that took place between 8 December 1941 
and 15 February 1942. 524 
After experiencing this programme, Kwa Chong Guan, director of the 
National Museum, said with excitement: “It breaks the stereotype that learning 
history is numbing, difficult, boring … Since the present youngsters like to use 
computers, it is easier to exploit them to introduce history to them … 
Multimedia is exciting … It makes the study of history more stimulating, more 
exciting.” 525  Similarly, Vernon Cornelius, a visitor, positively evaluated the 
computer software as a brilliant way of putting together a history subject 
especially for the young who were not exposed to the TV dramas on the war. He 
said: “Each second draws one’s curiosity deeper. The more your curiosity builds, 
the more you get educated.” 526 
On the first day of the multi-media show,  8 December 1991, George Yeo 
attended the opening ceremony for the exhibition and, in his speech, explained 
the purpose of the commemorative activities: “… our objective does not just 
commemorate what happened a half century ago. It is also to learn from the past 
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in order to better secure the future for ourselves and for our children.” 527 
Furthermore, he touched on two important lessons to remember from the Second 
World War. He said: “The first lesson is the need to construct a structure of 
peace in the region which enables conflicts among nations to be settled in a 
peaceful manner without recourse to violence … It was precisely the lack of 
such institutions which brought about the war in the Pacific.” 528 Yeo was well 
aware of the anarchical nature of the international structure and this perception 
leads to the second lesson: when a regional conflict happens, he continued, “we 
must be able to look after ourselves.” 529 This implies that Singapore needs to 
maintain strong defence forces, which is a lesson from the war. 
To prepare for the multimedia show, a committee comprised of officials 
from MITA, the National Museum, the Oral History Department, the National 
Archives, and the National Computer Board met about ten times during the 
project to ensure that the facts were right. The project began in June 1991 and 
was completed in December in the same year. Over six months, the team pored 
through hundreds of photographs, 22 hours of sound and voice recordings from 
                                                           
527
 Yeo, “Lessons from the Fall of Singapore”, 83. 
528




the Oral History Department, five hours of war film footage, and old news 
papers. 530   
 
2.2 The 50th anniversary of the fall of Singapore 
To mark the 50th anniversary of the fall of Singapore, the Singapore 
government conducted four exhibitions related to the war on the days before and 
after 15 February 1992. Those exhibitions were the exhibition in the Battle Box, 
the Volunteer Corps in the Defence of Singapore exhibition, the When 
Singapore was Syonan-to exhibition, and the Singapore Surrenders! exhibition. 
    
The exhibition in the Battle Box 
The Battle Box, the British wartime bunker in Fort Canning managed by the 
National Parks Board, was open to the public from 31 January 1992 to 15 
February 1992. 531 On that occasion, the exhibition on the Fall of Singapore was 
also held in the refurbished bunker. 532 The Battle Box is a historical site where 
Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival, the leader of the Allied forces stationed in 
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Singapore, made a decision to surrender before going to the Ford Motor Factory 
in Bukit Timah to sign the surrender document. When the bunker was used as 
British command rooms, it had a cipher room, a signal control room, a plotting 
room, a gun operations room, an electricity generator, and its own telephone 
exchange. 533 After the war, the British set up Fort Canning as the Singapore 
Base District Headquarters. However, when Singapore gained independence, the 
underground bunker was abandoned. 534  
Subsequently, in the 1980s, according to Kwa, there was a big argument in 
the government on how to use the land of Fort Cunning under which the historic 
bunker of the Battle Box resided adjacent to the central business district. Then, 
Kwa and his colleagues went into the bunker to check what was inside. 535 There 
was nothing in the Battle Box in 1991, according to Tan Teng Teng, an assistant 
of John Miksic, a historical consultant employed part time by the National Parks 
Board that owned the bunker. There was water up to her knees and no light at all. 
The rooms were empty. They did not know which room had been used for what. 
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536
 Then, the Civil Defence Force came to the Battle Box and pumped up the 
water. 537 
After that, a proposal to have an exhibition inside the bunker was made. That 
was how the Battle Box exhibition started. Thereafter, as mentioned above, Kwa 
persuaded the National Parks Board to have an exhibition inside the Battle Box. 
538
 Subsequently, at the end of 1991, only three months before the opening of the 
bunker, Miksic was asked by the National Parks Board to put up the exhibition 
there. 539  
There were three researchers to prepare the exhibition: Miksic, an 
archaeologist specialising in the 14th century, his assistant Tan who just 
graduated from a university, and Susan Sutton who had got a PhD in colonial 
history. The division of labour was made in an unspoken way. Miksic did 
research based on old news papers provided by the National Archives, Sutton 
concentrated on the examination of the 19th century, and Tan focused on the 20th 
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century. 540  They also interviewed two war veterans who worked under the 
British for the exhibition at the Battle Box. 541 
Then, they had the 24 rooms and passageways cleaned up, the floor tiled, 
and fans and lights added. Mannequins of soldier, as you can see in a shop 
window, were also displayed. One room housed replicas of British military issue 
tables and chairs for decoration. They did not change the ventilation system that 
was used during the war. Except for posters explaining the history of the war, all 
but one of the bunker’s rooms was bare of furnishings to retain historic 
authenticity. 542  However, from Miksic’s point of view, because of a lot of 
changes made in the Battle Box the authenticity of the original structure was 
damaged; they did not follow the archaeological guideline on the preservation of 
historical sites. In the preparation stage, he proposed to use an advanced 
technology to project pictures on the wall of the bunker to preserve the original 
structure, but his proposal was not adopted, and the historical bunker, according 
to him, ended up a modern creation. 543 
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In the process of creating the exhibition at the Battle Box, both Miksic and 
his assistant Tan said that there was no instruction or intervention about the 
content of the exhibition from the government officials so that they had a free 
hand to create it as far as the exhibition was about the Battle Box to mark the 
50th anniversary. The research team created the exhibition from a purely 
academic motivation. Tan Wee Kiat, the head of the National Parks Board, came 
to the Battle Box only one day before the opening of the exhibition, which was 
the first time for government officials to come to the bunker to see them. What 
Miksic was told in the process of making the exhibition was that the budget 
should be lower than $20,000. 544 
The exhibition traced the history of Fort Canning from the nineteenth 
century to the Second World War. Photographs, microfilm materials, and 
newspaper clippings during the war were on display. 545  In the exhibition,  
Miksic tried to show how the Battle Box functioned as the nerve centre of the 
British forces coordinating the relationship between army, navy and air force. 546 
With regard to the historical significance of the Battle Box, Miksic commented: 
“The Battle Box is probably unique in Asia in terms of its size and its elaborate 
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design. Other underground bunkers of that period were just used to store 
ammunitions and had only simple tunnels… But this had different rooms for 
different functions. It was a self-contained centre for strategic planning in the 
event of war and was not used for storage.” In addition, Miksic revealed an 
interesting story about Percival and the Battle Box: “Percival disliked sitting in 
it [the bunker] so much, he would sit in his own office at the headquarters 
nearby. When bombs dropped at the former National Theatre site [located above 
the bunker], plaster fell from the ceiling onto his head.”547  
According to both Miksic and Tan, a lot of people came to the Battle Box 
exhibition and the people’s response was good despite a little publicity of the 
exhibition. 548 As for the reason for the opening of the Battle Box, Lim Hng 
Kiang, Minister of State for National Development, said: “Those people were all 
great people. We should look for the names of those Singaporeans who fought 
against the Japanese in the photo exhibition. By doing so, we show our respect 
to them and also let their posterity feel pride.” 549  As seen from above, the 
political leaders might intend to have them hold an exhibition at the Battle Box 
in hope that visitors would be able to feel pride and show respect to their senior 
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martyrs while such an intention was probably not shared by the research team 
who created the exhibition. 
 
The Volunteer Corps in the Defence of Singapore exhibition 
To mark the 50th anniversary of the Fall of Singapore, the Volunteer Corps 
in the Defence of Singapore exhibition was held at Beach Road Camp from 8 to 
15 February 1992. 550 As mentioned above, this exhibition was suggested by 
Kwa Chong Guan and implemented by his acquaintances in the SAF. 551 With 
regard to the purpose of the exhibition, former Deputy Prime Minister Goh Keng 
Swee, who created the SAF, told reporters that it was a good opportunity for 
Singaporeans to be reminded of the vulnerability of their nation. He said: “What 
this [exhibition] shows is that though Singaporeans seldom discuss defence 
matters publicly or even privately, they know how vulnerable they are.” Then, 
he continued that he felt it was timely to reflect on the importance of National 
Service when the threat of a major international crisis had lessened due to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. He paid tribute to the men and women who 
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voluntarily helped defend Singapore as members of the Volunteer Corps during 
the war. 552  
Here, we can see that one of the government’s intentions of the war 
commemoration programmes was to convince ordinary Singaporeans of the 
importance of the maintenance of National Service even after the demise of 
communist threat. This one-week exhibition attracted more than 3,000 visitors, 
among who more than half were students. Such a number, according to Lianhe 
Zaobao, was beyond the organiser’s expectation. 553 
 
The When Singapore was Syonan-to exhibition  
The When Singapore was Syonan-to exhibition was held in the National 
Museum from 9 February to 31 May 1992. 554 The exhibition was organised by 
the National Museum, the Oral History Department, and the National Archives. 
The members in charge of this exhibition included Lim How Seng (assistant 
director of the Oral History Department), Lim Guan Hock (assistant director of 
the National Archives), Zhou Dan Ni (deputy director of the Oral History 
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Department), Zhuang Qin Yong (senior researcher of the National Archives), 
and Lin Ai Ling (researcher of the Oral History Department). 555 
On the day of the exhibit’s official opening, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong 
visited the National Museum and revealed the purpose of the exhibition. He 
said:  
 
I commend the National Museum for capturing a traumatic part of our past for all of 
us to remember. The older Singaporeans do not require this exhibition to remind 
them of Singapore’s past. But four out of five of us [those who were born after the 
war] certainly do. This is an occasion for us to remind ourselves that we must never 
take peace for granted. If we want peace, we must work for it and, if necessary, 
fight and die for it. 556 
 
Then, he continued, Singaporeans may seek the help of others but, in the end, 
they must rely on themselves. As seen from above, a main purpose of the 
Syonan-to exhibition and also that of the war commemoration programmes at 
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large was to remind young Singaporeans of the importance of Total Defence by 
letting them know the history of Japanese invasion and occupation. 557 However, 
according to Kwa, such intent was not in the back of implementers’ minds when 
they were interviewing war survivors or planning the exhibition. The underlying 
intent of the Syonan-to exhibition was, Kwa states, to show the Japanese 
Occupation as a turning point in Singapore’s history; they simply believed that 
they were working toward a more detailed and nuanced portrait of the Japanese 
Occupation by filling the gap in historical records, though they were also aware 
that political leaders could draw lessons about Singapore’s defence and nation-
building from the occupation period. 558 
The exhibition concentrated on the daily life of ordinary people when 
Singapore was Syonan-to. 559 The display was divided into three sections: From 
the British Colonial Rule to the Japanese Military Rule: Occupation Years: and 
Changes after the Japanese Occupation. The exhibition included more than 300 
photographs, 150 artefacts, 5 three-dimensional dioramas, sound recordings, and 
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film footages. 560 The exhibition also had many features. On display for the first 
time was the personal diary of Lim Bo Seng, which was contributed by his son, 
Lim Leong Geok. 561 Another artefact that was displayed for the first time was a 
big Japanese national flag filled signatures of many Japanese who seemed to be 
the families, relatives, and friends of the Japanese soldiers, sent from Japan for 
the sake of raising their morale in the battlefield. Another rare artefact on 
display was a book published during the occupation period entitled Singapore 
Assignment. This book praised the victories of the Japanese and was published 
in 1943 from Nippon Jihō in Tokyo. This item was a personal belonging of 
George Yeo, found in his father’s storeroom in the 1960s. Other books displayed 
in the same glass case were Rekishi Shashin – Beiei kanzen kaimetsu hen 
[History Photographs – the annihilation of the US and UK forces] and Shashin 
Shūhō [Weekly Photographs], which both described people’s lives in Singapore 
during the occupation. 562 
Some paintings depicting the horror of war were also displayed – “The Sook 
Ching massacre in Chinatown”, painted immediately after the end of the 
occupation by a famous painter Ma Jun, “Dark Years” and “Painful Memories” 
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both drawn by Sima Chunying in 1946, “The Sook Ching massacre” painted by 
Koh Sia Yong, and so forth. 563 Another special item displayed was a photo of a 
wedding couple by a man in his 50s and a teenage bride. During the occupation, 
many such couples tied the knot in order to protect single girls from Japanese 
soldiers, who were notorious for rapes in China. Other artefacts displayed were 
postcards, posters, comics, ration coupons, samurai swords, radios, helmets, 
rifles, alarms, slides, electronic history books, and so forth. 564 
One of the more popular exhibits at the exhibition was, according to Straits 
Times, the ‘torture gallery’, which listed 32 atrocities committed by the Japanese 
as well as photographs of some. Those atrocities included forcing the captives to 
swallow sand, plucking out their sinews, forcing them to swallow iron scraps, 
cutting open their abdomens, forcing them to drink soap solution, piercing their 
anus with a burnt iron rod, making them kneel on glass splinters, hanging them 
by the toes, and trampling on a victim’s abdomen after forcing him to swallow 
urine or water. 565 
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The public responses to the Syonan-to exhibition were, according to a 
National Museum staff, “very good”. 566  Only within two weeks after the 
exhibition started, the number of visitors had already exceeded 20,000. The 
average number per day was 1,000, and it increased to 2,000 per day on the 
weekend. Of them, more than a half were students. In fact, when a Lianhe 
Zaobao reporter visited the National Museum, she described that it was filled 
with students and some people could not enter the premises so remained 
outside.567 
The responses from the visitors that appeared in newspapers were mixed. 
However, many visitors interviewed agreed that the suffering which the people 
in Singapore endured was very “horrifying” and “cruel”.  For example, Steven 
Cheong, 25, a visitor to the exhibition, said with a grimace: “The pictures of the 
tortures are sickening. I’ve lost my appetite”. Joelyn Tay, 20, a student, said: “I 
certainly didn’t know the Japanese did things like chopping people’s heads. I’m 
disgusted and upset”. 568 Similarly, Secondary II students, Zhang Ling Ling and 
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Xu Jie Lian, commented that through the exhibition they came to understand 
more about the cruelty of war. 569 
 While most visitors, according to Straits Times, felt that the exhibition was a 
good account of what happened during the Japanese Occupation, there were 
some critical responses as well. For example, several said that the exhibition was 
too brief. Others suggested that more visuals, such as slide shows and videos, 
would make the display more eye-catching. Linda Lim, 18, a student, said: 
“There should be more cut-outs and other visual presentations. There are too 
many words – if I were younger, I wouldn’t be bothered to read all of them!”  570 
On a similar token, Kuang Xue Mei, 20, Li Yong Shen, 18, and Lin Mei Yu, 19, 
commented that the exhibitions would help, to some extent, the young learn 
more about Singapore history; however, if the decoration of the exhibition was 
attractive, it would be more effective. 571  Nicholas Leong, a Straits Times 
reporter, was also critical about a lack of displays on people’s reactions to the 
Japanese policies during the occupation. For example, the Japanese occupation 
forces made the study of Japanese language compulsory and issued certificates 
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in Japanese proficiency, which were on display, but nothing was shown on how 
teachers and students had reacted to such policies. 572      
After viewing the exhibition, according to Straits Times, all the visitors who 
were interviewed agreed that it was essential for Singapore to have a credible 
army. Irene Ling, 28, said: “It’s important to be prepared. There’s something 
lacking in a country without an army”. Roger Low, 26, told the reporter: “It’s 
important in motivating us to defend our country … This exhibition is good. It 
makes me serious about going for reservist training. No more talk about it as a 
joke!” 573 Similarly, Lianhe Zaobao concluded interviews with the more-than-
twenty students saying that they had learned from the exhibition the 
preciousness of peace, the cruelty of war, the importance of national defence, 
and the sufferings of their seniors, and a sense of history. 574 As seen from above, 
at least some young people received the messages that the Singapore 
government wanted to spread, namely, the importance of independence, defence, 
and patriotism. 
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The Singapore Surrenders! exhibition and Heritage Hunt 
Commemorating the 50th anniversary of the fall of Singapore, the Singapore 
Surrenders! exhibition was held at the old Ford Factory from 15 February 1992 
to 15 March 1992. 575 Persuaded by Kwa Chong Guan, the Singapore Heritage 
Society, led by Kenson Kwok, organised this exhibition with the help of Mary 
Lee, a freelance writer, who provided photographs. 576  
The exhibition focused on the British and Japanese military strategies and 
artefacts. 577 One of the highlights of the exhibition was the opening of the old 
Ford Factory’s board room to the public for the first time. The room, about half 
the size of a badminton court, is where the British signed the surrender 
document on 15 February 1942. Displayed in the board room were six chairs 
and a replica of the table used during the surrender negotiation between the 
British and the Japanese. 578 
 Another highlight was the winning entries of the Heritage Hunt, such as a 
permit to remittance to China with the sign of Shigeo Ōdate, Singapore’s first 
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mayor during the Japanese Occupation, and a set of match box labels with 
propaganda cartoons issued by the Japanese army. 579  The Heritage Hunt 
1991/1992, an annual artefact competition organised by the Singapore Heritage 
Society, was held from 23 December 1991 to 15 January 1992 in conjunction 
with the 50th anniversary of the fall of Singapore. The hunt brought forth a 
remarkable range of objects of everyday life such as Japanese Occupation ration 
cards, school textbooks, and kitchen ware, which might evoke memories of a 
way of life during the occupation. There were three categories in the competition, 
namely, historical documents, objects, and others. Ōdate’s document was chosen 
as the first prize in the historical document category while a set of match box 
labels won the first prize in the historical object category. Both winning entries 
were on display in the Singapore Surrenders! exhibition, 580  which attracted 
1,000 visitors during the first one week. 581   
On 15 February 1992, George toured the exhibition and commented that if 
younger Singaporeans ceased to know what took place during the war, we 
“would have lost something as a people”. The war, he continued, should be in 
Singapore’s history books and in the “collective consciousness” of Singaporeans. 
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582
 This seems to reflect Yeo’s main concern with regard to the purpose of the 
state-led programmes to commemorate the 50th anniversary:  the inculcation of 
national consciousness and identity in people. 
 
2.3 Content analysis of war exhibition catalogues 
One of the difficulties faced in the process of data collection was a lack of 
primary sources on the contents of each exhibition. Neither the National 
Archives nor individuals who were involved in the war exhibitions, such as Kwa 
Chong Guan and Pitt Kuan Wah, kept pamphlets, photos, guest books or a 
record of items in each exhibition. However, according to Pitt, who had been 
working for the National Archives since 1983 and helped create war exhibitions 
in the 1990s as an archivist, the same sources of oral history interviews and 
archival records that the National Archives possessed were repeatedly used in 
those exhibitions. For instance, he revealed, the contents of the end of World 
War II exhibition held in 1995 were almost the same as that of the Syonan-to 
exhibition held in 1992 because the former reused the same sources that the 
latter used. According to him, the National Archives provided its resources to 
the Fall of Singapore and Internment Years exhibitions, the exhibition in the 
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Battle Box, the Syonan-to exhibition, the Singapore Surrenders! exhibition, and 
the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II exhibition (to be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter). 583 
Fortunately, the National Archives and Singapore Heritage Society 
published a few exhibition catalogues on the Japanese Occupation. The first 
catalogue entitled The Japanese Occupation: Singapore, 1942-1945 was 
published in 1985 after the first exhibition on the occupation was held in the 
same year, and its revised version was published in 1996. 584 Another pictorial 
book on the occupation, written based on sources in the National Archives, is 
entitled Syonan: Singapore under the Japanese, 1942-1945, which was 
published by the Singapore Heritage Society in 1992. 585 Later in 2005, Lee 
Geok Boi wrote a script of the exhibit at the old Ford Factory with its focus on 
the Japanese Occupation: The Syonan Years: Singapore under the Japanese rule, 
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1942-1945. 586 There is also a Chinese version of this catalogue. 587 To roughly 
know the contents of the war exhibitions conducted between 1991 and 1995, the 
below discussion analyses the contents of the above exhibition catalogues 
published in 1992 and 1996. 
As mentioned above, The Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945, published in 
1996, is a revised version of another exhibition catalogue, The Japanese 
Occupation: Singapore, 1942-1945, published in 1985, which is a record of 
photos and documents exhibited in the first exhibition on the Japanese 
Occupation under the same title held from 16 February to 16 March 1985 at the 
office of the Archives and Oral History Department, the precursor of the present 
National Archives. 588 The exhibition featured 160 photos and 104 documents 
focusing on the lives and welfare of the people during the occupation. 589 
According to Pitt, who was involved in the exhibition, the exhibition was 
                                                           
586
 Lee Geok Boi, The Syonan Years: Singapore under the Japanese rule, 1942-1945 (Singapore: 
National Archives of Singapore, Epigram, 2005)  
587
 Zhaonan Fute Chechang Jinian-guan Zhanlan Yu Chuban Gongzuo Weiyuanhui [The Working 
Committee for the Exhibition at and the Publication about the Syonan Ford Factory Museum] ed. 
Zhaonan Shidai: Xinjiapo Lunxian San-nian Ba-ge-yue Zhanlan Tuji [Syonan Years: Pictorial 
Catalogue of the Exhibition of the Three and Eight Months’ Occupation of Singapore], Singapore: 
Xinjiapo Guojia Dang’an-guan, 2006. 
588
 Straits Times, 16 Feb 1985. 
589
 Archives & Oral History Department, The Japanese Occupation, Foreword. 
 247 
created from the collection of the Archives and Oral History Department, and 
people’s response to the exhibition was good because their memory of the 
occupation was still fresh. 590 Straits Times also reported that the exhibition was 
“one of the Archives and Oral History department’s best attended shows”.  591 
The exhibition impressed Tan Keong Choon, President of the SCCCI, to the 
extent that he had decided to have his chamber buy reproductions of exhibited 
photographs and documents for display at the Sun Yat Sen Villa that was then 
owned by the SCCCI. 592 
The 1985 exhibition catalogue covers various aspects of battles and lives 
during the Japanese Occupation including how Singapore fell: how POWs were 
treated: how the Sook Ching Massacre was conducted: how the Japanese treated 
different ethnic groups differently: how the Japanese maintained law and order 
by using the Kempeitai (military police) and other organisations: how the 
Japanese promoted the Japanese language and culture to foster the Japanese 
Emperor’s subjects in Singapore: how food supplies were controlled as well as 
food-growing was encouraged by initiating new settlement projects in Endau 
and Bahau: how people persevered their hard life but sometimes enjoyed 
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entertainments: how resistance fighters like MPAJA and Force 136 fought 
against the Japanese Occupation: and how the Japanese prepared the defence in 
Singapore against possible Allied counter-attacks but surrendered in the end. 
The first page of each chapter has just a few sentences of introduction followed 
by photos and documents with captions. There is neither the text to interpret 
those photos and documents nor the essays to send particular messages to the 
readers. This is probably because of the approach that the archivists who 
produced the exhibition catalogue used. In an interview with Pitt, he said that 
archivists should not interpret archives: they should just present them. 593  
This style is also adopted in the revised 1996 catalogue: it continues to be a 
collection of photos and documents without text to interpret them. The main 
difference is that excerpts of oral history interviews with war survivors, 
conducted by the Oral History Centre since 1981, were added. Though 
introduction to each chapter was expanded to a few pages, the style of writing is 
‘objective’ or dry as if it is a scientific article. For instance, the introduction to 
Chapter 2: Fall of Singapore, mostly gives historical facts about the Malayan 
campaign with various numbers: 35,000 Japanese troops defeated 80,000 British 
combat men on 15 February 1992 with overwhelming Japanese air forces (459 
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army planes and 158 naval planes): and the total battle casualties of the British, 
Australian, Indian, and volunteer local forces were about 8,700. 594  
Such a dry writing style was probably adopted not only because of the 
archivist’s non-interpretive approach but due also to the Singapore government’s 
stance toward that part of history. According to Pitt, he and his colleagues were 
very careful when captioning historical photos in the 1980s and the 1990s 
because the Singapore government was trying to be neutral toward the war; the 
government tried not to portray the war with very colourful or emotional words 
that might lead to stirring people’s emotion. This was not because the political 
elite of Singapore were afraid of Japan but simply wanted to be future-
oriented.595 
The chapters in the 1996 edition are mostly a copy of the 1985 edition. The 
only differences between the two are that one new chapter, ‘Pre-war Singapore’, 
was added before the ‘Fall of Singapore’ chapter. In addition, chapter twelve, 
‘Japanese Defence and Local Resistance’ from the 1985 version was split into 
two chapters in the 1996 edition: ‘Japanese Defence Build-up’ and ‘Anti-
Japanese Resistance’. In short, there is no major difference in the content 
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between the two editions apart from the oral history interviews that were added 
to the 1996 version. Many photos and documents that appeared in the two 
catalogues are the same. 
As far as the photos and documents used in the book are concerned, the same 
can be said for Lee Geok Boi’s book Syonan: Singapore under the Japanese, 
1942-1945, published in 1992. The same photos and documents that appeared in 
the above two catalogues are repeatedly used in her book because she wrote this 
pictorial book based on the same sources provided by the National Archives and 
the Oral History Centre. 596 The difference between her book and the other two 
catalogues is that the former has her text that gives a portrait of the Japanese 
Occupation period, whereas the catalogues are simply collections of photos, 
documents, and interview excerpts. The coverage of her book is comprehensive 
like the 1996 exhibition catalogue, starting with ‘The End of an Era: Prelude to 
the Occupation’ followed by ‘The Outbreak of War: The Siege of Singapore’, 
‘The Occupation Begins: Treatment of People’,‘Law and Order: Japanese Public 
Administration’, ‘Daily Life in Syonan-to: Life in The Great East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere’, and ‘The Beginning of the End: The Roots of Nationalism’. 
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597
 Lee’s book portrays the battles and daily life during the war mainly from the 
eyes of ordinary Singaporeans based on oral history interviews collected by the 
Oral History Centre, though she also refers to archival documents to show the 
big picture when necessary.  
Her writing style is descriptive and objective rather than interpretive and 
argumentative, though sometimes similar interview excerpts are repeatedly 
quoted. For instance, in the chapter of ‘The Outbreak of War’, she recurrently 
cites the remarks saying that people in Singapore were complacent and 
unprepared for war. Lee Kip Lin, then a student, said: 
 
No one expected the war. I mean, the British had made it out that they’re a powerful 
nation … And despite the fact that we had read in newspapers that the Japanese had 
already occupied both Indochina and Thailand, no one for a moment thought that 
the Japanese would really attack. We thought that it was just a bluff. So when the 
bombs did drop on that morning … without hesitation, everybody came to the 
conclusion that it was a practice. 598 
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Subsequently, the book continues: “Like so many others, Lee Tian Soo, then a 
student living in Chinatown, thought it was a practice air raid. ‘Not until some 
people went down to the spot to see the buildings being brought down by the 
bombs and they saw the casualties there, only then [did] we realise it was war.’” 
599
 After that Elizabeth Choy’s following remark is quoted: “Everybody said ‘Oh, 
don’t worry, Singapore is very well protected. It’s impregnable. And when 
bombs dropped, we wouldn’t believe it. And some of them said ‘yes, we saw so 
many dead people and all that.’ Still we wouldn’t believe”. 600 In the concluding 
part of the chapter, similar words from Robert Chong follow: “I would say the 
British were too confident. They took things easily. They spent too much time 
on relaxation, dancing, enjoying themselves instead of concentrating on the war. 
That’s how they lost the battle. They were not prepared.” 601 
Later, Lee Geok Boi confessed in an interview that she intentionally quoted 
people’s remarks about the British in a sarcastic way. She said: 
 
Yes, I intentionally wrote it in a sarcastic way. For the British talked big and looked 
down on us but escaped [when the Japanese invaded]. The people in Singapore at 
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that time must have really felt that they were betrayed. Probably, everyone saw the 
British cynically at that time. But it gave us a lesson – don’t rely on others. 602 
 
As seen from above, it seems that Lee intentionally quoted a similar kind of 
recollections, yet it is unknown whether she did so in order to spread an official 
message: ‘Don’t be complacent in defence and always be prepared for war.’ 
In contrast, she introduces various kinds of views from the interviewees in 
other parts of her book. For instance, in the section of ‘Lessons from the 
Occupation’ she quotes different lessons from and views toward the occupation. 
In that section, Herman de Souza recollects: “I’m glad I went through Bahau [a 
new settlement during the Japanese Occupation]. It taught me human nature and 
survival. But I wouldn’t like to go through it again.” 603 Lee Tian Soo’s different 
view follows: “I think now it is worthwhile for every citizen to fight and die 
rather than be taken as prisoners and be killed for nothing. That’s what we saw 
the Japanese do. They came here, they massacred the people. It is better to stand 
and fight to death than to be taken as prisoners”. 604 Thereafter, another view of 
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Elizabeth Choy is cited: “My values are quite changed. I am no more 
materialistic, even to this day. Never mind if I have no mansion, no diamonds … 
still I’m happy.” 605  In the concluding part of the section, Lee Kip Lin’s 
following comment appears:  
 
It was during the war that young people started to think. When the British were 
defeated after they had made out they were the strongest nation in the world, you 
know the questions simply hit your heads. You said ‘Why is this superior, strongest 
nation in the world being beaten, not just beaten, but beaten by just within two 
weeks, all of Singapore gone? ... Then you became suddenly to be a little bit 
politically conscious. 606 
 
As seen from above, the lessons from and views toward the Japanese 
Occupation shown in the book vary from person to person: some are in line with 
official views but some are not. Such a stance can also be seen in the book’s 
Epilogue, in which the author states that the Japanese Occupation boosted Malay 
nationalism for Malaya’s independence and Indian nationalism for India’s 
                                                           
605
 Ibid., 124-127. 
606
 Ibid., 127. 
 255 
independence. 607  Though that is true, such a view contradicts the official 
understanding of the occupation period, which sees that period as the starting 
point of Malayan as well as Singaporean nationalism, not Malay nor Indian 
nationalisms. 
 The contents of a pictorial book published by the Singapore Heritage Society 
in 1992 and an exhibition catalogue published by the National Archives in 1996 
are not exactly reflective of the official intentions and messages meant to be 
spread through the war exhibitions, as seen in Goh Chok Tong’s speech, as 
mentioned before, at the opening ceremony of the Syonan-to exhibition: he 
portrayed the occupation period as a period of terror, horror, and atrocities as 
well as that of bravery, patriotism, and sacrifice and claimed that we should 
remember war heroes’ brave sacrifices to defend Singapore. He said: 
 
The 44 months of the Japanese occupation were a period of terror, horror and 
atrocities. It was also a period of bravery, patriotism and sacrifice. 
We are here today to remember the Singaporean men and women of that time. 
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WE REMEMBER the C Company of the 1st Battalion of the Malay Regiment. They 
fought a heroic 48-hour battle on what is Kent Ridge Park today. They fought 
almost to the last man. 
WE REMEMBER the Singapore Volunteer Corps who stood up to defend 
Singapore … 
WE REMEMBER the men who joined the British Force 136. Brave men like Lim 
Bo Seng and Chuan Hui-Tsuan who infiltrated Malaya to fight an underground 
resistance against the Japanese … 
Above all, WE REMEMBER the whole generation of Singaporeans who suffered 
the Japanese Occupation. Our parents, grandparents, siblings and friends went 
through great humiliation, suffering and deprivation. But they also showed great 
resilience, courage and resourcefulness in coping with the Occupation. 
From these events and in memory of these men and women, we learn to honour that 
quality of bravery when others around are giving up, the need to stand firm and not 
wilt in the face of enemy advance, and the fortitude of enduring hardship in the dark 
hours. 608 
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In the concluding part of this speech, Goh revealed his intention for holding 
the Syonan-to exhibition, saying: “This is an occasion for us to remind ourselves 
that we must never take peace for granted. If we want peace, we must work for it 
and, if necessary, fight and die for it.” 609 However, as mentioned above, such 
intentions and messages were, Kwa Chong Guan confessed, not in the back of 
implementers’ minds when they were interviewing war survivors or planning the 
exhibition; they simply believed that they were working toward a more detailed 
and nuanced portrait of the Japanese Occupation by filling the gap in historical 
records. 610 Such an attitude is reflected in the contents of exhibition catalogues. 
The portrait of the occupation is comprehensive and diverse rather than focusing 
only on the brave episodes of war heroes, albeit they are also mentioned. 
Though it is possible to see an official message of ‘be prepared for war even in 
peacetime’ in the exhibition catalogues, that is not the sole message that readers 
can gain. Probably, different readers see different messages in the exhibition 
catalogues on the Japanese Occupation. The same could be said for the war 
exhibitions conducted in the 1990s, whose contents were likely to be similar to 
those of the exhibition catalogues. For, as Pitt Kuan Wah revealed, both 
exhibition catalogues and war exhibitions were created based on the same 
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photos, documents, and interview recordings provided by the National 
Archives.611  
Although the political elite intended to spread a message of ‘don’t forget to 
fight for Singapore’, or of the importance of defence, to Singaporean youth by 
conducting exhibitions on the Japanese Occupation, such an intention was not 
on the minds of staffs who created the exhibitions; thus the contents of war 
exhibitions were, like those of the exhibition catalogues, likely to be 
comprehensive and multi-faceted rather than focusing only on the brave stories 
of war heroes as models for young people to emulate. Probably, different 
visitors gained different messages from the war exhibitions. 
 
 
3. Commemorative ceremonies 
3.1 Introduction 
To mark the fall of Singapore and the death of Lim Bo Seng, the SCCCI 
performed commemorative ceremonies for the war dead in front of the Civilian 
War Memorial and the Lim Bo Seng Memorial, respectively. Politicians and 
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high-ranking government officials also attended those ceremonies. The 
following pages discuss how the Civilian War Memorial was built, how the war 
commemoration started, and how those commemorative ceremonies were 
conducted. 
 
3.2 The 50th anniversary of the fall of Singapore 
On the day of the 50th anniversary of the fall of Singapore, 15 February 1992, 
the SCCCI organised a service at the Civilian War Memorial. Participants paid 
respects there and they burnt incense and candles on two tables. Plates of roast 
pork, noodles, and cakes were placed as offerings to the war dead. 612 During the 
ceremony, Tan Eng Joo, President of the SCCCI, made a speech saying that “the 
Japanese Occupation taught us a valuable lesson, of the importance of being 
self-reliant in defending our country. Though Singaporeans have already 
forgiven Japan, the war years have become an indelible part of history. Hence, 
SCCCI will continue to hold this memorial service every year.” 613 At the end of 
the ceremony, members of the SCCCI laid down a large yellow wreath. An 
unusually large number of participants (approximately 200 people), mainly 
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families of the victims of the Sook Ching massacre, attended the ceremony. 614 
Also attended were George Yeo, Ker Sin Tze (Minster of State for Information 
and the Arts and Education), Tommy Koh (Ambassador-at-Large) and Takehiro 
Togo (the Japanese ambassador). 615 According to George Yeo, Togo visited 
Yeo before the memorial service telling him that the Japanese ambassador 
wished to lay a wreath to the Civilian War Memorial. Yeo responded 
affirmatively but admonished that the laying of a wreath would not mean the 
closure of the case regarding the history issue; Japan should be responsible for 
the teaching of a whole story of the Second World War to the younger 
generation. As a result, though Togo became the first Japanese representative to 
participate in the memorial service on 15 February, he decided not to lay a 
wreath. 616 Having attended the ceremony, Togo commented: “War memories 
cannot be erased, but the feelings towards Japanese here have been 
overwhelmingly friendly.” 617  
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Such a commemorative ceremony has been conducted every year on the day 
of fall of Singapore since the Civilian War Memorial was built in 1967. 618 The 
desire to build a memorial for the civilian victims of the Sook Ching massacre 
was already prevalent in the Chinese community immediately after the end of 
the war. When the 1947 War Crimes Trial pronounced lenient judgement on the 
Japanese war criminals responsible for the Chinese massacre (only two officers 
were sentenced to death), 619 the Chinese community was incensed. In response 
to such a situation, subsequently, the Singapore Chinese Massacre Appeal 
Committee decided to erect a memorial for families and relatives of the Sook 
Ching victims along Thomson Road. However, no further action was taken until 
the 1960s. 620 
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 At the beginning of 1962, a large number of human remains thought to be 
the victims of the massacre were discovered in Pasir Ris, Siglap, and Jurong. 
Thereafter, the SCCCI began to even more actively commit to the war 
monument issue. 621 One reason that the Chinese chamber became enthusiastic 
about the issue was, according to the vice president of the Nanyang Society, 
partly because of the rivalry between the SCCCI’s left-wing and right-wing 
members. The left-wing traders such as Ng Aik Huan and Tan Lark Sye, whose 
business with China grew stagnant, envied the right-wing business men, whose 
trade with Japan became more prosperous. After the discovery of human 
remains, the left-wing claimed the construction of a war memorial and sought 
reparation from Japan: their intention was to attack the right-wing leaders to 
create favourable conditions for the left-wing traders. 622 In addition, the Chinese 
merchants relying on a traditional business such as entrepot trade perceived the 
influx of Japanese investments, which would change Singapore’s industrial 
structure, as a threat to their business interests. Such economic factors, too, 
drove the SCCCI to go for the ‘blood-debt’ and war monument issue to slow 
                                                           
621
 Sikko, Business, ethnicity and state, 169. 
622
 Ikeda Notaka, “Shingapōru Kessai Mondai To Nihon No Taiō [Singapore’s Blood-debt Issue and 
Japan’s Responses]”, Kokugakuin Nihonbunka Kiyō 94 (2004): 323. 
 263 
down the Japanese investments. 623 The left-wing of the SCCCI made use of the 
anti-Japanese sentiments which prevailed across the Chinese community and 
pursued their own political and business interests. 
 Against a backdrop of such Chinese sentiments and with a referendum on 
Singapore’s merger with Malaysia near at hand, the issue of claiming reparation 
from Japan and erecting a war memorial became politicised. In February 1962, 
the oppositional Barisan Sosialis Party expressed its support for the SCCCI’s 
demand for reparation. A hidden motive of this move, according to an executive 
officer of a Singapore’s newspaper company, was to drive the PAP government 
into a difficult situation by asking them to claim reparation from Japan. The 
opposition knew that the PAP had been hesitant to raise the reparation issue with 
Japan out of their concerns for its negative impact on Japanese investments. 
Also, the Barisan Socialis at that time sharply opposed the PAP’s plan of 
Singapore’s merger with Malaysia. 624 Under such circumstances, the opposition, 
in parliament, asked Lee Kuan Yew’s government to seek compensation from 
Japan. When Lee was considering a snap election, he wanted to avert inviting 
such a situation that his refusal of the opposition’s request would lead to a sharp 
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decline of Chinese support for the PAP. At the same time, Lee did not want to 
be seen as a supporter of the radical claims of the left-wing Chinese. Under such 
circumstances, in March 1962, Lee openly admitted the need of atonement from 
Japan on condition that atonement should be made to the people of Singapore 
collectively, not merely to the families of the victims. Subsequently, the PAP 
government forced the SCCCI to adopt its official view – the Japanese 
Occupation as a national suffering – when it granted the Chinese camber a 
licence to dig up the victims’ bodies. 625  
 In 1967, the Civilian War Memorial was erected next to the Padang. 
However, in the process of planning and building of the monument, the 
government changed the SCCCI’s original plan of a Chinese memorial, which 
was to serve only families and relatives of the Chinese war dead, into a national 
memorial of the Second World War. Such a change is symbolically shown in the 
design change of the monument: the initially planned design of the monument 
consisted of a single pillar with a Chinese inscription telling the history of how 
the monument was erected after the discovery of human remains in 1962; it 
changed into a memorial consisting of four pillars with a simple inscription for 
all civilians killed during the war. The four pillars represent all main ethnic 
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groups in Singapore: Chinese, Malays, Indians, and Eurasians. 626 In this way, 
the Civilian War Memorial was built as a national war memorial for all 
Singaporeans. This is because, according to Blackburn, the Singapore 
“government wished to shape a collective memory of the Japanese Occupation 
in which all had suffered”. 627 
 
 
The Civilian War Memorial 
 
3.3 The 50th anniversary of the death of Lim Bo Seng  
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On the day of the 50th anniversary of the death of Lim Bo Seng, 29 June 
1994, a commemorative ceremony was conducted at the Lim Bo Seng Memorial 
located at the Esplanade Park. 628  About 300 people, including the family 
members of Lim Bo Seng, George Yeo, Ker Sin Tze (Minister of State, 
Information and the Arts and Education), Kwek Leng Joo (president of the 
SCCCI), and former members of Force 136, attended the ceremony. 629 It started 
with the bugler’s music followed by a wreath-laying onto the memorial by the 
family members, Yeo, Kwek, and the former members of Force 136. After that, 
the participants bowed to the memorial three times and had a one-minute silent 
prayer. Then, the ceremony master read an elegiac address. 630 
After the ceremony, Yeo told reporters that because of the sacrifice of the 
generation of Lim Bo Seng, the present-day Singapore could be developed, and 
the younger generation should remember the older generation’s contribution to 
the independence of Singapore. 631 He said “the sacrifice of the generation of 
Lim Bo Seng”, not Lim Bo Seng’s sacrifice itself, contributed to Singapore’s 
independence because he was aware of the fact that “Lim Bo Seng saw himself 
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as a Chinese national fighting for KMT China.” 632 As Hong Lysa and Huang 
Jianli point out, Singapore’s war heroes, such as Lim Bo Seng and Adnan Saidi, 
were simply brave individuals who happened to be in Singapore. 633 However, 
their brave episodes and stories of sacrifice were utilised as a means to inspire 
young Singaporeans to emulate their behaviours. This can be seen in Yeo’s 
comment when he attended the commemorative ceremony at the Lim Bo Seng 
Memorial. He told reporters that the younger generation should likewise do their 
duty and make some contribution to their posterity. He added: “The elder 
generation of that time probably knows, but the younger generation may not 
know. Therefore, we sometimes take those younger people to this memorial, let 
them reflect. It is very important to make this event be part of their 
education”.634 
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The grave of Lim Bo Seng at MacRitchie Reservoir Park (left)  
and the Lim Bo Seng Memorial at Esplanade Park (right)
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Chapter 6: Commemorating the End of the War - 1995 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed how and why the first highlight of the state-
led war commemoration programmes (1991-1992) was conducted, and argued 
that the driving force of the state-led programmes was created from the interplay 
between a contextual factor (the need to convince the youth of the necessity of 
Total Defence perceived by the political elite) and structural factors (anarchical 
nature of the nation-state system and the mechanism that each nation-state unites 
people). This argument can also be applied to the second highlight (1995), and 
this chapter discusses in more detail about how the second highlight of the state-
led commemoration was conducted.  
To mark the second highlight, it was reported that the Singapore government 
set up a steering committee and appointed Lim Siam Kim, chief executive 
officer of the NHB, as chair person. The committee members were reportedly 
composed of staff members from MITA as well as the Ministry of Education. 635 
However, Kwa Chong Guan later revealed that there was, in fact, no overall 
committee to handle the war commemoration activities. He recalled that though 
Lim Siam Kim raised money to erect eleven war plaques as part of the 
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commemoration, Kwa played an important role in the selection process of the 
eleven war sites and wrote the script on the plaques by himself. 636 
In 1995, the government announced the official commemoration period to be 
one month from 15 August 1995. 637 The first day of the commemoration period 
is the day the Japanese surrendered to the Allied forces in 1945. About one 
month before the start of the official commemoration period, Lim wrote a letter 
to Straits Times to reveal the plans to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of the 
war. The plans included an exhibition to commemorate the 50th anniversary of 
the end of the war, the school activities including a history camp and Humanities 
Week, and the Oral History department’s interviews with the Japanese who were 
in Singapore during the occupation, 638  though the interview project was, 
according to Pitt Kuan Wah, a continuous project rather than a special project to 
mark the 50th anniversary. 639  
As suggested above, the Singapore government in cooperation with the 
authorities concerned conducted war exhibitions, erected war plaques, and was 
involved in commemorative ceremonies to mark the 50th anniversary of the end 
of the war. In this chapter, those activities are discussed in more detail. 
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Furthermore, in the last section, the people’s and politicians’ responses toward 
the commemorative activities and evaluation of such programmes are examined. 
 
 
2. Exhibitions on the Second World War 
2.1 Introduction 
In 1995, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Japanese surrender, the 
Singapore government conducted three exhibitions related to the historical 
event: the 50th Anniversary of the End of World War II exhibition, photo 
exhibition on the Japanese surrender, and the Total Defence exhibition called 
‘Remembering Our Past, Looking To Our Future’. 
 
2.2 The 50th Anniversary of the End of World War II exhibition  
From 15 August to 31 December 1995, the 50th Anniversary of the End of 
World War II exhibition was held at the National Museum. It was organised by 
the NHB at a cost of $540,000. 640   
                                                           
640
 Straits Times, 16 Aug 1995. 
 272 
The purpose of the exhibition was, according to Lim How Seng, chair person 
of the NHB, to help young Singaporeans realise the cruelty of war and also 
remind them not to take the peace in the region for granted. 641 Another purpose 
of the exhibition was to help reinforce the value and importance of Total 
Defence. The TD Focus, a magazine issued by the Mindef, explained the reason 
for the importance of national defence by referring to experiences from the 
Second World War: “In World War II, we were unprepared, divided as a nation 
and dependent on the protection of others. Today, as one nation, as one people, 
we must always be ready to defend our peace and freedom”. 642 
Such purposes and messages of the exhibition were exactly repeated by Pitt 
Kuan Wah. He said that the exhibition’s message to young Singaporeans was 
self-defence, establishment of civil defence, or Total Defence, including 
psychological defence. The political elite and exhibition creators, he continued, 
wanted to give Singaporeans the message that if they did not defend the country, 
nobody would; the message was not aimed at stirring up the past nor nurturing 
hatred toward the Japanese; the message was self-awareness: and don’t take 
peace for granted. Thereafter, he added that because Japan was teaching only 
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one side of the story about the Second World War – the war as the liberation of 
Asians – the Singapore government deliberately spread the other side of the 
story in the exhibitions. 643 
The exhibition featured key international events and people associated with 
the end of the war as well as the post war reconstruction of Singapore. The 
exhibits included historical paintings, photographs, film footage, and war 
paraphernalia. Artefacts from the era, like old magazines, food-ration coupons, 
currency, uniforms, hand-made pistols, and jerry cans used to hoard food were 
exhibited. Also on display were two oil paintings depicting important incidents 
during the war, and the scenes of the Japanese and British surrenders, painted by 
a famous artist Lai Kui Fang. 644 Such exhibition contents were, according to Pitt 
Kuan Wah, almost the same as that of the Syonan-to exhibition held in 1992 
because the former reused the same sources that the latter used. 645 
One of the feature attractions was two virtual reality exhibits of the atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima and the collapse of the Berlin Wall. In the atomic 
bombing exhibit, visitors were invited to a Japanese style living room with a 
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screen on the wall which showed a peaceful scene of Hiroshima. Shortly after, 
suddenly, the lights in the room are turned off, and then the atomic bomb is 
‘dropped.’ An explosion is heard, the room rocks, warm winds blow, and the 
mushroom cloud appears on the screen. 646  
Elizabeth Choy, a Singaporean war heroine, attended the opening ceremony 
of the exhibition. 647 At a press conference, Choy told reporters that she had a 
message to spread for the younger generation. She said that we should “treasure 
peace, spare no efforts to avoid war. There is no winner in war, suffering most 
are people”. 648 
 
2.3 Photo exhibition on the Japanese surrender 
A one day photo exhibition on the Japanese surrender was held at the 
surrender chamber of the City Hall on 12 September 1995.  It showcased 17 
photographs taken on the same day 50 years ago when the Japanese signed a 
surrender document. The photographs, which were in the gold frames, captured 
the both bright and dark sides of the day of the Japanese surrender. One photo 
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captured the smiling faces of cheering children waving toward the returning 
British. On the other hand, another photo captured the agony and humiliation 
etched on the faces of the Japanese soldiers in front of the City Hall as well as 
the tired faces of the Australian soldiers after being released from the harsh 
POW’s camps.  649 The photo exhibition was held in the very room in which the 
surrender document was signed. According to a reporter, the room on the day of 
the 50th anniversary of the end of the war seemed not to have changed much in 
comparison with the photos that captured the scene of the signing of the 
surrender document in 1945: the same pillars, panelling, and shutters in the 
photos were still in the chamber. 650 
 
2.4 The Total Defence exhibition ‘Remembering Our Past, Looking To Our 
Future’ 
The Total Defence exhibition entitled ‘Remembering Our Past, Looking To 
Our Future’ was held in the Safti Military Institute from 4 to 12 November 1995. 
Mindef Public Affairs and the four other Total Defence ministries organised the 
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exhibition. The Mindef together with Pico Art International had been planning 
this project since April 1995. 651 
The exhibition highlighted the Japanese invasion and occupation period 
while its emphasis was also on the birth of Total Defence in Singapore. The 
exhibits were displayed on chronological order. After passing through a time 
tunnel into a busy pre-war Singapore, visitors would hear an announcement of 
war in a recreated coffee shop, the sound of explosions, bombings, and 
crumbling walls. Witnessing the British surrender and the Japanese Occupation, 
they would learn the history of the birth of the SAF and Total Defence. They 
also watched a movie in which a war survivor talked about today’s Singapore. 
The next section included interactive computer stations propagating the view of 
today’s uncertainty, after which they learned about five pillars of Total Defence. 
Also displayed were the equipment and vehicles provided by the SAF and the 
Singapore Civil Defence Force. 652 
The exhibition aimed to impress on people that they must be prepared in 
case of war or internal strife, and to bring Total Defence closer to the people. 653 
At the opening ceremony of the exhibition, Tony Tan, Deputy Prime Minister 
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cum Minster for Defence, tried to convince people of the importance of Total 
Defence, even in peacetime by using a historical lesson from the Japanese 
Occupation. He said that all would be lost if Singaporeans cannot defend 
themselves against an aggressor, a point proven by the devastation that 
Singapore experienced during the Second World War. Therefore, Singaporeans 
should not be complacent and unprepared just because their country does not 
seem to be threatened by any foreign power. Instead, they must remain vigilant 
at all times and any potential attack should be countered by Total Defence. 654  
In a similar way, Tony Tan explained important points and the necessity of 
Total Defence in an official defence newsletter, TD Focus. It reads:  
 
Everyone has a role to play in ensuring that we have peace and security. Through a 
strong sense of belonging and common destiny and developing social bonds, we 
can pool our resources to build a strong and nimble economy. We must also be able 
to muster moral and physical support to cope with any emergency at home and 
mobilise the entire population into an integrated defence force. This will enable us 
                                                           
654
 TD Focus, Jan/Feb 1996.  
 278 
to build the strongest fortress against any threat to our sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. 655  
 
 
3. Erecting war plaques 
3.1 Introduction 
In commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World 
War, the Committee on Historic Sites was reportedly set up and marked eleven 
war sites across Singapore. 656 As mentioned above, Kwa Chong Guan played an 
important role in the sites’ selection process that started in 1992. 657  It was 
reported that the committee was comprised of the representatives from MITA, 
the National Archives, the Urban Redevelopment Agency, the Mindef, the 
Ministry of National Development, the Singapore Tourist Promotion Board, the 
National Library, and the National University of Singapore. 658  Though Lim 
Siam Kim, chief executive officer of the NHB, was appointed as chair person of 
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the committee, 659 there is a possibility that he might not have played a major 
role. Kwa could not remember what Lim did in the war commemoration 
activities apart from his fund-raising effort for the building of eleven war 
plaques. 660 Pitt Kuan Wah suspected that Lim did not know much about the war 
commemoration because, even in the case of building a war museum at Bukit 
Chandu, he did not intervene at all in the building process: what he did was only 
giving an opening speech. 661 
A driving force behind the erection of war plaques was, according to Kwa, 
military education. In the military academy, army officers learn military history, 
and the Japanese Occupation was part of the syllabus, in which, for instance, the 
difference in the leadership style between General Yamashita and Lieutenant-
General Percival was taught. As part of such education, army officers were 
brought to the sites of the Second World War, such as Selangor, Kranji, and a 
tower in Johor Bahru. In line with this there was an educational need to mark the 
battle fields in Singapore. 662 
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Each war plaque is a bronze and brown book-shaped monument with an 
inscription explaining the historical significance of the site where the plaque is 
located. 663  Kwa wrote the script on each plaque in such a way that it was 
accurate, neutral, objective, short, and easy to understand for everyone; he 
avoided writing it in a way that the Japanese were cruel or the British were 
terrible in defending Singapore because blaming Japan or Britain was not the 
objective of those plaques. It was difficult for him to write the script in such a 
way and he went through many rewrites. 664 Each war plaque is two metres high 
and weighs almost one ton. The plaques were erected in such a way that they 
face the direction of the war event wherever possible. 665  
 
 
The plaque for the Battle for Bukit Timah 
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The aims of erecting war plaques were, according to an official defence 
newsletter, TD Focus, to remind Singaporeans of the lessons of the Second 
World War and the importance of Total Defence. 666 In addition, a statement 
issued by the Committee on Historic Sites stated that it hoped the war plaques 
would let young Singaporeans know sufferings and hardships that their seniors 
had gone through during the wartime. 667 The political elite and government 
officials repeatedly mentioned such aims at various occasions. For instance, Ker 
Sin Tze, an MP for Aljunied Group Representative Constituency (GRC), 
explained one purpose of erecting the war plaques: “we need to have such a 
reminder of this dark chapter of our history, so that we will never forget the 
price paid for the war”. 668 On a similar token, Yeo Cheow Tong, a Hong Kah 
GRC MP, said: “Without reminders such as these plaques, future generations 
will never appreciate the useful lessons of our history – that Singapore continues 
to be vulnerable.” It was important, he continued, that younger Singaporeans 
remained constantly aware of the country’s vulnerabilities, and one important 
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way of achieving this was to erect war plaques around the island. 669 Similarly, 
Ng Yew Kang, director of arts and heritage policy at MITA, told a reporter that 
the war plaques “will also instil an awareness among Singaporeans that our 
destiny is closely influenced by regional and world events, and that we must 
always be alert to and be prepared to counter any adverse situation.” 670 From 
these remarks, it is clear that one of the main purposes to erect the war plaques 
was to remind Singaporeans of the importance of preparedness in defence.    
To achieve that purpose, eleven war sites were chosen. (Later, three 
massacre sites and two sites related to the Chinese war efforts were added.) 
Those sites consisted of six battle sites, two memorial sites and three civilian 
sites. The unveiling ceremonies of the eleven war plaques were conducted not 
only during the official commemoration period from 15 August to 15 September 
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Figure 2. Eleven war plaques, types of site, and the dates of unveiling ceremonies 672  
 Name of war plaque Type of site Date 
1 Battle for Pasir Panjang battle site 10 June 1995 
2 Kranji Beach Battle battle site 18 June 1995 
3 Sarimbun Beach Landing battle site 18 June 1995 
4 Battle for Bukit Timah battle site 25 June 1995 
5 Labrador Battery battle site 2 July 1995 
6 Bukit Batok Memorial memorial site 9 July 1995 
7 Indian National Army Monument memorial site 15 July 1995 
8 The Sook Ching Centre civilian site 23 July 1995 
9 Kempeitai East District Branch civilian site 30 July 1995 
10 
Japanese Propaganda Department 
Headquarters 
civilian site 30 July 1995 
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Figure 3. Five other war sites, types of site, and the dates of unveiling ceremonies 673 
 
 Name of war site Type of site Date 
1 Changi Beach massacre site  
2 Punggol Beach massacre site  
3 Sentosa Beach massacre site  
4 The Ee Hoe Hean Club war site 18 October 1995 
5 Chin Kang Huay Kuan war site 24 December 1995 
 
3.2 Battle sites 
As seen from the above table, six war plaques at battle sites (Battle for Pasir 
Panjang, Kranji Beach Battle, Sarimbun Beach Landing, Battle for Bukit Timah, 
Labrador Battery and the Jurong-Kranji Defence Line) were unveiled between 
10 June and 12 November 1995. 
The first unveiling ceremony was held at Kent Ridge Park where the plaque 
to mark the Battle for Pasir Panjang was erected. In the morning of 10 June 1995, 
the guard of honour flanked the veiled plaque and a ceremony began with a 
short speech by Matthias Yao, Senior Parliamentary Secretary for Defence and 
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National Development. The book-shaped plaque was then unveiled. Just before 
the end of the unveiling ceremony, the buglers played ‘The Last Post’, and the 
veterans in attendance bowed their heads, some almost in tears. 674   
 
 
The plaque for the Battle for Pasir Panjang 
 
Etched on the plaque was the story of the heroic battle fought between the 
Malay Regiment and the Japanese on Kent Ridge. The plaque reads:  
 
At the Battle, the men of the Malay Regiment, led by officers like 2nd Lieutenant 
Adnan of “C” Company, distinguished themselves. The “C” Company held its 
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ground for 48 hours, and the last few survivors abandoned their posts only when the 
unit had almost been wiped out. 675 
 
The plaque celebrates the heroic stand of the Malay Regiment who fought 
fiercely to almost the last man, highlighting its leader Lt. Adnan bin Saidi. 
However, such an official celebration of the Malay Regiment and Lt. Adnan, 
according to Kevin Blackburn, was not stressed in Singapore before the 1990s. 
676
 Instead, the Malay Regiment was celebrated mainly in Malaysia after the 
Second World War. 677 
The origin of the heroic account of the Malay Regiment can be found in the 
eulogy for the regiment, written by Arthur Percival, the commander of the 
British forces who failed to defend Malaya and Singapore, in the context that the 
Allied forces were criticised on the ground that they had fought only half-
heartedly against the Japanese. 678 To defend his comrades in arms against such 
criticism he writes: 
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The [Japanese] attack fell chiefly on the Malay Regiment which fought 
magnificently. On this and the following day the Regiment fully justified the 
confidence which had been placed in it and showed what esprit de corps and 
discipline can achieve. Garrisons of posts held their ground and many of them were 
wiped out almost to a man. It was only when it was weakened by heavy losses that 
the regiment was forced to give ground. Those who have described the resistance 
on Singapore Island as half-hearted do scant justice to resistance such as this. 679                
 
In this way, the bravery of the Malay Regiment was first praised and popularised 
by Percival to counter the public criticism toward the Allied forces by giving 
evidence that some of them fought bravely against the Japanese. 
 The celebration of the Malay Regiment in Malaya was accelerated when 
MPAJA, which conducted armed resistance against the Japanese during the war, 
began an armed insurrection against the British under the leadership of the 
Malayan Communist Party (MCP). As a result, in 1948, the public 
commemoration of MPAJA ended; in its stead, there was a growing tendency to 
focus more on the Malay Regiment as heroes to be remembered. 680 In addition, 
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against a backdrop of the need to build a new national army when Malaya 
achieved independence in 1957, the Malay Regiment was further celebrated as 
the models to be emulated by young people in Malaya. 681 
 In contrast to the official celebration of the Malay Regiment in Malaya and 
its successor Malaysia, the Singapore government did not do so before the 1990s. 
For instance, even the first Singapore-centred history textbook for secondary 
school published in 1984, Social and Economic History of Modern Singapore, 
mentions the bravery of the Malay Regiment with only a few sentences as 
below: 
 
At Pasir Panjang Ridge (Hill), a small force of Chinese Volunteers together with the 
Malay Regiment fought bravely to defend the ridge. Most of the Chinese 
Volunteers and Malay soldiers were killed. 682 
 
A possible reason for such a short description of the Malay Regiment in the 
Battle for Pasir Panjang can be concerned with its little significance as a 
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historical event from a military perspective. That is because, as Lim Choo Hoon 
argues, the battle did not change the outcome of the fate of Singapore; even 
though the Malay Regiment won the battle, it was a matter of time before the 
British would surrender to the Japanese. 683 
 Despite such an insignificance of the battle from the military point of view, 
in the 1990s, the Malay Regiment’s bravery in the Battle for Pasir Panjang 
became more highlighted. The revised version of the above mentioned history 
textbook, published in 1994, Modern History of Singapore, depicts the battle as 
follows: 
 
There some men of the Malay Regiment, led by Lieutenant (Lt.) Adnan bin Saidi 
fought bravely. Many of the Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded. The next 
day, some Japanese soldiers tried to disguise themselves as Indian soldiers in the 
British army. It was Lt. Adnan who was sharp enough to notice that those familiar 
turbaned figures were marching in fours instead of the usual threes in the British 
army. He ordered his soldiers to open fire, killing several of them. This caused the 
rest of the Japanese to flee down the hill. 
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But, the Japanese were soon able to surround the hill. The Malays were heavily 
outnumbered. Fierce hand-to-hand bayonet fighting took place. Many soldiers on 
both sides were killed. Lt. Adnan was also hit by the enemy’s fire. In spite of his 
wounds, he kept on fighting. He was later captured by the Japanese and stabbed to 
death. 684 
 
Here we can see a stark contrast between the portrait of the Malay Regiment in 
the 1984 textbook and the one published in 1994. The former only mentions a 
fact of the battle. In contrast, the latter celebrates Lt. Adnan’s heroism. The 
celebration of Lt. Adnan’s bravery, as mentioned above, can also be seen in the 
war plaque for the Battle for Pasir Panjang erected in 1995. 
Then, the reason for Singapore’s celebration of the Malay Regiment and Lt. 
Adnan only in the 1990s may come into question. In the author’s interview, 
George Yeo gave an answer to this question saying that it was partly because the 
political elite wanted to spread a message or portrait that everyone in Singapore 
not only suffered from the Japanese Occupation but contributed to the defence 
of the island. In addition, in the process of the erection of a war plaque to mark 
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the Malay Regiment and of the building of a museum called Reflection at Bukit 
Chandu, which also commemorated Adnan Saidi and the Malay Regiment, Yeo 
encouraged the SAF to take part in the building process and now, he claimed, 
Adnan became a symbol of the Singaporean armed forces. 685  In a similar token, 
it could be said that the political elite in Singapore expected that the celebration 
of the Malay Regiment might help more effectively inculcate the values of 
“bravery, patriotism and sacrifice” 686 in the minds of the Malays whose loyalty 
to the Singapore government has always been questioned if there is a war 
against Malaysia. It might also be expected that the episode of a Malay hero 
fighting to the end for Singapore (Lt. Adnan is portrayed this way though it was 
impossible for him to have loyalty to Singapore which was not a nation-state 
then) would inspire the present Singapore youth, especially the Malays, to do the 
same as the war hero did though its effect is questionable. Another possible 
reason could be the Singapore government’s desire to counter an increasing 
sense of political alienation felt by the Malay Singaporeans in the 1990s. 687 
Major Abbas, 59, a retired army man who attended the unveiling ceremony 
of the war plaque of the Battle for Pasir Panjang, aptly summarised the possible 
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effects of the celebration of the Malay Regiment: “Setting up a commemoration 
plaque of the battle for Pasir Panjang is a kind of concrete expression to 
recognise and respect the feat of the Malay Regiment.” 688 Probably, giving such 
a sense of recognition and respect to the Malays was one of the purposes of the 
celebration of the Malay Regiment. “In addition,” he continued, “it would 
inspire the present soldiers as well as young people to do their best to contribute 
even in the form of sacrifice when the nation needs them.” 689 Such a purpose of 
the celebration was repeated by Brigadier General Han Ying Yuan, who also 
attended the unveiling ceremony: “The Battle for Pasir Panjang showed a good 
model for our present soldiers. The mission of our soldiers is that they should 
put the nation before them and also they should see the nation as important.” 690 
Their comments show that those generals seemed to be well aware of one 
purpose of the war commemoration in the 1990s. 
After the unveiling ceremony of the Battle for Pasir Panjang plaque, the 
plaques of the Kranji Beach Battle and Sarimbun Beach Landing were unveiled 
on 18 June 1995. Sarimbun Beach was the site where the Japanese troops first 
landed on the island of Singapore on 8 February 1992, while Kranji Beach was 
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the battle site between the Chinese volunteer army named Dalforce and the 
invading Japanese. Kranji Beach was selected as a site to erect a war plaque 
probably because the Singapore government wanted to pass on the fact that even 
the local Chinese were involved in the battle to defend Singapore although the 
Allied forces in Singapore were mainly composed of the British, the Australians, 
and the Indians. In fact, the text on the plaque of the Kranji Beach Battle 
celebrates the victory of Dalforce. The plaque reads:  
 
…troops of the 27th Australian Brigade and Singapore volunteers of Lieutenant-
Colonel Dalley's DALFORCE scored a victory against the invading Japanese 
forces…  
On the morning of 10th February 1942, troops from the 4th Regiment of the 
Japanese Imperial Guards landed when the tide was low. They were stuck in the 
mud and were caught in oil slicks created by Allied troops releasing oil from the 
nearby Woodlands depot. The first waves of Japanese troops were burnt when 
Allied troops set fire to the oil. 691 
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The plaque for the Kranji Beach Battle 
 
Such a portrait of the battle – a small episode was magnified into an 
impressive victory of the local volunteer army – is perhaps a reflection of what 
the Singapore government desired to see in the battle to inculcate patriotism and 
national pride in Singaporeans’ minds. Alternatively, the script writer of the 
plaque, Kwa Chong Guan, might be affected by the Chinese language literature 
on Dalforce published in the 1940s that exaggerated, or possibly manipulated, 
the role of Dalforce played in the battle against the Japanese. 692 Dalforce, or the 
Singapore Overseas Chinese Volunteer Army (Xinghua Yiyong Jun), was 
hastily formed with limited weapons and ammunition immediately before the 
fall of Singapore. The total strength of Dalforce was, according to British 
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officers in charge of the volunteer army, 1,250 men, but only a half of them 
were deployed at the battle front because the other half could not finish trainings 
for combat due to short of time. 693 In the light of common sense, it is hardly 
possible that such a small size of poorly equipped and trained army considerably 
contributed to a victory of a battle against the outnumbered Japanese. In fact, 
Japanese military histories do not make any reference to Dalforce and, instead, 
report that the greatest threat to the Japanese army was British artillery 
bombardment. 694 Although its contribution to the victory might be small or 
nought, Dalforce is portrayed as a victor of the Kranji Beach Battle in the plaque. 
This is probably because the Singapore government desired to use this episode 
as a means to inculcate national pride and patriotism in the minds of 
Singaporeans. 
At the unveiling ceremony of the plaque of the Kranji Beach Battle, Low 
Seow Chay, MP for Choa Chu Kang, mentioned the purpose of erecting the 
eleven war plaques. He said: “In peacetime, some people may complain about 
National Service and reservist trainings. These commemorative plaques of the 
                                                           
693
 Ibid., 235, 243-244. 
694
 Hayashi Hirofumi, “Massacre of Chinese in Singapore and Its Coverage in Postwar Japan”, in 
New Perspectives on the Japanese Occupation in Malaya and Singapore, 1941-1945, ed. Akashi 
Yoji and Yoshimura Mako (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 236. 
 296 
Second World War will remind them of the importance of National Service and 
Total Defence.” 695 
Similarly, taking the opportunity to attend unveiling ceremonies, other MPs 
also emphasised Singapore’s vulnerability and the necessity of National Service. 
For instance, when Bukit Timah MP Wang Kai Yuen attended the unveiling 
ceremony of the plaque for the Battle for Bukit Timah, on 9 July 1995, he said 
in a speech that since Singapore had enjoyed peace and prosperity over the past 
30 years, some of the younger Singaporeans took that for granted and were 
affected by the opinion that Singapore would not need to spend a lot of national 
budget on defence and it would be more beneficial to allocate more money to 
non-defence sectors. Thereafter, he argued against such an opinion: “The war to 
defend Singapore reminds us of vulnerability of peace. Such battles remind us 
that the price of war and defeat might be more serious if a state does not spend 
money to prepare for defence.” 696 In this way, he justified the government’s 
defence policy by referring to Singapore’s experience during the Second World 
War. Then, speaking of his mother’s experience, he added: “Perhaps as a result 
of her experience, she has always been an ardent advocate of strong government 
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and a supporter of National Service.” 697 He mentioned such an episode probably 
because he wanted to pass on the message that Singapore still needs National 
Service and a strong government.  
In addition, in attendance at the Jurong-Kranji Defence Line unveiling 
ceremony, Trade and Industry Minister Yeo Cheow Tong said: “In a few years, 
the older Singaporeans who actually experienced the war will be gone…Without 
reminders such as these plaques, future generations will never appreciate the 
useful lessons of our history – that Singapore continues to be vulnerable.” 698 
 
3.3 Memorial sites 
Two memorial sites were erected as a way to honour the dead: Bukit Batok 
Memorial and Indian National Army Monument. 699 Bukit Batok Memorial is 
the site where two monuments once stood in memory of Japanese and Allied 
soldiers who were killed in the battle for Singapore. The plaque explains what 
the two original memorials were like. It reads: “…the Japanese memorial, the 
Syonan Chureito, was a 40-foot high wooden pylon topped with a brass cone. To 
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the rear was a small hut housing the ashes of Japanese soldiers killed in the 
Battle for Bukit Timah. The prisoners-of-war were allowed to build a second 
monument to honour the Allied dead. This was 10-foot high wooden cross 
which stood just behind the Japanese monument.” 700 Those memorials were 
destroyed before the Japanese surrendered to the Allied forces.  
 
 
The image of Syonan Chureito etched on the plaque at the Bukit Batok Memorial 
 
On the day of the unveiling ceremony of this plaque, 9 July 1995, Ong Chit 
Chung, MP for Bukit Timah GRC, said in a speech that the lesson learned from 
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the war was that self-reliance, political will, and unwavering commitment were 
the only ways to ensure the survival of a small country like Singapore. 701 He 
continued: “If we ourselves do not pick up a weapon to protect and defend our 
legal interests, nobody protects us.” Thereafter, he introduced two episodes from 
which Singaporeans could learn: The first episode was the Second World War 
during which Singapore and Malaya fell in only 70 days because they depended 
on the British who lost sight of the defence of Southeast Asia while they were 
preoccupied with battles in Europe; the second episode was the British 
declaration of its retreat from the east of Suez in 1968, after which the Singapore 
government had to accelerate its army building process. Then he continued: “A 
lesson learned from those two incidents is that if we do not prepare our defence 
well, our efforts to build a nation would become futile; and if we want to keep 
peace, we must prepare well for war so that we will not repeat it depending on 
threat prevention and balance of power.” 702 
In addition to Ong Chit Chung, those who attended the unveiling ceremony 
included an MP for Hong Kah GRC (Harun Abdul Ghani), a British Supreme 
Commander, the Japanese ambassador of Singapore, representatives from the 
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British Broadcasting Corporation, Japan’s Kansai TV, and Japan’s Nikkei daily 
newspaper, and about 500 pupils and the public audience. 703  
The plaque for Indian National Army Monument was unveiled on 15 July 
1995. The INA was formed with help from the Japanese to garner support for 
the liberation of India from the British. Subhas Chandra Bose became the 
supreme commander of the army. In 1945, a memorial dedicated to unknown 
warriors of the INA was built at the present Esplanade Park. 704 The plaque 
briefly explains how it was built: 
 
In the final months of the Japanese Occupation of Singapore, a memorial dedicated 
to the "Unknown Warrior" of the Indian National Army (INA) was constructed at 
this site. The local INA was formed in 1942 with Japanese support. It sought to 
liberate India from the British and consisted mainly of prisoners-of war from the 
British Indian Army, Subhas Chandra Bose, who led the INA from 1943 onwards, 
laid a foundation stone at the monument in July 1945. The Urdu words inscribed on 
the monument read: ITTEFAQ (unity), ITMAD (faith) and KURBANI (sacrifice). 




 Straits Times, 16 Jul 1995. 
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When the British returned to Singapore, they demolished the memorial barely two 
months after its installation. 705 
 
50 years after the construction and destruction of the INA monument, the plaque 
to mark the memorial was erected.  
At the unveiling ceremony, Toa Payoh GRC MP S. Dhanabalan said that we 
could learn two important lessons from the war. The first lesson, he continued, 
was that Singapore was not a nation for most of its modern history; during the 
colonial period, Singapore was only a temporary abode, and different ethnic 
groups identified with their motherland: China, India and Malaya; therefore, the 
political struggle of the Singaporean Chinese was together with the Chinese in 
China against the Japanese, and for Singaporean Indians, it was with the Indians 
in India against the British.706 The second lesson, he claimed, was that even 
though people in Singapore had lived together for many years, outsiders could 
still divide them along the racial lines. Therefore, he continued: “We must 
assume that in future, if our sovereignty is threatened, the first attempt will be to 
divide our people by appealing to our racial origins... We must assume that there 
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will also be attempts by outsiders to get Singaporeans engaged in causes of the 
countries of origin of our forefathers and in the process divide Singaporeans 
according to their racial origins… If we fall victims to such attempts, we will be 
destroyed as a nation.” 707 
About twenty INA veterans from Singapore, Malaysia, the Seychelles, and 
India attended the unveiling ceremony. One veteran, Dr. Lakshmi Sahgal from 
India, said that she was very happy that the monument had been set up. She said: 
“We were very upset and shocked when the original memorial was blown up. It 
gives me very great satisfaction to see this new one.” 708 
 
 






The image of the original memorial etched  
on the plaque at the Indian National Army Monument 
 
3.4 Civilian sites 
Three plaques for civilian sites, where wartime operations affected civilians, 
were also erected: the Sook Ching Centre, the Kempeitai East District Branch, 
and the Japanese Propaganda Department Headquarters. 709 The Sook Ching is, 
as will be discussed in more detail, a month-long operation to purge anti-
Japanese elements targeting Chinese males soon after the Japanese had captured 
Singapore, and the plaque explains how the Sook Ching operation was 
conducted. The plaque reads:  
 
All Chinese men between 18 and 50 years old, and in some cases women and 
children, were ordered to report to these temporary registration centres for 
interrogation and identification by the Kempeitai and their hooded informants. 
Those who passed the arbitrary screening were released with the word “Examined” 
stamped on the face or arm or clothes. Others not so fortunate were taken to 
outlying parts of Singapore and executed for alleged anti-Japanese activities. Tens 
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of thousands were estimated to have lost their lives. For those who were spared, the 




The Sook Ching Centre plaque 
 
At the invitation of MITA, the SCCCI organised the unveiling ceremony of 
the Sook Ching Centre plaque on 23 July 1995. More than 100 guests attended 
the ceremony. 711 After unveiling the plaque, Ker Sin Tze, an Aljunied GRC MP, 
made a speech saying: “Having a commemorating plaque at this site will evoke 
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painful memories for relatives of victims of the Sook Ching operations. But we 
need to have such a reminder of this dark chapter of our history, so that we will 
never forget the price paid for the war.” 712  He continued: “The purpose of 
erecting the monument is to remind people of the cruelty of war and the 
necessity to prepare for war even in peacetime. Singapore is our motherland. 
The government and people united together and managed to gain the present 
achievement. Therefore, our country is worthy of being cherished and 
defended.” 713 Similarly, Kwek Leng Joo, president of the SCCCI, explained the 
purpose of the erection saying that though the erection of the plaque was, of 
course, meaningful to those who went through the occupation era, what was 
more important was to remind the younger generation of the fact that a stable 
and peaceful Singapore should not be taken for granted; it was achieved in 
return for the painful price that our seniors and ancestors paid. 714 The objectives 
of the unveiling ceremony are also stated in the 1995 annual report of the 
SCCCI, which are two-fold: to commemorate the Sook Ching and to remind the 
people of the importance of being self-reliant in defence. 715 From this it is found 
that the SCCCI, though it had supported the stance of Barisan Socialis, a major 
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opposition party in the 1960s, over the issue of blood-debt and commemoration 
of the war dead, now shared the same line with the PAP government as far as the 
erection of the war plaques is concerned. The board members of the SCCCI 
agreed to bear the costs of $50,000 to erect the monument at the Hong Lim 
Complex in Chinatown. 716 Chinatown was selected because it was the district 
where the Chinese had been densely populated since the city of Singapore had 
been built. 717   
Subsequently, on 30 July 1995, the plaques for the Japanese Propaganda 
Department Headquarters and Kempeitai East District Branch were both 
unveiled by Wong Kwei Cheong (Kampong Glam GRC MP). After finishing the 
unveiling ceremony of the plaque of the Japanese Propaganda Department 
Headquarters standing in front of Cathay building, Wong walked to the YMCA 
located diagonally in front of that building where he conducted another 
unveiling ceremony for the plaque for the Kempeitai East District Branch. 718 
The former plaque states: 
 
                                                           
716
 S.C.C.C.I. Annual Report 1995, 53. 
717
 Lianhe Zaobao, 22 Jul 1995. 
718
 Lianhe Zaobao, 31 Jul 1995. 
 307 
Cathay Building housed the British Malaya Broadcasting Corporation before the 
Japanese occupied Singapore. During the Occupation, the Japanese took over the 
building for their own propaganda activities. They tried to impose the Japanese 
language on the local population through their radio transmission from Cathay 
Building. Listening to Allied broadcasts was not allowed. Many refused to listen to 
the Japanese broadcasts and risked their lives by secretly tuning in to the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) for news. Cathay Building later served as 
headquarters for Admiral Louis Mountbatten, who accepted the Japanese surrender 
in 1945. 719  
 
The plaque was erected in front of Cathay Building, the tallest building in 
Singapore at that time, which was the centre of the Japanese propaganda activity. 
During the occupation, people were allowed to listen only to Radio Syonan, run 
by the Japanese. Radios were tuned to that station and sealed. If the seals were 
found broken, the owners were killed. 720  
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The image of Cathay Building etched on the plaque for  
 the Japanese Propaganda Department Headquarters 
 
About 100 people attended the unveiling ceremony for the plaque for the 
Kempeitai East District Branch which was erected next to the old YMCA 
building, torn down in 1981, that housed a branch of Japanese military police 
called Kempeitai. Many civilians were interrogated and tortured there and the 
cries and screams of the victims could often be heard even outside the building. 
721
 The plaque tells about what the Kempeitai did and how they were feared by 
the local people. It states: “The much-feared Kempeitai was assigned to crush 
local resistance to Japanese rule. They conducted the “Sook Ching” (mass 
screening) Operation which resulted in the deaths of many Chinese suspected of 
being anti-Japanese. The Kempeitai recruited informers from within the local 
community thus sowing distrust among the population. People were taken away 




on mere suspicion. Suspects were tortured during interrogation.” 722 In the final 
paragraph, the plaque quotes Elizabeth Choy’s comment when she recalled the 
Kempeitai’s torture during her imprisonment in the old YMCA building: “I don't 
think hell could be worse than that.” 723  
Elizabeth Choy was born in North Borneo in 1910 and was sent to a 
Singapore school called the Convent of the Holy Infant Jesus in her late teenage 
years. During the Japanese Occupation, she, together with her husband Choy 
Khun Heng, opened a canteen at Miyako Hospital that turned out to be the 
centre for relatives to pass messages, food, and medicine to internees in Changi 
Gaol through other internees who were sent to the hospital for treatment. After a 
1943 incident in which seven Japanese ships at Singapore’s Keppel harbour 
were sunk by Australians (Operation Jaywick), Choy Khun Heng was suspected 
for indirectly helping that operation by smuggling parts for a radio set that was 
unlawfully owned by an internee in Changi Gaol, and Choy was arrested. When 
Elizabeth was tricked into coming to the building on the pretext of visiting her 
husband, she was also imprisoned there for 193 days. 724  During her 
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imprisonment, she was subjected to all kinds of brutal treatment: electrocuted, 
beaten, and pumped up with water. However, she did not share any information 
with the Japanese interrogators. Thereafter, they dragged her husband from 
Outram Prison to the old YMCA building, and then, in his full view, the 
Japanese stripped Elizabeth Choy to her waist and applied an electric current to 
her. Later, she shared about this incident: “The electric shock sent my whole 
body into spasms; my tears and mucus flowed uncontrollably. The pain was 
indescribable, but it must have been thousands of times worse for my husband 
who had to see me being tortured.” 725  
Regardless of such cruel treatment, she did not divulge any information to 
the Japanese interrogators. That was possible because of, in her analysis, the 
education she received at her young age. At school, she learned Chinese classics 
that contained mostly stories about heroic acts in olden times and teachers taught 
students lessons based on those stories. Through such education, she learned 
moral values such as loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, and righteousness. Her 
moral education in addition to her strong Christian faith, Elizabeth analysed, 
sustained her throughout her ordeal in the old YMCA building. She continued: 
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“No matter how badly the enemy tortured me, I never buckled. I have my 
ancestors to thank for my unwavering spirit. Despite the mental and physical 
harm I was subjected to, I never gave up and, I go on living healthily.” 726 
In the last part of her interview conducted in order to publish a 
commemorative book in 1995, Elizabeth made a comment on a lesson from the 
Second World War: “In cerebrating 50 years of world peace, reliving the 
humiliating and horrifying war experience serves to remind us not to take peace 
for granted. Sometimes, a lot of blood has to be shed in exchange for peace. 
Hopefully, future generations will continue to learn from this war and be 
constantly reminded that vigilance is a form of psychological defence.” 727 Her 
messages – ‘do not take peace for granted’: ‘if necessary, Singaporeans must 
fight against the enemy’: and ‘vigilance is necessary’ – echoed the government’s 
stance on defence policy. Probably, that constitutes one reason for her being 
celebrated as a war heroine. 
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The image of the old YMCA building etched  
on the plaque for the Kempeitai East District Branch 
 
3.5 Other sites 
On 23 July 1995, Ker Sin Tze announced that three new war sites were being 
added to the already-publicised eleven war sites. These were the massacre sites 
on the Changi, Punggol, and Sentosa beaches, aimed to honour the Chinese who 
were killed during the Sook Ching massacre. 728 In the Sook Ching operation, as 
already mentioned, all Chinese males between 18 and 50 years of age were 
rounded up to screening centres across Singapore in February 1942. Those who 
were suspected to be anti-Japanese were sent to remote areas like Changi, 
Punggol, Sentosa, and Siglap and executed. The screening of the hundreds of 
thousands of Chinese was conducted in a very short time: it was completed 
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within a several days in the city and within only two days in settlements in the 
outskirts. 729  
Also, the method of screening, according to the accounts of those who 
survived the selection, varied from a screening centre to another. In a screening 
centre, those who raised their hands to admit them being members of Dalforce 
were taken to the edge of the island by lorries and slaughtered. Those who were 
rich and able to speak English were suspected as anti-Japanese thus were 
interrogated whether they knew Tan Kah Kee and had a photo of Chiang Kai-
shek. In other centres, those who acquired a tattoo, had sold flowers for the 
Federation of China Relief Fund, and were involved in business were suspected 
as anti-Japanese. 730  As seen from above, the ways in which the Japanese 
screened the people were sometimes arbitrary and as a result many innocent 
civilians were killed. The plaques set up on Changi, Punggol, and Sentosa 
beaches indicate how such killings were done. For instance, the plaque of 
Sentosa Beach reads: 
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For eight days from 20 February, 1942 hundreds of Chinese civilians, bound hand 
and foot, back to back, in groups of four, were transported by boats from nearby 
Tanjong Pagar Docks to the waters across from here. There Japanese soldiers 
hurled the bound civilians into the water and opened fire on them. Many bodies 
drifted ashore along the outer coastline of the then Blakang Mati (now Sentosa) 
island. Some 300 bodies were buried by British prisoners of war around the Berhala 
Reping artillery post (about 100 meters ahead). 731 
 
A recollection of a Kempeitai who conducted this operation is consistent 
with the above explanation. He recalled: “When we reached offshore far enough 
from the coast, I ordered: ‘jump into the sea’. They knew that if they would do 
so, they would die. But even though they would not jump into the sea, they 
would be stabbed by our bayonets and die. They were in a real pinch. Finally, 
they jumped into the sea and sank together.” 732 
In other places, executions were conducted in a different way. The Chinese 
who were suspected to be anti-Japanese were taken to rural areas and then shot 
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and stabbed. On Changi Beach, the plaque explains, “66 Chinese male civilians 
were killed by Japanese hojo kempeitai (auxiliary military police) firing squads 
at the water’s edge on this stretch of Changi Beach on 20 February, 1942… 
Tanah Merah Besar Beach, a few hundred metres south (now part of the Changi 
Airport runway) was one of the most heavily used killing grounds where well 
over a thousand Chinese men and youths lost their lives.” 733 In a similar way, 
“On 28 February, 1942, some 300-400 Chinese civilians were killed along the 
Punggol foreshore by hojo kempei (auxiliary military police) firing squads… 
The victims who perished along the foreshore were among 1,000 Chinese males 
rounded up following a house-to-house search of the Chinese community living 
along Upper Serangoon Road by Japanese soldiers.” 734  
 
The plaque to mark a Sook Ching massacre site at Sentosa Beach 
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Why were such atrocities committed by the Japanese army? Japanese 
historian Hirofumi Hayashi claims that “the Singapore Massacre was not the 
conduct of a few evil people, but rather a product of a long period of Japanese 
aggression against China and other Asian countries” 735  and points out the 
following reasons for the massacre. Firstly, he indicates that the Sook Ching 
massacre was a massacre planned before the capture of Singapore based on the 
Japanese army’s ten year experience of invasion of China. Japan invaded 
Northeast China in 1931 and founded a de facto colony of Manchukuo in 1932. 
In Manchukuo, Genjū Shobun (Harsh Dosposal), namely, army’s and police’s 
summary execution of anti-Japanese elements without trial was legalised and, 
subsequently, such a mode of killing was regularly used during the war in China. 
This method was, likewise, applied to the Sook Ching massacre. Secondly, 
Hayashi claims that the invading Japanese army (the 25th Army) had hardliners, 
such as Lt. General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Lt. Colonel Masanobu Tusji, and 
Colonel Wataru Watanabe, who were the driving force of harsh policies toward 
the Chinese population that included the Sook Ching massacre. Hayashi 
particularly stresses the important role played by Yamashita, who, as chief of 
staff of the North China Area Army in 1938-1939, formulated a plan of a 
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mopping-up operation in North China that made use of the method of Genjū 
Shobun and, when he was transferred to the 25th Army to invade Malaya and 
Singapore, similar methods were used to keep the Chinese population docile in 
the region. Thirdly, Hayashi argues that a culture of prejudice and discrimination 
toward other Asian peoples including the Chinese, deeply embedded in the 
minds of Japanese by the 1930s, contributed to the happening of various 
atrocities including the Sook Ching massacre. Finally, the Sook Ching massacre, 
according to Hayashi, was a sort of pre-emptive killing of the potential anti-
Japanese population to prevent from a future resistance against the Japanese rule. 
736
 However, Lt. Colonel Keijirō Ōya, a Kempeitai officer who conducted the 
Sook Ching operation, later reflected: “This persecution of the Overseas Chinese 
[the Sook Ching massacre], firstly, constituted an important cause of 
deterioration in the public security. Secondly, it triggered non-cooperation of the 
Overseas Chinese with the Japanese military rule.” 737  Similarly, another 
Kempeitai officer, Lt. Satoru Ōnishi, who was also involved in the massacre, 
later recalled that the Sook Ching not only plunged the Overseas Chinese into 
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the abyss of terror but also eroded Malays’ and Indians’ trust in the Japanese 
army. 738 According to the above Kempeitai’s memoirs, the pre-emptive killing 
of anti-Japanese elements did not contribute to a stable Japanese rule of 
Singapore. 
As Hayashi suggested above, in order to understand why the Sook Ching 
massacre occurred we need to look into the events that happened before the 
Japanese invasion of Malaya and Singapore. Before the invasion, Singapore was 
a centre of the Overseas Chinese’s National Salvation Movement that supported 
China’s war effort against Japan: the supporters of the movement raised fund for 
the Chinese government; they boycotted Japanese products; they instigated 
labour walkouts from Japanese firms in Singapore and Malaya. 739 Hence, it is 
not surprising that the Japanese army suspected that many anti-Japanese 
elements lived or stayed in Singapore.  
In the 1930s, the offices to support the salvation movement were selected in 
Singapore’s Chinatown and, in 1995, these old buildings – The Ee Hoe Hean 
Club and Chin Kang Huay Kuan – were decorated with new plaques to 
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remember the salvation movement. The plaque at the Ee Hoe Hean Club was 
unveiled by Ong Teng Cheng, President of Singapore, on 18 October 1995. An 
unveiling ceremony for the latter plaque was hosted by Zhuang Ri Kun, a senior 
official of Ministry of Community Development on 24 December 1995. 740 
The two historic buildings in Chinatown are located closely on the same 
road; the distance between the two is only about twenty metres. There are four 
plaques (two in English and two in Chinese) on the wall of the Ee Hoe Hean 
Club, whereas there is only one plaque written in both English and Chinese at 
Chin Kang Huay Kuan. The plaques at the two buildings concisely show their 
histories and one of the focuses is on their roles played during the Second Sino-
Japanese War from 1937 to 1945. The plaques at the Ee Hoe Hean Club tell us 
that it was founded in 1895 as “one of the oldest millionaires clubs in 
Singapore” and was then moved to the present location in 1925. On its role 
during the war, the plaque states: 
 
When Japan invaded Shandong province, its president Tan Kah Kee initiated the 
formation of a Shandong Relief Fund Committee. 
                                                           
740
 The plaque of the Ee Hoe Hean Club; Lianhe Zaobao, 16 Dec 1995. 
 320 
When Japan escalated its war against China in 1937, the Club had become the nerve 
centre of the China Salvation Movement of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Both the 
Singapore China Relief Fund Committee formed in 1937 and the Federation of 
China Relief Fund for the South Seas (FCRFSS) formed in 1938 had their 
headquarters at the Club under the chairmanship of its president... 741 
 
The foundation of the FCRFSS was triggered by the fall of Amoy, Fujian 
province, the hometown of the Hokkiens, in May 1938. Subsequently, Tan Kah 
Kee, a prominent Chinese leader in Singapore, became interested in gathering 
Hokkien leaders to consolidate their separate war-relief efforts and sent them 
letters to propose a general meeting to be held in Kuala Lumpur. When a 
Philippines’s overseas Chinese leader, Dee C. Chuan, heard this news, he wrote 
a letter to the SCCCI in which he proposed a general meeting for all overseas 
Chinese in Southeast Asia to be held in Singapore. This idea was strongly 
supported by other overseas Chinese and the Chinese government that 
culminated in a general meeting of overseas Chinese leaders from Southeast 
Asia held in Singapore on 10 October 1938. 742  More than 180 Chinese 
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delegates from the region – Singapore, Malaya, Sarawak, Borneo, Thailand, the 
Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Hong Kong, Burma, and Vietnam – attended 
the meeting that founded the FCRFSS under the leadership of Tan Kah Kee. 743 
The Ee Hoe Hean Club was chosen as the headquarters of the FCRFSS because 
Tan was also the president of the club. 744 
 In October 1938, Canton also fell to the hands of the Japanese. Now, the 
only available routes to send relief and military supplies to the Chinese 
government in Chongqing were the Vietnam – Yunan and Burma – Yunnan 
routes, and there were reportedly 2,000 tons of armaments stocked in Hong 
Kong. Under such circumstances, the Chongqing government, in 1939, cabled to 
request the FCRFSS to supply labour to transport the war materials in Hong 
Kong to the Chongqing government through the Burma – Yunnan route or the 
Burma Road. The FCRFSS quickly responded to the call and issued notices to 
branch associations to request them to recruit drivers and mechanics to serve the 
Chinese government. 745 This development, too, is briefly indicated in the plaque 
of the Ee Hoe Hean Club as follows: 
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The FCRFSS helped recruit about 3000 truck mechanics and drivers sent to 
transport arms from Burma to China via Burma Road. At the outbreak of the Pacific 
War, the Governor asked Tan Kah Kee to head the Overseas Chinese General 
Mobilisation Council to help, among other things, in engaging labourers for defence 
work. 
Many fellow members perished during the war… 746 
 
Subsequently, the plaque introduces some of the Club’s post-war developments 
like its active involvement in the struggle for citizenship, voters’ registration 
campaign, and other philanthropic activities. 
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The Ee Hoe Hean Club (left) and  
one of the plaques that shows the Club’s history (right) 
 
Similarly, a small plaque at Chin Kuan Huay Kuan, the building of a 
Chinese clan association for the people from Chin Kuan (or Jinjiang), Fujian 
Province, China, succinctly tells us of the building’s pre-war history in two 
sentences and then explains its role played during the war as below: 
 
On the eve of the Second World War the Chin Kang Huay Kuan building was used 
as the headquarters of the Overseas Chinese General Mobilisation Council headed 
by Mr Tan Kah Kee. The Mobilisation Council played a significant role before the 
fall of Singapore in helping the British to maintain law and order to supply 
labourers and to organise volunteers needed for the defence of Singapore. 
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During the Japanese Occupation the premises of Chin Kang Huay Kuan were 
occupied by the Japanese army. 747  
 
After that, the plaque introduces some of Chin Kang Huay Kuan’s post-war 
activities like “the setting of schools for students whose education was disrupted 
during the war, the establishment of welfare schemes for clan members and the 
formation of a recreational section to actively promote cultural activities.” 748 
The plaque is made of buchnera cruciata stone (heicao-shi) produced in Chin 
Kang County. The staffs at the clan association had decided to use that stone as 
the plaque’s material because, according to Zhang Jin Chuan, then President of 
Chin Kang Hauy Kuan, that stone was not only durable but also glossy. Its size 
is 60 centimetres high, 1.2 meters wide, and 3.5 centimetres thick. 749 
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Chin Kang Huay Kuan (left) and  
the plaque that tells of its history (right) 
 
According to Honorary President of Chin Kuan Huay Kuan, Sun Gun, there 
were two reasons why the clan association building was chosen as the 
headquarters of the Mobilisation Council: its convenient location and its housing 
capacity. Chin Kang Huay Kuan was not only located near the Ee Hoe Hean 
Club where the FCRFSS’s headquarters was situated but was also big enough to 
house many personnel of the Mobilisation Council. 750  
With regard to the meaningfulness of the commemorative plaque, Chin Kuan 
Huay Kuan’s younger leaders such as Zhang Jin Chuan and Xiao Sun Xi shared 




their ideas that this plaque would play a role in the preservation of memories of 
the Japanese Occupation, and we must remember what happened during that 
period. More importantly, they continued, the plaque would remind future 
generations of the fact that peace had been built in exchange for the heavy price 
that their older generations paid. 751 Similarly, Zhuang Ri Kun, a senior official 
of the Ministry of Community Development, commented that it was very 
meaningful to set up such a war monument which would remind Singaporeans 
to remember the painful period of the Japanese Occupation. Also, he continued, 
it would clearly tell us the price of peace so that we would be able to realise that 
national defence is every citizen’s duty. 752  As seen from above, those war 
plaques were erected to remind Singaporeans of lessons from the war, and one 
of the most significant ones is the importance of defence. 
 
 
4. Commemorative ceremonies 
4.1 Introduction 
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In 1995, the year of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, 
two significant state-involved commemorative ceremonies were conducted at 
the Civilian War Memorial: the first one was held on the day of the fall of 
Singapore (15 February) and the second one, on the day of the Japanese 
surrender in Singapore (12 September). These ceremonies were organised by the 
SCCCI in cooperation with the Singapore government. This section elaborates 
on the ways in which the two ceremonies were conducted and discusses the 
purposes of and the people’s responses to the commemorative services. 
 
4.2 Commemorating the fall of Singapore  
On the day of the fall of Singapore, 15 February 1995, the SCCCI, for the 
first time, officially invited school children to a commemorative ceremony at the 
Civilian War Memorial. The SCCCI had conducted it every year on 15 February 
since the memorial was built in 1967. 753 Responding to the invitations, 100 
students from seven primary and secondary schools attended the service and 
representatives of those schools joined the wreath-laying ceremony. 754  Due 
partly to such invitations, the number of people who attended the ceremony in 
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1995 rose sharply to about 500, which was five times of the number of 
participants in the previous year. 755  
In his speech at the ceremony, George Yeo touched on the transmission of 
lessons learned from the war. He said: “Lessons learned from the past will be 
passed on from generation to generation. We should not forget them for our 
posterity. If history will repeat itself, it will be a tragedy.” 756 Similarly, Fang 
Shui Jin, vice secretary of the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Association, 
emphasised the significance of commemorative ceremonies as transmitters of 
the past. He said that the younger generation should attend such a 
commemorative ceremony because many of the war dead were social leaders at 
that time and the younger generation should learn from their spirit to accomplish 
their missions even though they would risk their lives. 757 In addition, Freddy 
Lam, vice president of the SCCCI, delivered the elegy hoping that the cruelty 
and misery of war would be remembered so that peace would be cherished for 
many more years to come. 758 
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The responses of the students who attended the ceremony seemed to be good, 
and their experience to join the commemorative service appeared to have a deep 
impression on their minds. For instance, a Primary VI pupil, Hu Hui Xin, did not 
have a strong impression of the war in the past even though her grandmother 
told her about her war experience. However, after attending the ceremony, she 
realised the cruelty of the war. She said: “War is extremely bad. It harms and 
kills many people. And it also harms many people’s hearts… Those who were 
killed are pity so much. I feel sad, too.” Similarly, another participant, Chen Mei 
Hong, a Secondary II student, told the reporter that she did not know a lot about 
the war though she had heard war experiences from her grandparents and had 
read news reports on the war; however, after attending the ceremony, she 
became more interested in learning more about the war. She said: “Attending the 
ceremony gave deeper impression on my mind than reading books on that 
period.” Xu Han Xing, a Secondary I student, agreed with her: “In the past, I had 
never paid attention to this memorial. Now I know the meaningfulness of the 
commemoration.” He felt that war was very scary and no country should start a 
war. 759 
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After the ceremony, a group of students gathered around two former 
members of Force 136: Lee Kim Chuan, 79, and Tham Sien Yen, 77. Students 
asked many questions to the two members: “Why did you want to join Force 
136?”: “You did not feel that was a hard job at that time?”: and “Was the war 
scary?” The veterans were happy to answer those questions and told the students 
what it was like to be in Force 136. Tham Sien Yen, who took over Lim Bo 
Seng’s role in Force 136 after his death, said: “Through joining such an activity 
I hope that the next generations will realise the importance of peace and they 
should avoid war because war is extremely cruel.” After listening to their stories, 
one of the students, Charles Ng, 12, said: “This is very good, I can lean about 
Singapore’s history.” 760  
 
4.3 The 50th anniversary of the end of the war 
On the day of the 50th anniversary of the Japanese surrender, 12 September 
1995, a big commemorative ceremony was conducted at the Civilian War 
Memorial. The memorial service started with a short speech by Kwek Leng Joo, 
president of the SCCCI, saying that in order to end the Second World War and 
maintain peace in the following 50 years, Singapore had sacrificed many 
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innocent lives. The peace was, he continued, achieved in exchange of precious 
lives so that everyone should make an effort to contribute to the maintenance of 
peace.  761  
After his speech, a prayer session was performed by leaders of six major 
religions in Singapore: Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, and 
Sikhism. Thereafter, they offered a one minute silent prayer for the victims of 
the war. 762 And then 50 pairs of white doves were released to the sky to mark 
the 50th anniversary. More than 1,000 guests attended the memorial service. 763 
Those who attended were not only war veterans and family members of the war 
dead but national leaders, diplomatic envoys, representatives from commercial 
and communal organisations, and over 500 students from seventeen schools. 764 
Also in attendance were Acting Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and MITA 
Minister George Yeo. 765  
After the ceremony, Lee told reporters that Singaporeans must never forget 
the war because it was a part of the present Singapore. Without the war and the 
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Japanese Occupation, he said, there would not have the subsequent history such 
as Britain’s reoccupation, Singapore’s independence, its economic progress, and 
what it is today. War experiences, he continued, could only add to Singaporean’s 
strength and Singaporeans should understand the experiences, hardships, and 
sacrifices made and build on that to ensure continued progress. 766 Then, he 
added: “In this way, we know where we came from, where we will probably 
make mistakes, and we understand there is a possibility that a disaster may 
happen. In this way, we can be serious towards our lives.” 767   
Subsequently, Yeo said that we should provide opportunities for the elder 
generation to share their experiences and memories with the younger generation. 
Since the war was a soul-stirring event, he continued, it caused the generation of 
that time to unite as a people, and the present-day Singaporeans could share this 
common spirit. The war is, he added, a part of Singapore’s history which binds 
all Singaporeans together, regardless of race and religion.768  These speeches 
show that the political elite in Singapore saw the Second World War as a 
precious common experience shared by all Singaporeans that, in turn, binds the 
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present Singaporeans together. This seems to be one of the important messages 
that they wanted to spread through the war commemoration programmes.  
After the commemorative ceremony, some students took the opportunity to 
ask veterans about their life under the Japanese rule. Melvin Tham, 15, and 
Joseph Luo, 15, from Nan Chiau High School were such students. After 
listening to the veterans’ stories, Melvin told a reporter that it was more 
interesting to listen to the veterans’ personal experiences than simply read 
history books. His friend Joseph said that he could now understand better what 
the books said; he was able to see how the veterans had suffered: some could not 
walk, some had lost a leg or their hearing due to the war. 769   
 Other students appeared to have gained different impressions. However, 
many students seemed to more deeply feel the suffering that their older 
generation went through. For example, having attended the ceremony, Xie Fei, 
17, a junior college student, said: “This is a very meaningful commemorative 
ceremony. We of the young people who are living in a peace and prosperous 
time now get to understand the importance of peace.” Another junior college 
student, Chen Jin Song, 17, said: “We are living in the world in which time 
distance is very far from the Second World War. That kind of commemorative 
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ceremony gives us a chance to understand the sufferings that our seniors 
experienced in wartime. Don’t forget the war which had taken place in 
Singapore before.” Having attended the commemorative ceremony, Chen had 
realised the importance of National Service: only depending on the regular 
troops is not sufficient; if an enemy invades Singapore, the conscription army 
could give them a heavy blow. 770  It seems that the message from the 
government – National Service is necessary - was received by, at least, some 
students through the commemorative ceremonies.   
 
 
5. People’s responses and evaluation of the war commemoration programmes 
5.1 People’s responses 
It seems that the people’s responses to the war commemoration programmes 
were generally positive. According to a survey conducted by Pana News, a 
Japanese language newspaper in Singapore, more than 60% of young 
Singaporeans praised the government’s war commemoration programmes. The 
survey was conducted in 1995 with 300 students from junior colleges, 
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polytechnics, and universities in Singapore. 62.7% answered ‘yes’ to the 
question of “[t]he government’s attempt to remind the people of the struggles in 
the war was praiseworthy”, whereas only 27.3% reported ‘no’. 771  
Reflecting such a positive attitude toward the war commemoration activities, 
the number of student participants in the annual commemorative ceremony at 
the Civilian War Memorial on the day of fall of Singapore skyrocketed from 100 
students in 1995 to 1,000 students in the following year. 772 Surrounded by these 
students, George Yeo was reportedly touched to see their good responses. 773 He 
said: “There are like a thousand students here today volunteered. The teachers 
and the students wanted to come…. [I] never expected the response to be so 
good.”774 Though we can suspect that not all of the students wanted to come 
(because they most probably had to follow their teachers), it can be said that the 
teachers and schools more openly responded to the invitations to attend the 
ceremony. This is probably because of the effect of the government’s activities 
to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War 
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concentrated in August and September 1995, resulting in the attendance increase 
in 1996. 
Similarly, Chin Kah Chong, president of Pana News, claimed that Singapore 
youth’s abundant knowledge about the Second World War must be affected by 
various commemorative activities organised by the government. According to 
the survey, the names of historical figures and events during the Japanese 
Occupation were well known by Singapore youth. For instance, 83.3% of the 
youth knew the Sook Ching massacre (don’t know: 15.7%, not sure: 1.0%): 
likewise, Lim Bo Seng, 81.3% (don’t know: 17.3%, not sure: 1.3%), General 
Yamashita, 76.3% (don’t know: 22.7%, not sure: 1.0%), and Syonan-to, 70.3% 
(don’t know: 27.3%, not sure: 2.3%). 775 
The fact that many Singapore youth knew the names of key events and 
figures during the Second World War probably reflected their strong interest in 
that period. According to a Lianhe Zaobao’s survey conducted with 659 
secondary students in 1996, the part of Singapore history that gained most 
interested was the Japanese Occupation period, which stood at 56.1%. That is an 
overwhelming percentage because after the Japanese Occupation the second 
most interesting topic was only ranked by 14.9% (Raffle’s landing on 
                                                           
775
 Lianhe Zaobao, 17 Aug 1995. 
 337 
Singapore) followed by Singapore’s independence, which was ranked by a 
merely 10.6%. 776  Such a tendency was also supported by another survey 
conducted in 1996 by the Ministry of Education. It was done as a surprise quiz 
on Singapore history with some 2,500 students from primary schools up to 
universities. Almost all knew that Singapore was under Japanese rule during the 
Second World War. Commenting on the survey result, Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong summed up its trend: “They are more familiar with Singapore’s 
colonial past and the Japanese Occupation than our struggles for nationhood.” 
777
  
The history teachers who were interviewed were not surprised with such a 
result. They recognised that students liked to hear the dramatic, extraordinary, 
turbulent, and tragic stories like those from the Japanese Occupation. In fact, 
Luo Wei Heng, a Secondary II student who was interviewed by a reporter, said 
that the history of the Japanese invasion was relatively interesting because “it is 
not so boring, it is clear to distinguish good people from bad people, the process 
of the battles is also interesting. I like most to read the tragic historical facts that 
the anti-Japanese heroes fiercely resisted against the Japanese army.” In addition, 
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the teachers and students unanimously pointed out the reasons for the interest: 
there were the witnesses and victims of the war at home, there were lots of TV 
dramas about the war period, and the teaching materials about the Japanese 
Occupation, such as videos and pictures, abounded. 778 
The government’s effort to remind young Singaporeans of the events during 
the Second World War was relatively well received by students and teachers. 
Probably because of their strong interests in the war period, many Singapore 
youth knew the key events and figures of the war and, as Chin Kah Chong 
claimed, this must be affected by the war commemoration programmes 
conducted by the government. 779  
 
5.2 Evaluation 
With regard to whether the programmes were successful in transmitting the 
intended messaged, George Yeo commented, at the last phase of the war 
commemoration programmes in September 1995, as follows: “I was not sure at 
first whether we were succeeding. But when I saw a musical put up by the 
Nanyang Technological University about the (last world) war, I feel comforted 
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that there is transmission, that the messages are being passed on.” 780  The 
messages he wanted to pass on were, as mentioned above, the importance of 
independence, defence, and nationalism. 781 Having watched the musical, he was 
delighted because he could see nationalism in the minds of the students who put 
on the show. On this point, he said:  
 
I see a hope on the young people. In parliament, I have once touched on my 
experience of watching a musical in Nanyang Technological University. The 
content of the students’ performance was related to nationalism during the period of 
anti-Japanese war. I have never thought that they had such deep emotion towards 
that period of history to the extent that they were willing to take much trouble to 
create, produce, rehearse, fund-raise, and finally perform it. In general, unless you 
do not have emotion, you will not be willing to take trouble to such an extent. 782 
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It seems that Yeo thought that the war commemoration programmes were 
successful in transmitting the messages to young people, at least, as far as those 
Nanyang Technological University (NTU) students were concerned.  
According to a survey conducted by Singapore’s Malay newspaper Berita 
Harian in 1995, the young people who received the ‘right’ messages from the 
government were not only the NTU students: when younger Singaporeans were 
asked what Singapore learned most from the Japanese Occupation, they put 
‘independence’, ‘the importance of defence’, and ‘being prepared at all times’ 
on top of their list. 783 These are, on top of the importance of nationalism, the 
very messages that Yeo wanted to transmit to the younger generation. Hearing 
such a survey result, he reportedly cheered and told reporters that if the same 
survey had been conducted ten years ago, it would not have been positive 
toward National Service and defence. 784  It can be said that the war 
commemoration programmes was generally successful in reminding the young 
people of the importance of defence and the necessity of National Service.  
On the other hand, it is questionable whether the programmes were also 
successful in instilling Singapore nationalism in the minds of people. According 
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to a survey on the relationship between citizens and the state, conducted in 2000, 
Singapore’s national identity was not strengthened for the majority of people 
throughout the 1990s. The survey revealed that only 28% of the respondents 
believed that a sense of being Singaporean had become more important between 
1990 and 2000. In other words, more than 70% of Singaporeans felt that 
Singapore’s identity was not strengthened in that period. 785 Therefore, unlike 
the programmes’ success in reminding people of the importance of defence, it is 
questionable if it was also successful in promoting and solidifying a sense of 
nationalism between Singaporeans. 
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  Chapter 7: National Education and History Textbooks, 1996-2005 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed how and why the state-led programmes to 
mark the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War were conducted 
in 1995. It argued that one purpose of the commemoration programmes was to 
remind the youth of the necessity of Total Defence, and a lesson from the war—
be prepared for war even in peacetime because the fall of Singapore was caused 
by the British unpreparedness—was often highlighted. Therefore, it can be said 
that an official portrait of the past was reconstructed from the present point of 
view, and it was affected by the present interest and aspirations of the political 
elite. The same argument can be applied to development after the introduction of 
National Education. This chapter delineates how and why National Education 
was introduced in 1997 and examines its effects on the portrait of the Japanese 
Occupation in history textbooks published under the 1999 and 2005 syllabuses. 
Discussion on the need for National Education was triggered by Lee Kuan 
Yew’s comment on 8 June 1996 that Singapore should not rule out the 
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possibility of a re-merger with Malaysia as an option in the future. 786  This 
invited strong opposition and nationalistic responses from Malaysia, but, 
according to his son, Lee Hsien Loong, the reactions among Singaporeans were 
much milder. In a speech made on 17 July, he expressed dissatisfaction with the 
absence of Singaporeans’ nationalistic defence of their ideals and lifestyles such 
as meritocracy and religious harmony, against those of Malaysia; he also 
expressed dissatisfaction with the young generation’s ignorance of Singapore’s 
recent history revolving around its merger with and separation from Malaysia.787 
Subsequently, The New Paper conducted a quick survey on Singapore’s 
history with 50 Singaporeans, aged 16 to 25. The questions were: (1) When did 
Singapore become independent? (2) How many years were we part of Malaysia? 
(3) Why did we leave Malaysia? (4) Then PM Lee Kuan Yew cried when 
Singapore left? Why? and (5) Give a reason for the riots in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The survey showed shocking results. Out of 50 people, 14 could not answer a 
single question correctly. Only two answered perfectly.788  
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The next day, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong quickly responded, saying 
that “a recent New Paper poll had also shown that many young Singaporeans did 
not know basic facts, such as when the country became independent and why it 
separated from Malaysia. It is frightening to me because like a tree, if you do not 
have deep roots, a storm comes along, your tree will be easily uprooted because 
it has very shallow roots.” It was important, he continued, to help young 
Singaporeans know “where and whence they came from and make sure that they 
can stand stormy weather.” 789 Goh’s comment implies that, in the view of the 
political elite, the teaching of national history as a means to inculcate national 
identity and patriotism in young people would ensure Singaporeans’ unity and 
resilience against a crisis, such as a water shortage, an economic crisis or armed 
conflict. Lastly, Goh added that he would ask the Ministry of Education to 
review its history syllabus. 790 
Thereafter, Lianhe Zaopao conducted a similar survey with 659 secondary 
students. The result appearing on 29 July revealed that those students expressed 
little interest in Singapore’s recent history: out of 659 respondents, only 4 (0.6%) 
and 19 (2.9%) people reported their interest in the periods of the post-
independence (after 1965) and self-government (1959-1965) respectively, while 
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70 students (10.6%) showed their interest in Singapore’s independence (1965). 
The lack of young people’s interest in their country’s recent history showed a 
clear contrast with their strong interest in the period of the Japanese Occupation 
(370 respondents, 56.1%). 791  In the next month, the Ministry of Education 
conducted another survey of 2,500 students, comfirming that young 
Singaporeans knew little of the events surrounding their country’s independence. 
792
 This lack of interest and knowledge, according to Education Minister Teo 
Chee Hean, “could be attributed to the lack of coverage given to Singapore's 
self-rule, independence and nation building in existing history books.” 793 
Against such a backdrop, speaking at a Teacher’s Day rally on 8 September 
1996, Goh stressed the need for National Education aimed at further inculcation 
of the national consciousness in the minds of students by teaching Singapore’s 
national past and ideals. He said: “National Education must be a vital component 
of our education process…. It is an exercise to develop instincts that become 
part of the psyche of every child. It must engender a shared sense of nationhood, 
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an understanding of how our past is relevant to our present and future. It must 
appeal to both heart and mind.” 794 Subsequently, Deputy Prime Minister Lee 
Hsien Loong formally launched National Education on 17 May 1997. 
The purpose of National Education (NE) was to “develop national cohesion, 
the instinct for survival and confidence in the future.” This was to be achieved 
by four methods: fostering a sense of identity, pride and self-respect as 
Singaporeans; telling Singapore story (the story of how Singapore succeeded 
against the odds to become a nation); teaching about Singapore's vulnerabilities; 
and instilling the core values of the Singaporean way of life. 795 The core values 
to be instilled were, according to six NE messages, racial and religious harmony, 
meritocracy, and incorruptibility. Other messages to be taught through National 
Education were: Singapore is our homeland, this is where we belong, no one 
owes Singapore a living, we must ourselves defend Singapore, and we have 
confidence in our future. 796 In sum, National Education was designed to make 
every pupil learn “the facts of how we became a nation, why our constraints and 
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vulnerabilities make us different from other countries and why we must continue 
to work together and outperform others to succeed in future.” 797  
There are two ways of achieving this goal: teaching factual knowledge about 
Singapore and instilling a sense of emotional belonging to the nation. A press 
release titled “Launch of National Education” issued on 16 May 1997, explains 
this as follows: 
 
The cultivation of national instincts among pupils will have two prongs - first to 
develop an awareness of facts, circumstances and opportunities  facing 
Singapore … and second, to develop a sense of  emotional belonging and 
commitment  to the community and nation so that they will stay and fight when the 
odds are against us. 798 
 
This implies that one of the objectives of National Education was to instill 
national pride and patriotism in all Singaporeans, particularly the young, to 
ensure they would fight against the odds.  
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 Different emphases were placed on the two approaches according to the 
pupils’ ages. At the primary level, developing a sense of emotional belonging 
was stressed (“Love Singapore”) while from the secondary level onward, the 
teaching of knowledge about Singapore (“Know Singapore”) was National 
Education’s principal approach. In addition, post-secondary students would 





2. Implementation of National Education 
After Goh’s speech on National Education at a Teacher’s Day rally on 8 
September 1996, a National Education Committee was set up. Lim Siong Guan, 
Permanent Secretary of Prime Minister's Office and Education, was appointed as 
chair person. Committee members were invited by the Ministry of Education, 
MITA, Mindef, Prime Minister's Office, and People's Association. The 
committee set up thirteen project teams and tasked them with developing ways 
to monitor National Education’s implementation in schools. Principals were 




assigned to play key roles in the implementation of the NE programme. In 
addition, an NE Coordinator was appointed in every school to coordinate the NE 
efforts and help disseminate information to teachers. 800 
National Education was implemented through formal and informal curricula. 
The formal curriculum included classroom lessons such as history, social studies, 
civics and moral education, geography, and general paper. The activities in the 
informal curriculum were conducted outside classrooms, such as attending 
commemorative events on Total Defence Day (15 February) and National Day 
(9 August). 801 
In the formal curriculum in primary schools, social studies was expanded, 
and after 2000, pupils from Primary I to VI were required to study the subject 
(in the previous syllabus, only pupils from Primary IV to VI had to learn social 
studies). 802  In secondary schools, a new history syllabus published in 1999 
expanded the scope of Singapore’s history from 1965 to 1971 to teach the 
development of its recent history more intensively. 803 Furthermore, a new social 
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studies curriculum for upper secondary, designed to instil the six NE messages, 
became compulsory for all students in 2001. 804 
From 1997 on, the informal curriculum guided pupils to attend Singapore’s 
commemorative events such as Total Defence Day (15 Feb), the day of the fall 
of Singapore, to remind pupils of the importance of the Total Defence; Racial 
Harmony Day (21 Jul), the day of Singapore’s racial riots in 1964, to remind 
pupils of the significance of racial harmony; National Day (9 Aug), the day of 
Singapore’s separation from Malaysia to celebrate Singapore's independence; 
and International Friendship Day (21 Sep), the day of Singapore’s entrance into 
the United Nations in 1965, to promote international friendship (this day was 
shifted to early April later). 805 In particular, the attendance of the NE Show (a 
preview of the National Day Parade) became compulsory for all Primary V 
students. 806  In addition to these commemorative events, the informal NE 
programmes included school visits to key public installations and economic 
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facilities, 807 community involvement programmes, and co-curricular activities 
such as the Uniformed Groups. 808 
Finally, it is important to mention the method of assessment. To assess the 
extent to which pupils absorb and internalise the six NE messages, students at 
Primary VI and Secondary IV were required to pass a National Education Test 
to continue studies in schools on a higher level. The test was conducted in the 




3. National Education’s Effects on History Textbooks 
3.1 Effects on History Syllabuses and Textbooks 
National Education was launched to deal with the young people’s 
ignorance and little interest in Singapore’s recent history and ideals, such as 
racial and religious harmony, meritocracy and incorruptibility, which were 
claimed vis-à-vis Malaysian ways of life including Islam as the state religion 
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and various pro-Bumiputera policies. Therefore, the explicit change in history 
syllabuses and textbooks after the launch of National Education can be seen in 
the increase in the teaching of Singapore’s post-war history. 
First, the scope of the teaching of Singapore’s history was expanded to 
1971 while, under the 1994 syllabus, students learned the development of 
Singapore up to 1965. This arrangement remained unchanged in the 2005 
syllabus. 810 
Second, the volume and percentage of the teaching of Singapore’s post-war 
years drastically increased after the launch of National Education. As seen in the 
table below, the percentages of the coverage of post-war years in the history 
textbooks for lower secondary students under the 1984 and 1994 syllabuses 
(Social and Economic History of Singapore and Modern History of Singapore) 
were both approximately eighteen percent. However, this figure skyrocketed 
after the introduction of National Education in 1997. History textbooks 
published under the 1999 and 2005 syllabuses (Understanding Our Past and 
Singapore: From Settlement To Nation) devoted 54.3% and 44.5% of the 
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textbook to portraying Singapore’s post-war years respectively. This is a 
significant change in the content of history textbooks, caused by National 
Education, which was initiated by the political elite.  
 
Figure 4. Pages and percentages devoted to the portrait of the Japanese Occupation 











1984 syllabus 76 pages 14.1% 100 pages 18.2% 
1994 syllabus 37 pages 19.1% 36 pages 18.5% 
1999 syllabus 50 pages 19.4% 140 pages 54.3% 
2005 syllabus 32 pages 13.6% 105 pages 44.5% 
 
3.2 Effects on the Portrait of the Japanese Occupation 
National Education’s effect on the portrait of the Japanese Occupation was 
insignificant compared to that on Singapore’s recent history. As seen in the table 
above, there was no significant change in the percentages devoted to the portrait 
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of the Japanese Occupation in history textbooks before (14.1% and 19.1%) and 
after (19.4% and 13.6%) the launch of National Education. In addition, the ways 
in which the Japanese Occupation is portrayed in two history textbooks for the 
lower secondary level published after the introduction of National Education 
(Understanding Our Past and Singapore: From Settlement To Nation) are, in 
principle, the same as the 1994 edition (Modern History of Singapore)—all 
textbooks are written from the Singapore-centric point of view, the Japanese 
Occupation is portrayed as a period of hardship and suffering, lessons from the 
war are taught, and local war heroes are celebrated.  
This is probably because some of the NE messages, such as “Singapore is 
our homeland” and “we must ourselves defend Singapore,” were already 
embedded in history syllabuses and textbooks even before the introduction of 
National Education. For instance, the 1984 syllabus stated that the objective of 
history teaching was, “To develop in our pupils a sense of Singapore identity” 
and “instil pride in Singapore’s past and their ancestors’ achievements”. 811 
Similarly, the 1994 syllabus said the rational of history education was “to 
develop in them [our pupils] a strong sense of identity and pride in our country.” 
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812
 This is exactly same as one of National Education goals: fostering a sense of 
identity, pride and self-respect as Singaporeans by telling the Singapore Story. 
813
 
The message of “we must ourselves defend Singapore” was, as discussed 
earlier, already embedded in the 1994 history textbook as a lesson from the war. 
The textbook states:  
 
The defeat of the British was due partly to their poor preparations for war. They 
under-estimated their enemies. Their soldiers were disorganised and their defence 
was weak. From this, one can learn the lesson that the government and people of a 




This message is printed in the 1999 edition in the form of a quote from PAP 
leader Teo Chee Hean.  
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We should remember never again to be unprepared to defend our own country, our 
families and our way of life. We should remember that the price of peace is eternal 
preparedness. 815 
 
In the 2005 edition, the explicit message of “we must ourselves defend 
Singapore” disappeared from the textbook. However, its teacher’s guide 
instructs that students should discuss whether the British were prepared enough 
for the Japanese invasion by doing a role-play between British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill, British military commanders in Singapore, General Percival, 
and the people in Singapore.  
Students are divided into four groups and each group is instructed to act each 
role based on sources given. The sources given to the Churchill group state that 
Japan would never attack Singapore with a superior American fleet in the Pacific 
and the defence of Egypt is more important to Britain, while the students acting 
the role of military commanders in Singapore are provided with sources that 
discuss the danger of Japan’s invasion of Malaya from north and the need for 
more aircrafts to defend Malaya. The sources given to students acting the role of 
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Percival state that if the British fleet would sail to Singapore, it would 
immediately put an end to any danger to Singapore, and the students performing 
the role of the people in Singapore are given sources complaining about the 
British’s over-confidence at the time. 816  Given such sources, it would be 
difficult to conclude that the British were well-prepared for the Japanese 
invasion. This role play is intended to send to students the message of “we must 
ourselves defend Singapore,” or be prepared for war even in peacetime.  
One goal of National Education is, as mentioned above, to foster a sense of 
identity and pride as Singaporeans by teaching the Singapore Story, a story of 
how Singapore succeeded against the odds to become a nation. 817 This story 
line was already devised in the 1980s, and the 1984 history textbook was written 
along this line; this is one reason that there was no significant change in the 
portrait of the Japanese Occupation in history textbooks after the introduction of 
National Education.  
The preface of the 1984 textbook states that its story line is “the gradual 
transition of an immigrant society to one that is locally oriented and possesses a 
sense of identity with this country,” or the transformation from an immigrant 
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society to a nation. It goes on to state that the textbook depicts “the struggles and 
efforts of the people and their leaders to bring about improvements in the social 
and economic spheres … and shows how the people of Singapore responded and 
adapted to these external events and developments.” 818 
This story line basically remains unchanged in the 2005 textbook. Its preface 
states that “The story of Singapore … traces the growth of Singapore and how 
events that happened outside the island affected us. More importantly, the story 
focuses on the determination of the people to struggle against all odds to achieve 
independence and strive to build a nation.” 819 Therefore, the basic story line of 
the Singapore Story is nothing new and was already reflected in Singapore’s 
first national history textbook in 1984. 
Having said that, there are changes in the portrait of the Japanese Occupation 
in the 1999 and 2005 editions. First, more emphasis was placed on the role of 
ordinary people in shaping history. For example, more people’s voices are 
introduced in the 1999 and 2005 textbooks than the 1994 edition—only one war 
survivor’s voice can be found in the 1994 textbook while eight and five war 
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survivor’s testimonies appear in the 1999 and 2005 editions respectively. 820 
This is probably because the Singapore Story is a story that stresses the people’s 
struggles against the odds as stated in preface of the 1999 and 2005 textbooks: 
the story of Singapore is “the story focuses on the determination of the people to 
struggle against all odds”. 821 
This focus on the people’s struggle is particularly clear in the 2005 textbook. 
For instance, an extension activity in the textbook asks students to find more 
about lesser-known individuals, unlike Adnan Saidi and Lim Bo Seng, who 
struggled against the Japanese during their rule of Singapore. 822 Section titles in 
the textbook, such as “How did the people of Singapore react the Japanese 
attack?”, “How did the Japanese Occupation change the lives of people in 
Singapore?”, and “What were the effects of World War II on civilian 
populations?” also reflect the emphasis placed on the people’s perspective.823 
Second, the 2005 textbook, for the first time, highlights Elizabeth Choy and 
Subhas Chandra Bose as war heroes in addition to Lim Bo Seng and Adnan 
Saidi. In the textbook, Choy is portrayed as a compassionate heroine who 
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secretly passed food, medicine and messages to British POWs during the 
Japanese Occupation, before she was imprisoned and tortured by the Japanese 
Kempeitai. Despite the harsh treatment, after the war she refused to name her 
torturers, saying that they had to follow their supervisor’s orders under the 
circumstances of war. 824  This episode was included in the 2005 textbook 
because, according to two former staffs of the Ministry of Education who were 
involved in history and social studies syllabus revisions, Choy represents a 
woman’s voice to strike a better balance between the historical representation of 
men and women. 825 
Three pages in the 2005 textbook spotlight the episode of Bose and the INA. 
The column focuses on the role Bose and the INA played in India’s 
independence after Bose came to Singapore in 1943. In Singapore, Bose 
assumed leadership of the INA, organised a Free India Provisional Government, 
and travelled to countries in Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia such as Bangkok, 
Rangoon, and Saigon, to garner support and collect donations for India’s 
independence. 826  The column downplays the fact that Bose and the INA 
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collaborated with the Japanese and stresses their independent role and 
contribution to India’s independence. 
 
Under Bose, the INA refused to be part of the Japanese army. Instead, they chose to 
be an independent army, fighting for the freedom of their motherland … The INA 
did not succeed in their armed struggle, but their fervour and patriotism contributed 
to the eventual achievement of India’s independence. At the famous Red Fort trials, 
attempts by the British to charge the INA with treason sparked off anti-British 
demonstrations. Not long after, on 15 August 1947, India became independent. 827 
 
The reason for the inclusion of this episode in the 2005 textbook is unknown. 
However, Yong Mun Cheong, who was involved in the history textbook revision 
in 2005, suggested that there probably was a need to include an Indian war hero 
in the textbook because only a Chinese (Lim Bo Seng) and a Malay (Adnan 
Saidi) war hero were highlighted in the previous editions. 828 
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Finally, different points of view were included in the 1999 and 2005 
textbooks while there was no such attempt in the 1994 edition. This is because 
“Thinking Schools, Learning Nation,” aimed to foster the students’ ability to 
think critically, was launched in 1997; this initiative was reflected in textbooks 
after that year. 829  
In the 1999 textbook, two columns introduce different points of view. The 
first perspective regards whether Singapore could have been saved if the British 
held on to Singapore a little longer. General Yamashita believed this was true 
based on the grounds that there was a lack of supplies to continue fighting, while 
military historian Dr. Stanley Falk said it was not true because the Japanese 
could have brought more military strength if needed. 830 The second perspective 
examines how to understand the Japanese view of the Second World War—that 
the purpose of the war was to defend their country and liberate Asia from 
colonial rule—in contrast with Lee Kuan Yew’s belief that, “from my personal 
experience of the war, I cannot agree it was a war to liberate Asia.” 831 Different 
points of view included in the 2005 edition, as already mentioned, discuss 
                                                           
829
 Curriculum Planning & Development Division, Syllabus: For Implementation from January 1999: 
History Lower Secondary (Singapore: Ministry of Education, 1998), 1. 
830
 C.P.D.D., Understanding Our Past, 80. 
831
 Ibid., 83. 
 363 
whether the British were prepared enough for the Japanese invasion by doing a 
role-play. 832  
Although different points of view were introduced in those textbooks, the 
last two questions have a clear desirable answer among different views. As for 
the question of how to make sense of the Second World War, Koh Ee Moi 
claims that there is little point in asking students which point of view they agree 
with because they are not given enough information to support the Japanese 
point of view. 833 The textbook was written in such a way that careful students 
must choose Lee Kuan Yew’s view. With regard to the question of whether the 
British were well-prepared for the Japanese attacks, it would be unreasonable to 
conclude that Britain’s preparedness for war was perfect. Even though different 
points of view are given, it is designed for students to decide that the British 
were unprepared. This is probably because one of the NE messages, “we must 
ourselves defend Singapore,” or be prepared for war even in peacetime, can be 
claimed based on the assumption that the British unpreparedness caused the fall 
of Singapore. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
In the current political structure of the nation-state system, a nation-state 
cannot survive without inculcating national identity and patriotism in the minds 
of people, and among its major means of inculcation are history education and 
war commemoration. Within such a structure, present interests, aspiration, and 
desire of the state, or of the political elite, strongly affect the official 
interpretation and representation of a national past. Also, the political elite can 
decide whether the government actively disseminates the official representation 
of the past to the people. 
In Singapore, after the British returned in 1945, there was no common 
history syllabus for all schools of different language streams. Only in the early 
1960s the Singapore government finished the task of publishing a complete set 
of a common Malayanised history syllabus for primary and secondary schools of 
all language streams that was designed to inculcate a Malayan consciousness in 
local youth. However, due to Singapore’s separation from Malaysia (1965) the 
government stopped the active use of history as a means to inculcate national 
identity in Singapore youth and since then history education at the primary level 
was marginalised; it was made non-examinable, dropped from the Primary 
School Leaving Examination, and merged with civics and geography. According 
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to Ong Pang Boon, Minister for the Environment at that time, this is because 
“History has no immediate practical use… It does not help us compute our way 
through life. Thus in schools, history together with geography, is being pushed 
out of the curriculum to make room for more useful studies” such as English, 
mathematics and science. 834  Furthermore, with the sudden separation from 
Malaysia in 1965, the Singapore government became preoccupied with its 
economic survival so the subjects that were seen as not useful to developing 
industrial skills, such as history and geography, were pushed out. 
In addition, soon after independence, the political elite judged that history 
teaching did not contribute to nation-building. As Singapore was still a poor, 
unstable, and conflict-ridden society, its history up to the 1960s was “the story 
of how immigrants from many countries came and settled down and how 
communal tension and suspicion led to mass riots and destruction.” 835  This 
vision of history would not help to raise pupils’ national pride. S. Rajaratnam 
openly confessed in 1987:  
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Until very recently Singapore’s past was a matter of supreme indifference for most 
Singaporeans simply because they believed this island never really had a history 
worth remembering … because all of that history was British colonial history. The 
only proven history Singapore had was in the eyes of most nationalists a shameful 
episode of exploitation, oppression and humiliation of a people who nevertheless 
insisted on remaining in Singapore. Patriotism required that we performed some 
sort of collective lobotomy to wipe out all traces of 146 years of shame. 836  
 
Another important reason for the marginalisation of history was to avoid the 
risk of dividing a multi-ethnic society of Singapore. The political elite were 
worried that ethnic nationalisms would be further strengthened by the teaching 
of ethnic roots at the point when the communal riots between the Chinese and 
Malays in 1964 were still fresh. 837 Rajaratnam explained such worries:  
 
We could have contrived a more lengthy and eye-boggling lineage by tracing our 
ancestry back to the lands from which our forefathers emigrated – China, India, Sri 
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Lanka, the Middle East and Indonesia. The price we would have to pay for this 
more impressive genealogical table would be to turn Singapore into a battleground 
for endless racial and communal conflicts and interventionalist politics by the more 
powerful and bigger nations from which Singapore had emigrated. 838  
 
In short, the political elite in the 1960s and 1970s recognised that teaching 
history would be detrimental to nation-building. 
However, in the 1980s the political elite started to stress the importance of 
history teaching. In 1980, Goh Chok Tong called for the revision of history 
education and suggested the story line of a new national history: Singapore 
history should focus on “the struggle for independence and against the 
communists, the building of a modern state, the values that were taught, the 
society that was formed and the nation that was built.” 839 Thereafter, Wang 
Gungwu from Australian National University was appointed as chief consultant 
with other six consultants from National University of Singapore. With their 
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consultation, the first Singapore history textbook for secondary schools entitled 
Social and Economic History of Modern Singapore was published in 1984. 840  
The textbook was written from the Singapore-centric point of view and the 
Japanese Occupation was also portrayed in the textbook with emphasis on 
events in Singapore. Such a change in focus happened due to Singapore’s 
independence from Malaysia, creating the need to inculcate a Singaporean 
identity in the minds of students, instead of a Malaysian identity, though such a 
textbook was introduced almost twenty years after Singapore’s independence. 
The absence of the teaching of a national history of Singapore in secondary 
schools for almost twenty years was also caused by political considerations. As 
argued above, political leaders such as Rajaratnam recognised until the 1970s 
that the teaching of Singapore’s colonial history was not only unable to elevate 
students’ national pride but also potentially detrimental to national unity. Such 
political considerations delayed the introduction of Singapore’s national history 
in schools for almost twenty years.  
During the 1980s, however, the political elite’s perception about the 
usefulness of history teaching had changed, mainly due to the following two 
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reasons. Firstly, Singapore’s rapid economic growth that already started in the 
1970s enabled Singapore’s history to be told as a success story; the teaching of 
such a story was now seen as a means to elevate students’ national pride. Also, 
Singapore’s economic miracle liberated the government from its preoccupation 
with economic survival, which provided the condition in which political leaders’ 
interest in history would be revived. Another consequence of the economic 
miracle was that the government could no longer rely only on economic growth 
to unite people. Therefore, instead of economic growth, the government needed 
another means to achieve national unity. Thus, the teaching of national history 
was re-evaluated. In this way, the economic miracle provided the condition in 
which the political elite’s interest in history was revived. 
Secondly, the necessity to counter Western values changed the political 
elite’s indifferent attitude toward history. As mentioned above, soon after 
independence, the government made attempts to sever the links with ancestral 
homelands such as China and India. However, in the 1980s, the political elite in 
Singapore began to claim that it was the knowledge of their own cultural roots in 
China, India, Southeast Asia, and so forth that was an important key for nation-
building. 841 Such a reinterpretation of history occurred in close connection with 
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the interests of the political elite of the time. The prevalence of Western values 
among the young was problematised especially after the PAP’s by-election 
defeat in 1981. The political elite observed that one of the important factors of 
this defeat was the young citizens’ increasing critical attitude toward authorities 
and the growing preference for a Western-style democracy. To deal with such a 
situation, the PAP government began to promote cultural heritages from 
ancestral homelands, especially from China, and exploited a Chinese tradition of 
Confucianism under the name of ‘Asian Values’ in order to counter Western 
values. Now, the promotion of tracing back to ancestral traditions, such as a 
Confucian political culture based on a fiduciary relationship between the ruler 
and the ruled, was not a divisive but a ‘unifying’ factor between the state and 
people. 842 In this context, the political elite’s interest in history was revived, 
which led to the revision of the history syllabus in 1984. 
The resurgence of interest in history in the 1980s laid the groundwork for the 
government’s active transmission of the official portrait and message pertaining 
to the Second World War to Singaporean youth through various activities to 
commemorate the 50th anniversary of the war between 1991 and 1995. During 
this period, the Ministry of Information and the Arts, together with the National 
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Heritage Board, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Defence, and the 
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, held war exhibitions, 
developed national museums, erected war plaques, conducted history camps, 
and performed commemorative ceremonies. 
In these activities, the political elite intended to spread the message of ‘be 
prepared for war even in peacetime’ and highlighted a historical analysis that the 
British were easily defeated because of their unpreparedness for the Japanese 
invasion. In addition, they portrayed the Japanese Occupation as the starting 
point of a local nationalism, painted the period as that of ‘terror, fear, and 
atrocities’ and ‘bravery, patriotism, and sacrifice’, albeit such political intentions 
were not always exactly reflected in the war exhibitions. 
The portrait of ‘terror, fear, and atrocities’ highlighted people’s suffering 
under the Japanese rule and aimed to send the message that “[t]he suffering that 
the people went through during the Japanese Occupation also taught the people 
to see the need to get rid of their foreign masters.” 843 According to this official 
stance, the people’s suffering under the Japanese awakened their zeal for 
national independence. In other words, it was understood that a local nationalism 
had been born during the Japanese Occupation. To support this logic, the official 
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narrative stressed the common suffering of all ethnic groups despite the fact that 
different ethnic groups had responded to the Japanese Occupation differently.  
The second portrait of the occupation – bravery, patriotism, and sacrifice –
was manifested in the behaviour and actions of local war heroes such as Lim Bo 
Seng and Adnan Saidi. Both of them were portrayed in history textbooks as 
showing brave resistance against the Japanese; both of them sacrificed their lives, 
were painted as staunch patriots, and were celebrated as models for the young 
people to emulate. The political elite intended to spread such a portrait of war 
heroes probably because they wanted to evoke the spirit of ‘bravery, patriotism, 
and sacrifice’ in young Singaporeans who would then fiercely defend Singapore 
when a crisis comes. Here, can we find the message intended to be spread to 
Singapore youth: ‘don’t forget to fight for Singapore; be prepared for war even 
in peacetime.’ 
The driving force of the dissemination of such portraits and message through 
the state-led programmes was created from the interplay between contextual and 
structural factors. Firstly, the political elite were concerned about the danger that 
the end of the Cold War would make more Singaporeans complacent in defence. 
For instance, Lee Boon Yang, Second Minister of Defence, expressed his 
concern as follows: 
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The problem is that with each passing year and the absence of threat some 
Singaporeans may begin to feel complacent … Despite the absence of visible 
danger, the end of the Cold War has not guaranteed peace at all … We must 
maintain a strong SAF and be committed to the security of our nation at all times. 
National service will continue to serve as the bedrock of our defence force and our 
efforts to build a nation. 844    
 
Under such circumstances, instead of the communist threat, the lesson of the war 
– the British were defeated due to their unpreparedness – was used as a new 
theory to justify Singapore’s burdensome defence policies. Low Seow Chay, MP 
for Choa Chu Kang, succinctly stated the purpose of the state-led 
commemoration: “In peacetime, some people may complain about National 
Service and reservist trainings. These commemorative plaques of the Second 
World War will remind them of the importance of National Service and Total 
Defence.” 845 
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Secondly, there is a structural factor that drives the nation-state to inculcate 
national identity and patriotism in people through various means such as history 
education and war commemoration; that is the nation-state system. As argued 
above, the contextual factor (the political elite’s concerns about Singaporean 
youth’s complacency in defence) was the important driving force to launch the 
state-led commemoration programmes that aimed to spread the message of the 
importance of independence, defence, and patriotism. However, such an effort 
was not necessary if the basic nature of the international system were not 
anarchy and war were not accepted as a method of conflict resolution. In other 
words, due to such a structure of the international system each nation-state 
needed to maintain substantial defence forces and foster patriotism. This may be 
a taken-for-granted factor but such a structural factor tends to be overlooked 
when we examine the state-led war commemorations and history education 
conducted across the world. It was in such an international structure that the 
Singapore government used the opportunity of the 50th anniversary to convince 
the people of the necessity of strong defence and patriotism even after the end of 
the Cold War. 
Lastly, there is another structural factor: a mechanism that nation-states unite 
people. The nation-state binds people by inculcating national identity and 
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patriotism in the minds of them. Conversely speaking, if a people lose their 
national identity and do not perceive themselves to be members of the nation, 
the nation may be broken apart. To avoid such a situation, nation-states need to 
continuously inculcate national identity and patriotism, and this structure was an 
important factor for the Singapore government to launch the state-led 
commemoration programmes, one of whose purposes was nation-building. 
Due to the above two structural factors, a nation-state always needs to 
inculcate national identity and patriotism in the minds of people. Within this 
structure, contextual factors, such as the present interests and aspirations of the 
political elite, affect the ways in which the inculcation is conducted and how a 
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